Poder vs proceso

para Diego Fernandez de Cevallos

por Luis Rubio

La crisis económica de los últimos años difícilmente pudo haber llegado en un momento más ominoso para el viejo orden internacional. Las instituciones, prácticas y relaciones de poder que surgieron con el final de la segunda guerra mundial y los acuerdos tomados en Bretton Woods colocaron a EUA en el centro del mundo y a las instituciones que normarían el funcionamiento de los mercados, el comercio y las transacciones financieras como el corazón de la interacción internacional. Sesenta años después las cosas se ven muy distintas. China se ha convertido en un formidable actor internacional, la economía de los llamados países emergentes ha cobrado una importancia inusitada y la mayoría de los desarrollados está en crisis. La vieja pirámide se ha invertido, alterando la realidad política internacional.

Ian Bremmer, autor de El fin del mercado, título un tanto exagerado dado su contenido, dice que el gran cambio se originó en la nueva correlación de fuerzas entre las naciones del orbe, pero responde más que nada a lo que el autor denomina “capitalismo de Estado”. Según Bremmer, un conjunto de países, la mayoría con gobiernos autoritarios o autocráticos, se ha distanciado de las reglas del mercado en las últimas décadas esencialmente gracias a la activa promoción de sus empresas paraestatales, reglas del juego discriminatorias y fondos soberanos de inversión. Con estos instrumentos, han logrado trastocar las instituciones que modularon las relaciones comerciales y de inversión a partir de los cincuenta y amenazan el funcionamiento del orden económico existente. Algunas de estas naciones, notablemente China, se han distinguido por la forma en que han conducido a sus economías y logrado elevadas tasas de crecimiento económico, en tanto que otras han logrado su poderío gracias a la posesión de amplios yacimientos petroleros, sobre todo Rusia y Arabia Saudita. El autor incluye a naciones tan diversas como Egipto, Brasil, India, Ucrania y Argelia en su argumentación, a lo largo de la cual trata de probar que el mercado ha funcionado muy bien y que el orden internacional corre el riesgo de colapsarse en los años por venir.

La verdadera tesis del libro es que el balance de poder a nivel internacional ha cambiado, que EUA ya no representa el poderío de antaño y que hay otras naciones, particularmente China, que se sienten con el mismo derecho de definir la forma en que debe administrarse la actividad económica. Es decir, que la antigua hegemonía estadounidense se ha venido abajo y que los valores que ese país promovía en la forma de economía de mercado y democracia han perdido legitimidad. La tesis no es novedosa pero no por eso deja de ser relevante.

Si uno analiza el argumento con detenimiento, la verdad es que la contraposición de posturas es interesante pero no siempre veraz. La operación eficiente de una economía no es algo fácil de lograr. Crear instituciones y reglas del juego eficaces para una economía de mercado requiere no sólo convicción sino también un gobierno capaz de hacerlas funcionar y eso, como hemos podido ver en México en los últimos años, no siempre ocurre. En adición a lo anterior, la democracia, complemento necesario de una economía de mercado, requiere en sí misma instituciones e incentivos que la hagan operar. En ausencia de éstos no es posible esperar que así funcione y que los actores políticos se comporten de acuerdo a sus reglas.

En adición a lo anterior, muchas naciones ni siquiera han pretendido construir una economía de mercado o un sistema político democrático. El grupo de naciones que cita el autor difícilmente se ha distinguido por sus intentos de construir una democracia funcional y, cuando lo intentaron, como en el caso de Rusia, el experimento duró apenas unos cuantos años. Es en este sentido que la verdadera tesis del libro resulta relevante porque entraña enseñanzas y consecuencias que no debemos ignorar.

Lo inusitado del ascenso de naciones como China en el concierto internacional no reside en el hecho mismo, pues la historia del mundo se ha caracterizado por transiciones de potencias una y otra vez. Lo interesante del ascenso chino es que se trata de una nación enorme con un gobierno centralizado y con visión estratégica que tiene la capacidad de trastocar no sólo el balance de poder internacional sino la forma misma en que funciona el planeta en ámbitos que van desde la economía hasta la forma de vivir. Otras naciones igualmente grandes, o más, como India quizá acaben teniendo un menor impacto porque se caracterizan por una estructura de poder interno más difusa, independientemente de que tengan la posibilidad de acabar siendo mucho más ricas. Además, y quizá más importante, el gran tema es menos quien asciende y quien desciende que cómo se da la interacción entre las naciones más poderosas.

China y EUA han tenido muchos años de cooperación pero en los últimos tiempos parecen estar avanzando hacia una ruta de colisión. Cuando uno escucha a los funcionarios chinos, el mensaje claro y llano es que no buscan una colisión sino, más bien, una ruta más equitativa en la definición de los principales temas que aquejan y caracterizan al mundo. China, nación orgullosa que se siente con derecho, no ve razón alguna por la cual tenga que sujetarse a las reglas del juego que estableció EUA como potencia dominante hace sesenta años o que su evolución interna, económica y política, tenga que asemejarse a la que se ha supuesto en el mundo occidental.

