Quo vadis Europa (parte não sei quantas)? O texto que se segue peca por ser extenso, mas é de uma enorme  relevância. Existem pontos com os quais não estou de acordo e  presumivelmente muitos dos meus leitores também não.   Em próximos posts irei rebater os pontos sobe os quais manifesto  a minha discordância, mas entretanto para vossa leitura e apreciação, com a devida vénia, segue o que foi publicado  na Stratfor

Europe: The New Plan December 21, 2010 By Peter Zeihan Europe is on the cusp of change. An EU heads-of-state summit Dec. 16 launched a process aimed to save the common European currency. If successful, this process would be the most significant step toward creating a singular European power since the creation of the European Union itself in 1992— that is, if it doesn’t destroy the euro first. Envisioned by the EU Treaty on Monetary Union, the common currency, the euro, has suffered from two core problems during its decade-long existence: the lack of a parallel political union and the issue of debt. Many in the financial world believe that what is required for a viable currency is a fiscal union that has taxation power — and that is indeed needed. But that misses the larger point of who would be in charge of the fiscal union. Taxation and appropriation — who pays how much to whom — are essentially political acts. One cannot have a centralized fiscal authority without first having a centralized political/military authority capable of imposing and enforcing its will. Greeks are not going to implement a German-designed tax and appropriations system simply because Berlin thinks it’s a good idea. As much as financiers might like to believe, the checkbook is not the ultimate power in the galaxy. The ultimate power comes from the law backed by a gun. Europe’s Disparate Parts This isn’t a revolutionary concept — in fact, it is one most people know well at some level. Americans fought the bloodiest war in their history from 1861 to 1865 over the issue of central power versus local power. What emerged was a state capable of functioning at the international level. It took three similar European wars — also in the 19th century — for the dozens of German principalities finally to merge into what we now know as Germany. Europe simply isn’t to the point of willing conglomeration just yet, and we do not use the American Civil War or German unification wars as comparisons lightly. STRATFOR sees the peacetime creation of a unified European political authority as impossible, since Europe’s component parts are far more varied than those of mid-19th century America or Germany. Northern Europe is composed of advanced technocratic economies, made possible by the capital-generating capacity of the well-watered North European Plain and its many navigable rivers (it is much cheaper to move goods via water than land, and this advantage grants nations situated on such waterways a steady supply of surplus capital). As a rule, northern Europe prefers a strong currency in order to attract investment to underwrite the high costs of advanced education, first-world infrastructure and a highly technical industrial plant. Thus, northern European exports — heavily value added — are not inhibited greatly by a strong currency. One of the many outcomes of this development pattern is a people that identifies with its brethren throughout the river valleys and in other areas linked by what is typically omnipresent infrastructure. This crafts a firm identity at the national level rather than local level and assists with mass-mobilization strategies. Consequently, size is everything. Southern Europe, in comparison, suffers from an arid, rugged topography and lack of navigable rivers. This lack of rivers does more than deny them a local capital base, it also inhibits political unification; lacking clear core regions, most of these states face the political problems of the European Union in microcosm. Here, identity is more localized; southern Europeans tend to be more concerned with family and town than nation, since they do not benefit from easy transport options or the regular contact that northern Europeans take for granted. Their economies reflect this, with integration occurring only locally (there is but one southern European equivalent of the great northern industrial mega-regions such as the Rhine, Italy’s Po Valley). Bereft of economies of scale, southern European economies are highly dependent upon a weak currency to make their exports competitive abroad and to make every incoming investment dollar or deutschemark work to maximum effect. Central Europe — largely former Soviet territories — have yet different rules of behavior. Some countries, like Poland, fit in well with the northern Europeans, but they require outside defense support in order to maintain their positions. The frigid weather of the Baltics limits population sizes, demoting these countries to being, at best, the economic satellites of larger powers (they’re hoping for Sweden while fearing it will be Russia). Bulgaria and Romania are a mix of north and south, sitting astride Europe’s longest navigable river yet being so far removed from the European core that their successful development may depend upon events in Turkey, a state that is not even an EU member. While states of this grouping often plan together for EU summits, in reality the only thing they have in common is a half-century of lost ground to recover, and they need as much capital as can be made available. As such variation might suggest, some of these states are in the eurozone, while others are unlikely to join within the next decade. And that doesn’t even begin to include the EU states that have actively chosen to refuse the euro — Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom — or consider the fact that the European Union is now made up of 27 different nationalities that jealously guard their political (and in most cases, fiscal) autonomy. The point is this: With Europe having such varied geographies, economies and