Por décadas, desde que China se reintegró al mundo y comenzó su apertura económica, la presunción en EUA era que el crecimiento de la economía llevaría a demandas de participación política lo que, a su vez, transformaría a esa nación en una democracia. Ese escenario puede seguir siendo posible, pero al día de hoy no cabe duda que el sistema político centralizado que funciona en torno al Partido Comunista retiene el poder político. Hasta ahora, China ha logrado eso en buena medida gracias a su obsesión por mantener elevados niveles de crecimiento económico y su disposición a cambiar lo que sea necesario, reformar cualquier estructura o institución, con tal de lograr el crecimiento. Esa estrategia, que contrasta dramáticamente con la de nuestros políticos y gobernantes, ha mantenido satisfecha a la población de esa nación.

El actual equilibrio de poder en China y entre China y el resto del mundo dependerá en buena medida de la forma en que EUA negocie y satisfaga a aquel gobierno o lo confronte y amenace. Cualquiera que sea la forma, lo que es indudable es que, como dijo Napoleón, una vez que despertó el gigante asiático, todo será diferente.

Frase do Dia - O mercado  rege-se por critérios de eficiência e de rentabilidade, não de justiça ou de equidade. É um soberbo órgão de criação de riqueza, mas não um mecanismo competente de distribuição de rendimentos.

José Guilherme Merquior

Reestruturação da rede de embaixadas, missões e consulados 

 A generalidade das pessoas sabe que está em curso no MNE uma reestruturação da rede diplomática e consular, para que as Necessidades possam fazer face ao corte drástico de 8% do respectivo orçamento. Todos especulam sobre o sentido exacto dessa reformulação da dita rede, que incidirá, principalmente, numa redução da “network” europeia, compensando-a com abertura de alguns postos (muito poucos) no Médio Oriente e África,  mas, a meu ver, esquecem algumas questões essenciais.

Antes do mais, o MNE, atenta a dimensão e a importância do país que temos (que é este e não outro qualquer), deve pensar em termos estratégicos e de longo prazo e não apenas  em implementar medidas avulsas e em cima do joelho que  constituem  meros paliativos para um problema de fundo que não tem verdadeira solução  nesse âmbito, ou seja com medidas conjunturais com aplicação, no curto e médio prazos.

A redução dos postos diplomáticos na Europa, que, tudo leva a crer, incidirá  principalmente nos pequenos países da U.E., aliás já em curso, suscita-nos problemas de difícil superação. Será possível que na Europa a 27, vamos apenas ter representação diplomática em 20 ou 21 Estados-membros? Nos países bálticos, a Letónia já se encontra desactivada, seguir-se-ão a curto prazo a Lituânia e depois a Estónia. Numa segunda fase, seguem-se a Eslovénia, Chipre e Malta. Todas estas embaixadas foram abertas há muito poucos anos e quase todas tiveram apenas um único Chefe de Missão (excepto, Malta). A prazo, presumivelmente, seguir-se-á a Eslováquia e outras, quem sabe? A instalação de todos estes postos foi obviamente cara (abstenho-me de superlativos), a respectiva desinstalação será caríssima (indemnizações ao pessoal local, fecho de contratos de arrendamento de chancelarias e de residências e questões conexas) e processar-se-á ao longo do tempo, via de regra dilatado. Logo, a poupança não será imediata, só sendo sensível ao fim de dois ou três anos. Ora, se a situação do país não permite, na presente conjuntura, manter estes postos será que há poucos anos atrás permitia abri-los? Vivíamos então numa situação folgada?  Responda quem souber. Fechando os postos neste preciso momento quando é que veremos resultados reais, em 2012 ou 2013?

Perante o encerramento de embaixadas em países da Europa comunitária, por alegadas razões financeiras, é natural que sejamos pagos exactamente na mesma moeda, aplicando os nossos parceiros a regra da reciprocidade. Por conseguinte, ora agora fechas tu e a seguir fecho eu. A medida não é amistosa, longe disso.

Bom, mas o que é que isso nos importa? Muito. Em primeiro lugar, o voto da Letónia ou da Eslovénia no Conselho Europeu valem tanto como os de Portugal ou da Alemanha. Em segundo lugar, uma missão diplomática num outro país comunitário é uma “antena” dos nossos interesses nesse pais. Podemos, conhecendo a situação no terreno e auscultando os interlocutores certos, antecipar posições e prever cenários, em todos os sectores de governação (relações externas, economia e finanças, agricultura e pescas, telecomunicações, transportes, obras públicas, comércio externo, administração interna, defesa, saúde, justiça, cultura, trabalho, etc. ) cujos interesses para Portugal são manifestos e carecem de demonstração. Em terceiro lugar, estamos a fechar embaixadas em países europeus não só estados-membros da U.E., mas a maior parte deles, também estados-membros da NATO

Resumindo e concluindo, Portugal pode-se dar ao luxo de fechar essas missões perdendo informação, margem de manobra, capacidade de previsão, gerando anti-corpos, efectuando falsas poupanças, ou poupanças dilatadas no tempo, sem resultados visíveis?

E fechamos para quê? Para reabrir daqui a dois ou três anos?

Atentemos no que se passou quando do encerramento de algumas embaixadas em África: Windhoek (Namíbia), Abidjan (Costa do Marfim) e Lusaka (Zâmbia). Portugal, o país com sólidas raízes africanas, o grande organizador de cimeiras entre a Europa e a África, a referência em termos de cooperação para o desenvolvimento, blá-blá, mais blá-blá e ainda blá-blá. Saiu bastante oneroso o exercício, do qual não saímos prestigiados, perdendo alguns pontos na África Ocidental, Central e Austral, mas as poupanças foram epidérmicas, nem se notaram no cômputo geral,  ou seja não ganhámos quase nada com o quiosque.

Mas, agora há mais: fecha-se na Europa, aos bochechos, para se abrir nos Emiratos, possivelmente no Kuwait e, segundo me dizem, também na Namíbia (Então porque é que se encerrou há uns anos? Estamos a brincar, ou o que é isto? Abre-se, fecha-se, reabre-se para se voltar a fechar?).

Vejamos se há uma falsa poupança com o encerramento, criam-se novos encargos com uma abertura e uma reabertura. Em suma, não se poupa coisa alguma, ou muito pouco.

Como é que se podia poupar?

Da seguinte forma:

(a) Colocando encarregados de negócios com cartas de gabinete em todos os postos europeus que se pensou encerrar, ocupando aqueles as casas dos chefes de missão, não beneficiando, pois, do subsídio de residência;

(b) Optar durante todo o ano de 2011 pelas encarregaturas de negócios, em todos os casos de vacatura de postos;

(c)  Congelando, a título excepcional, todo e qualquer  movimento diplomático, excepto em casos de força maior devidamente justificados;

(d) Não reabrindo ou abrindo nenhum posto (para os Emiratos, por ora, bastará enviar um delegado do AICEP e, no Kuwait, a ser verdade que estão a pensar em abrir, adia-se para as calendas gregas).

(e) Não admitindo mais funcionários locais, em nenhuma circunstância e não substituindo os que entretanto forem atingindo a idade de aposentação.

(f)  Cortando cerce, em percentagem tida por adequada, todas as despesas do Orçamento de Funcionamento dos Postos

Estas medidas, acompanhadas eventualmente de outras,  resultariam numa poupança real e consistente.

É claro que temos o Ministério entregue a um mentecapto, com um quociente de inteligência rudimentar, cujo discurso redondo e oco não convence ninguém, nem a ele próprio (cada vez que fala ou nós, atentos, veneradores e obrigados abrimos a boca de enfado ou espantamo-nos, com as grossíssimas asneiras que dali ecoam, pondo tudo em reboliço, sem razão aparente –no fundo,  “much ado about nothing”).  Valha-nos Santa Engrácia!

Como é que esta aventesma, com tão poucos méritos, consegue subir tanto nas quotas de popularidade do povão? Mistérios insondáveis!  

Guiné-Bissau: Acordo secreto permite a libertação de Zamora

Segundo a PNN (Portuguese News Network), a libertação de Zamora Induta, confirmada na véspera de Natal, acontece três meses depois do Tribunal Militar de Bissau ter decidido pela ilegalidade da detenção do ex-CEMGFA. Zamora, detido desde as movimentações militares de 01 de Abril, prepara agora em liberdade a sua defesa das acusações feitas pelo líder dos revoltosos de Abril, António Indjai, que o implicam nos casos das mortes de 2009.

Na altura da decisão do Tribunal Militar, as chefias militares e o próprio Presidente Malam Bacai Sanhá terão recuado uma vez que consideraram não estarem reunidas as condições de segurança que permitissem a libertação de Zamora Induta. No entanto, durante a noite de 24, a residência de Zamora Induta manteve-se sem qualquer aparato de segurança policial correndo em Bissau rumores de que esta libertação «era uma armadilha».

Para além das conhecidas dissenções, aliás, públicas, entre o Primeiro-Ministro Carlos Domingos Gomes e o Presidente da República Malan Bacai Sanhá e da ascensão ao mando das FA's de conhecidos traficantes de droga com são os casos de Bubo Na Tchuto  e de António Indjai, em que o segundo libertou o primeiro que se encontrava preso, a libertação, agora, da José Zamora Induta, detido há largos meses sem mandato nem processo judicial instaurado vem lançar mais uma confusão no conturbado panorama  da Guiné-Bissau. Zamora foi um dos últimos chefes militares do conflito armado de 1998-99, ainda vivos e no activo  e, além disso, é oficialmente, CEMGFA, porque nunca foi demitido das suas funções.

Tudo leva a crer que terá havido um acordo secreto entre Malan Bacai Sanhá e o PM para que o Chefe de Estado mantenha algum controlo sobre a segurança interna (Ministério do Interior) a troco da libertação de Zamora Induta, uma questão vital para os interesses do Presidente da República. 

Isto é feito porque Zamora  não disporia de qualquer poder efectivo sobre as Foças Armadas efectivamente controladas por Bubo Na Tchuto e por António Indjai. Logo a sua libertação não iria provocar qualquer manobra de desestabilização que pusesse em perigo  o status quo existente. Consequentemente, o narco-tráfico pode continuar para benefício da economia guineense e de uns tantos em Bissau. Valha-nos, Deus!

Malan libertou ainda mais uns tantos militares envolvidos nos atentados de 2009, entre eles Manuel Mina. Trata-se pois de um acordo político para conseguir a paz no país e para que os negócios se processem sem problemas de maior. 

Amílcar Cabral deve dar voltas na tumba. 