political systems, any political and fiscal union would be fraught with complications and policy mis-prescriptions from the start. In short, this is a defect of the euro that is not going to be corrected, and to be blunt, it isn’t one that the Europeans are trying to fix right now. The Debt Problem If anything, they are attempting to craft a work-around by addressing the second problem: debt. Monetary union means that all participating states are subject to the dictates of a single central bank, in this case the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt. The ECB’s primary (and only partially stated) mission is to foster long-term stable growth in the eurozone’s largest economy — Germany — working from the theory that what is good for the continent’s economic engine is good for Europe. One impact of this commitment is that Germany’s low interest rates are applied throughout the currency zone, even to states with mediocre income levels, lower educational standards, poorer infrastructure and little prospect for long-term growth. Following their entry into the eurozone, capital-starved southern Europeans used to interest rates in the 10-15 percent range found themselves in an environment of rates in the 2-5 percent range (currently it is 1.0 percent). To translate that into a readily identifiable benefit, that equates to a reduction in monthly payments for a standard 30-year mortgage of more than 60 percent. As the theory goes, the lower costs of capital will stimulate development in the peripheral states and allow them to catch up to Germany. But these countries traditionally suffer from higher interest rates for good reasons. Smaller, poorer economies are more volatile, since even tiny changes in the international environment can send them through either the floor or the roof. Higher risks and volatility mean higher capital costs. Their regionalization also engenders high government spending as the central government attempts to curb the propensity of the regions to spin away from the center (essentially, the center bribes the regions to remain in the state). This means that when the eurozone spread to these places, theory went out the window. In practice, growth in the periphery did accelerate, but that growth was neither smooth nor sustainable. The unification of capital costs has proved more akin to giving an American Express black card to a college freshman: Traditionally capital poor states (and citizens) have a propensity to overspend in situations where borrowing costs are low, due to a lack of a relevant frame of reference. The result has been massive credit binging by corporations, consumers and governments alike, inevitably leading to bubbles in a variety of sectors. And just as these states soared high in the first decade after the euro was introduced, they have crashed low in the past year. The debt crises of 2010 — so far precipitating government debt bailouts for Ireland and Greece and an unprecedented bank bailout in Ireland — can be laid at the feet of this euro-instigated over-exuberance. It is this second, debt-driven shortcoming that European leaders discussed Dec. 16. None of them want to do away with the euro at this point, and it is easy to see why. While the common currency remains a popular whipping boy in domestic politics, its benefits — mainly lower transaction costs, higher purchasing power, unfettered market access and cheaper and more abundant capital — are deeply valued by all participating governments. The question is not “whither the euro” but how to provide a safety net for the euro’s less desirable, debt-related aftereffects. The agreed-upon path is to create a Itália,  that can manage a bailout even for the eurozone’s larger economies when their debt mountains become too imposing. In theory, this would contain the contradictory pressures the euro has created while still providing to the entire zone the euro’s many benefits. Obstacles to the Safety Net Three complications exist, however. First, when a bailout is required, it is clearly because something has gone terribly wrong. In Greece’s case, it was out-of-control government spending with no thought to the future; in essence, Athens took that black card and leapt straight into the economic abyss. In Ireland’s case, it was private-sector overindulgence, which bubbled the size of the financial sector to more than four times the entire country’s gross domestic product. In both cases, recovery was flat-out impossible without the countries’ eurozone partners stepping in and declaring some sort of debt holiday, and the result was a complete funding of all Greek and Irish deficit spending for three years while they get their houses in order. “Houses in order” are the key words here. When the not-so-desperate eurozone states step in with a few billion euros — 223 billion euros so far, to be exact — they want not only their money back but also some assurance that such overindulgences will not happen again. The result is a deep series of policy requirements that must be adopted if the bailout money is to be made available. Broadly known as austerity measures, these requirements result in deep cuts to social services, retirement benefits and salaries. They are not pleasant. Put simply: Germany is attempting to trade financial benefits for the right to make policy adjustments that normally would be handed by a political union. (click here to enlarge image) It’s a pretty slick plan, but it is not happening in a vacuum. Remember, there are two more complications. The second is that the Dec. 16 agreement is only an agreement in principle. Before any Champagne corks are popped, one should consider that the “details” of the agreement raise a more than “simply” trillion-euro question. STRATFOR guesses that to deliver on its promises, the permanent bailout fund (right now there is a temporary fund with a “mere” 750 billion euros) probably would need upwards of three trillion euros. Why so much? The debt bailouts for Greece and Ireland were designed to