Quo vadis Europa (parte tantas de não sei quantas)? - brevíssimos comentários -

 O estudo da Stratfor  é omisso quanto ao impacto estrutural dos CDS (Credit default swaps), a nível europeu e global.

A geografia, ou seja os rios, as planícies, os climas, etc. justificam, de facto, diferenças entre as economias da união e, deste modo, os PIGS deveriam pagar 4/5% e não os 2% da Alemanha, mas se vão pagar 10%, isso  já nada tem a ver com questões estruturais de competitividade mas, sim, com puros movimentos especulativos.

Nesta conformidade, a análise serve para explicar 40% do problema, mas não o explica na íntegra. De facto,  os países meridionais têm que ter mais cabeça. A Alemanha protege legitimamente os seus interesses egoístas, como aliás todos o fazem (o problema é que quem lidera tem responsabilidades acrescidas), e à falta de melhor sistema (tudo isto deveria, obviamente, ser repensado e redesenhado) acabamos por seguir a Alemanha porque é a única que se encontra em condições de impor regras aos demais. Não nos encontramos perante a situação ideal, longe disso, talvez esta peque por ser intrinsecamente injusta, mas num exercício mental de prós e contras acabamos por aceitar o status quo porque a alternativa é pior.

Agora os restantes 60%  explicam-se porque a interligacao das economias e a desregulamentacao dos mercados permite que o círculo restrito, mas com peso, da alta finança de Nova Iorque  ganhe muito à custa de muitos. É claro que questionar o capitalismo - para os seus defensores, um sistema que se auto-regenera e que se auto-regula - constitui  uma heresia para a Stratfor, que faz parte do grupo. Assim sendo, o capitalismo gera o ponto mais eficiente e esse deve consistir  no ponto de partida. Em seguida, a sociedade deve escolher se quer sacrificar a eficiência (output) para ter mais equidade. Quando poucos ganham muito e muitos perdem pouco a decisão acaba sempre por favorecer os primeiros que são os únicos com incentivo para se mobilizarem/lobbiarem.  E os factos provam-no: crise após crise, no seguimento  das consequentes cimeiras e reuniões do G20, os poucos que ganham muito continuam alegremente a brincar aos CDS e equiparados. Ponham-se restrições aos derivados e demais produtos tóxicos e o problema não teria, seguramente, estas dimensões, talvez fosse 60% mais pequeno ...

Subsídios de representação 

O MNE não devia ser como é uma coutada de um número restritíssimo de senhores. No caso dos abonos de representação, congeminados numa fase inicial, como uma distribuição mais equitativa do "bolo", de acordo com as condições de vida de cada local de afectação e da posição hierárquica de cada funcionário, foram rapidamente desvirtuados por todos os malfeitores e mafiosos que passaram pelo 4º andar e que  obtiveram o aval para as suas actividades menos transparentes e - porque não dizê-lo - criminosas por parte do Poder político. Até porque alguns estavam interessados em postos financeiramente apetecíveis, contando sempre "with a little help from my friends". E mais não digo... Será compreensível que um diplomata em Madrid ganhe em subsídio de representação entre 13 a 14.000 Euros e quem esteja  na Índia se fique pelos 7/8.000? Será que o custo de vida comparado entre esses dois países nos leva a essas disparidades ou é obra desse grupo de  bandoleiros de meia-tijela? Nunca se quis pensar a sério num sistema equilibrado e justo das representações. Foi um fartar vilanagem para alguns e os outros que vão para.... Os ministros nunca se preocuparam a sério com esta questão que é verdadeiramente central, mas que lhes passou ao largo.
Depois há que ver se o sistema é de facto equitativo.
Em seguida, há que saber-se porque querem os diplomatas isenção do pagamento de IRS e de descontos para a CGA relativos ao valor da representação? Não será estupidez, que se esconde por detrás de uma chico-espertice de resultados duvidosos? Se descontarem uma boa maquia para a SS, também auferirão, mais tarde, uma choruda aposentação? Por outro, será justo não se pagarem impostos sobre essas quantias astronómicas a que o comum dos cidadãos não tem acesso - uma representação mensal em Madrid, por exemplo, equivale a várias vezes uma pensão anual de mera subsistência, ao dobro do salário mínimo anual e, pelo menos,  a um salário médio anual?
Será justo? Está correcto?
Quem é que desvirtuou tudo isto?
Não se aperta o cinto diplomático ou apertar é só para o povão?
Faça-se justiça.      

Quo vadis Europa (parte não sei quantas)? O texto que se segue peca por ser extenso, mas é de uma enorme  relevância. Existem pontos com os quais não estou de acordo e  presumivelmente muitos dos meus leitores também não.   Em próximos posts irei rebater os pontos sobe os quais manifesto  a minha discordância, mas entretanto para vossa leitura e apreciação, com a devida vénia, segue o que foi publicado  na Stratfor