completely sequester those states from debt markets by providing those governments with all of the cash they would need to fund their budgets for three years. This wise move has helped keep the contagion from spreading to the rest of the eurozone. Making any fund credible means applying that precedent to all the eurozone states facing high debt pressures, and using the most current data available, that puts the price tag at just under 2.2 trillion euros. Add in enough extra so that the eurozone has sufficient ammo left to fight any contagion and we’re looking at a cool 3 trillion euros. Anti-crisis measures to this point have enjoyed the assistance of both the ECB and the International Monetary Fund, but so far, the headline figures have been rather restrained when compared to future needs. Needless to say, the process of coming up with funds of that magnitude when it is becoming obvious to the rest of Europe that this is, at its heart, a German power play is apt to be contentious at best. The third complication is that the bailout mechanism is actually only half the plan. The other half is to allow states to at least partially default on their debt (in EU diplomatic parlance, this is called the “inclusion of private interests in funding the bailouts”). When the investors who fund eurozone sovereign debt markets hear this, they understandably shudder, since it means the European Union plans to codify giving states permission to walk away from their debts — sticking investors with the losses. This too is more than simply a trillion-euro question. Private investors collectively own nearly all of the eurozone’s 7.5 trillion euros in outstanding sovereign debt. And in the case of Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece, debt volumes worth half or more of GDP for each individual state are held by foreigners. Assuming investors decide it is worth the risk to keep purchasing government debt, they have but one way to mitigate this risk: charge higher premiums. The result will be higher debt financing costs for all, doubly so for the eurozone’s more spendthrift and/or weaker economies. For most of the euro’s era, the interest rates on government bonds have been the same throughout the eurozone, based on the inaccurate belief that eurozone states would all be as fiscally conservative and economically sound as Germany. That belief has now been shattered, and the rate on Greek and Irish debt has now risen from 4.5 percent in early 2008 to this week’s 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. With a formal default policy in the making, those rates are going to go higher yet. In the era before monetary union became the Europeans’ goal, Greek and Irish government debt regularly went for 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Continued euro membership may well put a bit of downward pressure on these rates, but that will be more than overwhelmed by the fact that both countries are, in essence, in financial conservatorship. (click here to enlarge image) That is not just a problem for the post-2013 world, however. Because investors now know the European Union intends to stick them with at least part of the bill, they are going to demand higher returns as details of the default plan are made known, both on any new debt and on any pre-existing debt that comes up for refinancing. This means that states that just squeaked by in 2010 must run a more difficult gauntlet in 2011 — particularly if they depend heavily on foreign investors for funding their budget deficits. All will face higher financing and refinancing costs as investors react to the coming European disclosures on just how much the private sector will be expected to contribute. Leaving out the two states that have already received bailouts (Greece and Ireland), the four eurozone states STRATFOR figures face the most trouble — Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Austria, in that order — plan to raise or refinance a quarter trillion euros in 2011 alone. Italy and France, two heavyweights not that far from the danger zone, plan to raise another half-trillion euros between them. If the past is any guide, the weaker members of this quartet could face financing costs of double what they’ve faced as recently as early 2008. For some of these states, such higher costs could be enough to push them into the bailout bin even if there is no additional investor skittishness. The existing bailout mechanism probably can handle the first four states (just barely, and assuming it works as advertised), but beyond that, the rest of the eurozone will have to come up with a multitrillion-euro fund in an environment in which private investors are likely to balk. Undoubtedly, the euro needs a new mechanism to survive. But by coming up with one that scares those who make government deficit-spending possible, the Europeans have all but guaranteed that Europe’s financial crisis will get much worse before it begins to improve. But let’s assume for a moment that this all works out, that the euro survives to the day that the new mechanism will be in place to support it. Consider what such a 2013 eurozone would look like if the rough design agreed to Dec. 16 becomes a reality. All of the states flirting with bailouts as 2010 draws to a close expect to have even higher debt loads two years from now. Hence, investors will have imposed punishing financing costs on all of them. Alone among the major eurozone countries not facing such costs will be Germany, the country that wrote the bailout rules and is indirectly responsible for managing the bailouts enacted to this point. Berlin will command the purse strings and the financial rules, yet be unfettered by those rules or the higher financing costs that go with them. Such control isn’t quite a political union, but so long as the rest of the eurozone is willing to trade financial sovereignty for the benefits of the euro, it is certainly the next best thing. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Frase do dia

"La esclavitud es hija de las tinieblas; un Pueblo ignorante es instrumento ciego de su propia destrucción"

SIMON BOLIVAR

Novos rumos? Previsões?

É fácil constatar pela leitura e análise atenta do mapa supra, que o Japão e os EUA pretendem fechar  o acesso da China ao mar aberto (Oceano Pacífico).

Historicamente, a China nunca foi uma potência marítima de relevo e antes que tenha veleidades de o vir a ser, o Japão, com apoio de Washington, pode aspirar a tornar-se na próxima grande potência marítima da zona e uma âncora para os interesses globais dos norte-americanos, na região Ásia-Pacífico.

Por outro lado e num outro cenário a uns milhares de quilómetros de distância, com ou sem o aval da Casa Branca, e independentemente do que possam pensar os russos, a Alemanha, mais uma vez, vai-se rearmar e afirmar-se como uma grande potência continental. Aliás, economicamente a Federação Russa vai encontrar-se numa relação de dependência em relação à RFA, uma vez que os interesses de uma e de outra são complementares e Moscovo encontra-se numa posição de subalternidade.

É por demais óbvio que a corrida armamentista, que já se configura na linha do horizonte, vai  infelizmente  traduzir-se em desenvolvimento, o que não só é enganoso, mas altamente perigoso.

Finalmente,  a França irá presumivelmente vender o seu armamento à China, completando o quadro. 

Alea jacta est!

TRABALHADORES DOS CONSULADOS E MISSÕES DIPLOMÁTICAS A SAGA CONTINUA

Londres, Reino Unido 16/12/2010 12:14 (LUSA)
Temas: Trabalho, Conflitos laborais, Política, Sociedade
Consulados: Trabalhadores em Londres dizem-se “abusados” após desconto inesperado de IRS
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Londres, 16 dez (Lusa) - Uma trabalhadora do consulado de Londres passou a dormir nos sofás de amigos e a embaixada de Londres ficou sem cozinheiro por causa da redução no salário após o desconto inesperado do IRS.
“Sentimo-nos abusados e ignorados”, queixaram-se alguns funcionários à Agência Lusa.
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A situação foi desencadeada após a Direção Geral dos Impostos (DGCI) ter decretado que, a partir de junho, os funcionários contratados para as missões diplomáticas no Reino Unido deveriam pagar imposto sobre os rendimentos.
Estes pensaram estar isentos por nunca ter sido descontado IRS desde a assinatura dos contratos, alguns dos quais em 2008.
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Agora confrontam-se com uma redução de 21,5 por cento no ordenado.
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“Tenho de me ir embora porque assim não é possível viver”, lamentou uma funcionária, que quis manter o anonimato, à Agência Lusa.
O elevado nível de vida na capital britânica foi o motivo invocado nomeadamente pelo cozinheiro da embaixada para demitir-se há cerca de três meses.
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A situação afeta, pelo menos, seis dos 13 trabalhadores do consulado de Londres e cerca de oito da embaixada, o que motivou reclamações.
Também o anterior embaixador, António Santana Carlos, que deixou o posto no final de outubro por limite de idade, tentou interceder, mas em nenhum dos casos o MNE respondeu.
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Num parecer datado de maio, a DGCI sustenta a decisão na Convenção celebrada entre Portugal e o Reino Unido para evitar a dupla tributação.
“É legal, mas não é ético”, condena o secretário-geral do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Consulares e das Missões Diplomáticas no Estrangeiro (STCDE), Jorge Veludo. Isto, explicou hoje à Agência Lusa, porque estes trabalhadores assinaram contratos pensando que estariam isentos deste encargo pois “era a prática na altura”.
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O dirigente sindical admite que ainda existem centenas de funcionários em consulados e embaixadas que não pagam IRS. A solução que o STCDE defende é uma “equiparação salarial” com os colegas que receberam uma compensação salarial em 2001 para passarem a pagar o imposto.
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Foi neste sentido que o STCDE iniciou há duas semanas uma ação no Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Lisboa contra o Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros.
“Há pessoas com a mesma categoria, no mesmo posto e com o mesmo tipo e quantidade de trabalho a ganharem muito menos”, denuncia.
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É o que acontece em Londres, onde pessoas responsáveis pela emissão de documentos de identificação, vistos, registo civil ou cartório podem ganhar menos do que telefonistas. Os funcionários afetados não questionam a necessidade de pagar IRS, mas querem a restituição dos descontos feitos e um novo contrato que reveja o nível salarial.
Só em seis meses, estimam ter perdido cerca de 3 000 euros, “o que corresponde a quase três meses de trabalho”.
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O valor reclamado pelo STCDE, com efeitos a partir de 01 de Janeiro de 2009, para os cerca de 200 associados nesta situação ronda os seis milhões de euros.
Mas a fatura, avisou, pode ser maior se outros funcionários que não pertencem ao sindicato exigirem o mesmo.
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Questionado pela Lusa, o secretário de Estado das Comunidades, António Braga, referiu que “está a ser estudada uma fórmula para acomodar essas alterações de modo a diminuir o reflexo negativo no salário dos trabalhadores em causa”, mas não especificou quando essa situação poderá estar resolvida.
BM.
Lusa/Fim