Europe: The New Plan December 21, 2010 By Peter Zeihan Europe is on the cusp of change. An EU heads-of-state summit Dec. 16 launched a process aimed to save the common European currency. If successful, this process would be the most significant step toward creating a singular European power since the creation of the European Union itself in 1992— that is, if it doesn’t destroy the euro first. Envisioned by the EU Treaty on Monetary Union, the common currency, the euro, has suffered from two core problems during its decade-long existence: the lack of a parallel political union and the issue of debt. Many in the financial world believe that what is required for a viable currency is a fiscal union that has taxation power — and that is indeed needed. But that misses the larger point of who would be in charge of the fiscal union. Taxation and appropriation — who pays how much to whom — are essentially political acts. One cannot have a centralized fiscal authority without first having a centralized political/military authority capable of imposing and enforcing its will. Greeks are not going to implement a German-designed tax and appropriations system simply because Berlin thinks it’s a good idea. As much as financiers might like to believe, the checkbook is not the ultimate power in the galaxy. The ultimate power comes from the law backed by a gun. Europe’s Disparate Parts This isn’t a revolutionary concept — in fact, it is one most people know well at some level. Americans fought the bloodiest war in their history from 1861 to 1865 over the issue of central power versus local power. What emerged was a state capable of functioning at the international level. It took three similar European wars — also in the 19th century — for the dozens of German principalities finally to merge into what we now know as Germany. Europe simply isn’t to the point of willing conglomeration just yet, and we do not use the American Civil War or German unification wars as comparisons lightly. STRATFOR sees the peacetime creation of a unified European political authority as impossible, since Europe’s component parts are far more varied than those of mid-19th century America or Germany. Northern Europe is composed of advanced technocratic economies, made possible by the capital-generating capacity of the well-watered North European Plain and its many navigable rivers (it is much cheaper to move goods via water than land, and this advantage grants nations situated on such waterways a steady supply of surplus capital). As a rule, northern Europe prefers a strong currency in order to attract investment to underwrite the high costs of advanced education, first-world infrastructure and a highly technical industrial plant. Thus, northern European exports — heavily value added — are not inhibited greatly by a strong currency. One of the many outcomes of this development pattern is a people that identifies with its brethren throughout the river valleys and in other areas linked by what is typically omnipresent infrastructure. This crafts a firm identity at the national level rather than local level and assists with mass-mobilization strategies. Consequently, size is everything. Southern Europe, in comparison, suffers from an arid, rugged topography and lack of navigable rivers. This lack of rivers does more than deny them a local capital base, it also inhibits political unification; lacking clear core regions, most of these states face the political problems of the European Union in microcosm. Here, identity is more localized; southern Europeans tend to be more concerned with family and town than nation, since they do not benefit from easy transport options or the regular contact that northern Europeans take for granted. Their economies reflect this, with integration occurring only locally (there is but one southern European equivalent of the great northern industrial mega-regions such as the Rhine, Italy’s Po Valley). Bereft of economies of scale, southern European economies are highly dependent upon a weak currency to make their exports competitive abroad and to make every incoming investment dollar or deutschemark work to maximum effect. Central Europe — largely former Soviet territories — have yet different rules of behavior. Some countries, like Poland, fit in well with the northern Europeans, but they require outside defense support in order to maintain their positions. The frigid weather of the Baltics limits population sizes, demoting these countries to being, at best, the economic satellites of larger powers (they’re hoping for Sweden while fearing it will be Russia). Bulgaria and Romania are a mix of north and south, sitting astride Europe’s longest navigable river yet being so far removed from the European core that their successful development may depend upon events in Turkey, a state that is not even an EU member. While states of this grouping often plan together for EU summits, in reality the only thing they have in common is a half-century of lost ground to recover, and they need as much capital as can be made available. As such variation might suggest, some of these states are in the eurozone, while others are unlikely to join within the next decade. And that doesn’t even begin to include the EU states that have actively chosen to refuse the euro — Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom — or consider the fact that the European Union is now made up of 27 different nationalities that jealously guard their political (and in most cases, fiscal) autonomy. The point is this: With Europe having such varied geographies, economies and political systems, any political and fiscal union would be fraught with complications and policy mis-prescriptions from the start. In short, this is a defect of the euro that is not going to be corrected, and to be blunt, it isn’t one that the Europeans are trying to fix right now. The Debt Problem If anything, they are attempting to craft a work-around by addressing the second problem: debt. Monetary union means that all participating states are subject to the dictates of a single central bank, in this case the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt. The ECB’s primary (and only partially stated) mission is to foster long-term stable growth in the eurozone’s largest economy — Germany — working from the theory that what is good for the continent’s economic engine is good for Europe. One impact of this commitment is that Germany’s low interest rates are applied throughout the currency zone, even to states with mediocre income levels, lower educational standards, poorer infrastructure and little prospect for long-term growth. Following their entry into the eurozone, capital-starved southern Europeans used to interest rates in the 10-15 percent range found themselves in an environment of rates in the 2-5 percent range (currently it is 1.0 percent). To translate that into a readily identifiable benefit, that equates to a reduction in monthly payments for a standard 30-year mortgage of more than 60 percent. As the theory goes, the lower costs of capital will stimulate development in the peripheral states and allow them to catch up to Germany. But these countries traditionally suffer from higher interest rates for good reasons. Smaller, poorer economies are more volatile, since even tiny changes in the international environment can send them through either the floor or the roof. Higher risks and volatility mean higher capital costs. Their regionalization also engenders high government spending as the central government attempts to curb the propensity of the regions to spin away from the center (essentially, the center bribes the regions to remain in the state). This means that when the eurozone spread to these places, theory went out the window. In practice, growth in the periphery did accelerate, but that growth was neither smooth nor sustainable. The unification of capital costs has proved more akin to giving an American Express black card to a college freshman: Traditionally capital poor states (and citizens) have a propensity to overspend in situations where borrowing costs are low, due to a lack of a relevant frame of reference. The result has been massive credit binging by corporations, consumers and governments alike, inevitably leading to bubbles in a variety of sectors. And just as these states soared high in the first decade after the euro was introduced, they have crashed low in the past year. The debt crises of 2010 — so far precipitating government debt bailouts for Ireland and Greece and an unprecedented bank bailout in Ireland — can be laid at the feet of this euro-instigated over-exuberance. It is this second, debt-driven shortcoming that European leaders discussed Dec. 16. None of them want to do away with the euro at this point, and it is easy to see why. While the common currency remains a popular whipping boy in domestic politics, its benefits — mainly lower transaction costs, higher purchasing power, unfettered market access and cheaper and more abundant capital — are deeply valued by all participating governments. The question is not “whither the euro” but how to provide a safety net for the euro’s less desirable, debt-related aftereffects. The agreed-upon path is to create a Itália,  that can manage a bailout even for the eurozone’s larger economies when their debt mountains become too imposing. In theory, this would contain the contradictory pressures the euro has created while still providing to the entire zone the euro’s many benefits. Obstacles to the Safety Net Three complications exist, however. First, when a bailout is required, it is clearly because something has gone terribly wrong. In Greece’s case, it was out-of-control government spending with no thought to the future; in essence, Athens took that black card and leapt straight into the economic abyss. In Ireland’s case, it was private-sector overindulgence, which bubbled the size of the financial sector to more than four times the entire country’s gross domestic product. In both cases, recovery was flat-out impossible without the countries’ eurozone partners stepping in and declaring some sort of debt holiday, and the result was a complete funding of all Greek and Irish deficit spending for three years while they get their houses in order. “Houses in order” are the key words here. When the not-so-desperate eurozone states step in with a few billion euros — 223 billion euros so far, to be exact — they want not only their money back but also some assurance that such overindulgences will not happen again. The result is a deep series of policy requirements that must be adopted if the bailout money is to be made available. Broadly known as austerity measures, these requirements result in deep cuts to social services, retirement benefits and salaries. They are not pleasant. Put simply: Germany is attempting to trade financial benefits for the right to make policy adjustments that normally would be handed by a political union. (click here to enlarge image) It’s a pretty slick plan, but it is not happening in a vacuum. Remember, there are two more complications. The second is that the Dec. 16 agreement is only an agreement in principle. Before any Champagne corks are popped, one should consider that the “details” of the agreement raise a more than “simply” trillion-euro question. STRATFOR guesses that to deliver on its promises, the permanent bailout fund (right now there is a temporary fund with a “mere” 750 billion euros) probably would need upwards of three trillion euros. Why so much? The debt bailouts for Greece and Ireland were designed to completely sequester those states from debt markets by providing those governments with all of the cash they would need to fund their budgets for three years. This wise move has helped keep the contagion from spreading to the rest of the eurozone. Making any fund credible means applying that precedent to all the eurozone states facing high debt pressures, and using the most current data available, that puts the price tag at just under 2.2 trillion euros. Add in enough extra so that the eurozone has sufficient ammo left to fight any contagion and we’re looking at a cool 3 trillion euros. Anti-crisis measures to this point have enjoyed the assistance of both the ECB and the International Monetary Fund, but so far, the headline figures have been rather restrained when compared to future needs. Needless to say, the process of coming up with funds of that magnitude when it is becoming obvious to the rest of Europe that this is, at its heart, a German power play is apt to be contentious at best. The third complication is that the bailout mechanism is actually only half the plan. The other half is to allow states to at least partially default on their debt (in EU diplomatic parlance, this is called the “inclusion of private interests in funding the bailouts”). When the investors who fund eurozone sovereign debt markets hear this, they understandably shudder, since it means the European Union plans to codify giving states permission to walk away from their debts — sticking investors with the losses. This too is more than simply a trillion-euro question. Private investors collectively own nearly all of the eurozone’s 7.5 trillion euros in outstanding sovereign debt. And in the case of Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece, debt volumes worth half or more of GDP for each individual state are held by foreigners. Assuming investors decide it is worth the risk to keep purchasing government debt, they have but one way to mitigate this risk: charge higher premiums. The result will be higher debt financing costs for all, doubly so for the eurozone’s more spendthrift and/or weaker economies. For most of the euro’s era, the interest rates on government bonds have been the same throughout the eurozone, based on the inaccurate belief that eurozone states would all be as fiscally conservative and economically sound as Germany. That belief has now been shattered, and the rate on Greek and Irish debt has now risen from 4.5 percent in early 2008 to this week’s 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. With a formal default policy in the making, those rates are going to go higher yet. In the era before monetary union became the Europeans’ goal, Greek and Irish government debt regularly went for 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Continued euro membership may well put a bit of downward pressure on these rates, but that will be more than overwhelmed by the fact that both countries are, in essence, in financial conservatorship. (click here to enlarge image) That is not just a problem for the post-2013 world, however. Because investors now know the European Union intends to stick them with at least part of the bill, they are going to demand higher returns as details of the default plan are made known, both on any new debt and on any pre-existing debt that comes up for refinancing. This means that states that just squeaked by in 2010 must run a more difficult gauntlet in 2011 — particularly if they depend heavily on foreign investors for funding their budget deficits. All will face higher financing and refinancing costs as investors react to the coming European disclosures on just how much the private sector will be expected to contribute. Leaving out the two states that have already received bailouts (Greece and Ireland), the four eurozone states STRATFOR figures face the most trouble — Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Austria, in that order — plan to raise or refinance a quarter trillion euros in 2011 alone. Italy and France, two heavyweights not that far from the danger zone, plan to raise another half-trillion euros between them. If the past is any guide, the weaker members of this quartet could face financing costs of double what they’ve faced as recently as early 2008. For some of these states, such higher costs could be enough to push them into the bailout bin even if there is no additional investor skittishness. The existing bailout mechanism probably can handle the first four states (just barely, and assuming it works as advertised), but beyond that, the rest of the eurozone will have to come up with a multitrillion-euro fund in an environment in which private investors are likely to balk. Undoubtedly, the euro needs a new mechanism to survive. But by coming up with one that scares those who make government deficit-spending possible, the Europeans have all but guaranteed that Europe’s financial crisis will get much worse before it begins to improve. But let’s assume for a moment that this all works out, that the euro survives to the day that the new mechanism will be in place to support it. Consider what such a 2013 eurozone would look like if the rough design agreed to Dec. 16 becomes a reality. All of the states flirting with bailouts as 2010 draws to a close expect to have even higher debt loads two years from now. Hence, investors will have imposed punishing financing costs on all of them. Alone among the major eurozone countries not facing such costs will be Germany, the country that wrote the bailout rules and is indirectly responsible for managing the bailouts enacted to this point. Berlin will command the purse strings and the financial rules, yet be unfettered by those rules or the higher financing costs that go with them. Such control isn’t quite a political union, but so long as the rest of the eurozone is willing to trade financial sovereignty for the benefits of the euro, it is certainly the next best thing. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Frase do dia