Euro - a orquestra au grand complet ensaia o réquiem de Mozart

Podem limpar as mãos à parede com este aumento de fundos do BCE para “blindar o Euro”, através de um dito “Fundo de resgate” e, entretanto, emenda-se o Tratado de Lisboa. Fantasias! Não vai resolver nada, nem vai trazer confiança a quem quer que seja.

A crise financeira que a Europa e o mundo atravessam não é uma crise localizada, mas, como já o dissemos, global. É uma crise sistémica que não se resolve com mais dinheiro, com fundos especiais, com sacos, saquinhos e saquetas a transbordar de notas, que, aliás, se podem imprimir ao dobrar da esquina, como toda a gente sabe. Assim, a estulta criação do Euro, uma moeda comum, entre economias dissemelhantes, sem estar acompanhada de uma política fiscal comum, redundou nesta sub-crise, que é uma sequela do meltdown de 2008. O ataque contra o Euro é intenso e concertado. Interessa aos Estados Unidos  estar na primeira linha desse ataque  porque não lhes é admissível, sob nenhuma forma ou circunstância, que a sua própria moeda - the almighty dollar - esteja debaixo de fogo, porque sustentada por uma economia com pés de barro. Aliás, porque é se demonizou Saddam Hussein e se demoniza Hugo Chávez,   Ahmadinedjad  e quejandos? É precisamente  pela tentação que todos eles tiveram de recorrer a outras moedas que não o dólar para venderem o bem mais precioso do planeta chamado petróleo. Se a alternativa era o Euro, nada mais fácil do que apontar as baterias nessa direcção.

Por outro lado, à Alemanha não lhe interessa estar num clube de supostos losers, que, note-se bem, ela própria criou,  e o melhor é procurar outros rumos, alguns ínvios, como toda a gente sabe. A “pérfida Albion” nem sequer entrou. Os do Norte são “fiscalmente bem comportados” e alinham com a Alemanha, não vá constipar-se e a gente morre todos com uma pneumonia. Depois, a Sul e a Leste é a fome e a vontade de comer...aguentem malandros que bem nos esmifraram...agora, esmiframo-vos nós!

A crise chama-se falta de confiança e a falta de confiança é a crise e daqui não saímos.

Wikileaks

Taking Stock of WikiLeaks December 14, 2010 By George Friedman Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-“Cablegate” and post-“Cablegate” eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First, how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position? Let’s begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term “informed opinion” deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren’t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised. Let’s consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for putting those civilians in harm’s way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail — as they inevitably do — uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions. Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war crimes that were contained in the leaks. The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands. There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don’t know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn’t care, since the charges were all over Italian media. I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called “Batman and Robin.” That’s amusing, but it isn’t significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks. Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics. Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing. At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international tension. This raises the question of why diplomats can’t always simply state their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations. And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about people who aren’t American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn’t understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been released so far. There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state — or a business or a church — acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work? This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs. Assange’s claims are made even more interesting in terms of his “thermonuclear” threat. Apparently there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will not be revealed if he is unharmed — otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange’s position is that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not to, in which case the public has no need to know. It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in the first place. To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear solution. The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no-foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive. Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing. Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn’t a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His best defense will be that he can’t be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so trivial. I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know — given the material leaked so far — that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore, Assange’s claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on this: “Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments — some governments — deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.” “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” I don’t like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates’ view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn’t come close. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Irlanda 