"La esclavitud es hija de las tinieblas; un Pueblo ignorante es instrumento ciego de su propia destrucción"

SIMON BOLIVAR

Novos rumos? Previsões?

É fácil constatar pela leitura e análise atenta do mapa supra, que o Japão e os EUA pretendem fechar  o acesso da China ao mar aberto (Oceano Pacífico).

Historicamente, a China nunca foi uma potência marítima de relevo e antes que tenha veleidades de o vir a ser, o Japão, com apoio de Washington, pode aspirar a tornar-se na próxima grande potência marítima da zona e uma âncora para os interesses globais dos norte-americanos, na região Ásia-Pacífico.

Por outro lado e num outro cenário a uns milhares de quilómetros de distância, com ou sem o aval da Casa Branca, e independentemente do que possam pensar os russos, a Alemanha, mais uma vez, vai-se rearmar e afirmar-se como uma grande potência continental. Aliás, economicamente a Federação Russa vai encontrar-se numa relação de dependência em relação à RFA, uma vez que os interesses de uma e de outra são complementares e Moscovo encontra-se numa posição de subalternidade.

É por demais óbvio que a corrida armamentista, que já se configura na linha do horizonte, vai  infelizmente  traduzir-se em desenvolvimento, o que não só é enganoso, mas altamente perigoso.

Finalmente,  a França irá presumivelmente vender o seu armamento à China, completando o quadro. 

Alea jacta est!

TRABALHADORES DOS CONSULADOS E MISSÕES DIPLOMÁTICAS A SAGA CONTINUA

Londres, Reino Unido 16/12/2010 12:14 (LUSA)
Temas: Trabalho, Conflitos laborais, Política, Sociedade
Consulados: Trabalhadores em Londres dizem-se “abusados” após desconto inesperado de IRS
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Londres, 16 dez (Lusa) - Uma trabalhadora do consulado de Londres passou a dormir nos sofás de amigos e a embaixada de Londres ficou sem cozinheiro por causa da redução no salário após o desconto inesperado do IRS.
“Sentimo-nos abusados e ignorados”, queixaram-se alguns funcionários à Agência Lusa.
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A situação foi desencadeada após a Direção Geral dos Impostos (DGCI) ter decretado que, a partir de junho, os funcionários contratados para as missões diplomáticas no Reino Unido deveriam pagar imposto sobre os rendimentos.
Estes pensaram estar isentos por nunca ter sido descontado IRS desde a assinatura dos contratos, alguns dos quais em 2008.
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Agora confrontam-se com uma redução de 21,5 por cento no ordenado.
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“Tenho de me ir embora porque assim não é possível viver”, lamentou uma funcionária, que quis manter o anonimato, à Agência Lusa.
O elevado nível de vida na capital britânica foi o motivo invocado nomeadamente pelo cozinheiro da embaixada para demitir-se há cerca de três meses.
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A situação afeta, pelo menos, seis dos 13 trabalhadores do consulado de Londres e cerca de oito da embaixada, o que motivou reclamações.
Também o anterior embaixador, António Santana Carlos, que deixou o posto no final de outubro por limite de idade, tentou interceder, mas em nenhum dos casos o MNE respondeu.
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Num parecer datado de maio, a DGCI sustenta a decisão na Convenção celebrada entre Portugal e o Reino Unido para evitar a dupla tributação.
“É legal, mas não é ético”, condena o secretário-geral do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Consulares e das Missões Diplomáticas no Estrangeiro (STCDE), Jorge Veludo. Isto, explicou hoje à Agência Lusa, porque estes trabalhadores assinaram contratos pensando que estariam isentos deste encargo pois “era a prática na altura”.
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O dirigente sindical admite que ainda existem centenas de funcionários em consulados e embaixadas que não pagam IRS. A solução que o STCDE defende é uma “equiparação salarial” com os colegas que receberam uma compensação salarial em 2001 para passarem a pagar o imposto.
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Foi neste sentido que o STCDE iniciou há duas semanas uma ação no Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Lisboa contra o Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.
“Há pessoas com a mesma categoria, no mesmo posto e com o mesmo tipo e quantidade de trabalho a ganharem muito menos”, denuncia.
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É o que acontece em Londres, onde pessoas responsáveis pela emissão de documentos de identificação, vistos, registo civil ou cartório podem ganhar menos do que telefonistas. Os funcionários afetados não questionam a necessidade de pagar IRS, mas querem a restituição dos descontos feitos e um novo contrato que reveja o nível salarial.
Só em seis meses, estimam ter perdido cerca de 3 000 euros, “o que corresponde a quase três meses de trabalho”.
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O valor reclamado pelo STCDE, com efeitos a partir de 01 de Janeiro de 2009, para os cerca de 200 associados nesta situação ronda os seis milhões de euros.
Mas a fatura, avisou, pode ser maior se outros funcionários que não pertencem ao sindicato exigirem o mesmo.
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Questionado pela Lusa, o secretário de Estado das Comunidades, António Braga, referiu que “está a ser estudada uma fórmula para acomodar essas alterações de modo a diminuir o reflexo negativo no salário dos trabalhadores em causa”, mas não especificou quando essa situação poderá estar resolvida.
BM.
Lusa/Fim

Euro - a orquestra au grand complet ensaia o réquiem de Mozart

Podem limpar as mãos à parede com este aumento de fundos do BCE para “blindar o Euro”, através de um dito “Fundo de resgate” e, entretanto, emenda-se o Tratado de Lisboa. Fantasias! Não vai resolver nada, nem vai trazer confiança a quem quer que seja.

A crise financeira que a Europa e o mundo atravessam não é uma crise localizada, mas, como já o dissemos, global. É uma crise sistémica que não se resolve com mais dinheiro, com fundos especiais, com sacos, saquinhos e saquetas a transbordar de notas, que, aliás, se podem imprimir ao dobrar da esquina, como toda a gente sabe. Assim, a estulta criação do Euro, uma moeda comum, entre economias dissemelhantes, sem estar acompanhada de uma política fiscal comum, redundou nesta sub-crise, que é uma sequela do meltdown de 2008. O ataque contra o Euro é intenso e concertado. Interessa aos Estados Unidos  estar na primeira linha desse ataque  porque não lhes é admissível, sob nenhuma forma ou circunstância, que a sua própria moeda - the almighty dollar - esteja debaixo de fogo, porque sustentada por uma economia com pés de barro. Aliás, porque é se demonizou Saddam Hussein e se demoniza Hugo Chávez,   Ahmadinedjad  e quejandos? É precisamente  pela tentação que todos eles tiveram de recorrer a outras moedas que não o dólar para venderem o bem mais precioso do planeta chamado petróleo. Se a alternativa era o Euro, nada mais fácil do que apontar as baterias nessa direcção.

Por outro lado, à Alemanha não lhe interessa estar num clube de supostos losers, que, note-se bem, ela própria criou,  e o melhor é procurar outros rumos, alguns ínvios, como toda a gente sabe. A “pérfida Albion” nem sequer entrou. Os do Norte são “fiscalmente bem comportados” e alinham com a Alemanha, não vá constipar-se e a gente morre todos com uma pneumonia. Depois, a Sul e a Leste é a fome e a vontade de comer...aguentem malandros que bem nos esmifraram...agora, esmiframo-vos nós!

A crise chama-se falta de confiança e a falta de confiança é a crise e daqui não saímos.

Wikileaks

Taking Stock of WikiLeaks December 14, 2010 By George Friedman Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-“Cablegate” and post-“Cablegate” eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First, how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position? Let’s begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term “informed opinion” deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren’t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised. Let’s consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for putting those civilians in harm’s way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail — as they inevitably do — uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions. Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war crimes that were contained in the leaks. The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands. There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don’t know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn’t care, since the charges were all over Italian media. I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called “Batman and Robin.” That’s amusing, but it isn’t significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks. Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics. Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing. At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international tension. This raises the question of why diplomats can’t always simply state their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations. And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about people who aren’t American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn’t understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been released so far. There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state — or a business or a church — acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work? This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs. Assange’s claims are made even more interesting in terms of his “thermonuclear” threat. Apparently there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will not be revealed if he is unharmed — otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange’s position is that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not to, in which case the public has no need to know. It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in the first place. To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear solution. The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no-foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive. Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing. Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn’t a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His best defense will be that he can’t be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so trivial. I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know — given the material leaked so far — that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore, Assange’s claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on this: “Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments — some governments — deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.” “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” I don’t like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates’ view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn’t come close. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"