A propósito do bail out da banca irlandesa, eis a frase do dia a reter:  “Digamo-lo claramente. Deixar que países que se enriqueceram graças ao comércio intra-europeu absorvam em seguida a base fiscal dos seus vizinhos, isto não tem rigorosamente nada a ver com os princípios da economia de mercado ou com o liberalismo. Isto só tem um nome e chama-se: roubo. E ir emprestar dinheiro às pessoas que nos roubaram, sem nada exigir em troca para que isso não se reproduza, a isto chama-se estupidez”. Thomas Piketty

Dispatch: U.S.-German Diplomacy in Light of WikiLeaks

STRATFOR has followed the developing German foreign policy for the last couple years intently. Our thesis is that Germany is no longer shackled by Cold War institutions and particularly it is looking to evolve its relationship with NATO and the EU.

The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 2010 eurozone sovereign debt crisis have allowed Germany to exert more influence on EU affairs. In particular, Berlin has looked to reshape and reformulate European Union and the eurozone in its own image. We have also seen the German-Russian relationship grow and in particular this has given Berlin an impetus to evolve its relationship with its NATO member state allies. It has led the European efforts to counter Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO and it has also been relatively easy on Russia following the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008.

At the heart of the German foreign policy evolution is really its relationship with the United States. In the past, Germany has been explained and described as a model U.S. ally. However the underpinning reason for this model ally has always been the Cold War. Germany had neither the option nor really the willingness to develop an opinion of its own in terms of foreign policy. It was the battlefield of the Cold War and the superpower conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States would have happened on German soil.

This situation is no longer the case. STRATFOR has in the past concentrated on two specific examples of developing rift between Germany and United States. The first has been German support, or rather lack thereof, toward sanctions against Iran and the second has been German resistance to U.S. efforts to counter the financial and economic crisis. The recently revealed WikiLeaks U.S. diplomatic cables illustrate just how it important both were to the German-American relationship. From the leaked cables we have learned that the Opel issue really was a central problem and the central rift between Berlin and Washington, to the extent that German Chancellor Angela Merkel was extremely angered by the lack of pressure from Washington on GM to sell Opel at the time.

Meanwhile German support on Iran wavers throughout the released cables. In fact, the German diplomats and politicians often stressed the disproportionate negative economic impact the sanctions would have on German trade with Iran. From the released cables we see that the U.S. diplomats had some serious misgivings about the incoming German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, while at the same time U.S. diplomats do not seem to be willing to treat Germany as a great power but rather continue to treat it as a subservient Cold War ally. Of course the leaked diplomatic cables are only a very small selection of the total correspondence between the U.S. diplomats in Europe and Washington.

Nonetheless they do highlight in a few interesting cables the growing sense of unease between Berlin and Washington. This issue has been at the forefront of STRATFOR’s European forecast for many years. It may be the most significant and yet this least understood geopolitical issue of the moment.

Republished  duly authorized by www.stratfor.com

Wikileaks – the morning after 

A revelação dos telegramas de e  para as embaixadas dos EUA, documentos classificados, alguns altamente reservados, constitui obviamente um grande “furo” jornalístico. O maior “furo” de que há memória, uma vez que toda a documentação é publicamente divulgada e aparece nua e crua, não necessitando sequer de grande tratamento. Todavia, trata-se de um produto roubado, por conseguinte,  suscitam-se, a justo título, questões deontológicas aos grandes órgãos de informação ditos de referência e, além disso, representativos das principais línguas ocidentais como “Le Monde”, The Guardian”, “The New York Times”, “Der Spiegel” e “El Pais”. Antes de se tornar público, o produto foi pago e bem pago e nenhum dos órgãos de informação revelou quanto pagou por ele. Aqui estamos perante um segredo jornalístico que ninguém ousa revelar. Aliás, se atentarmos no desfasamento entre as revelações públicas, através da net, e nas divulgações naqueles media, estes antecedem sempre o que veio a ser difundido urbi et orbe depois. Bastava que o “Guardian” ou o “Le Monde”, por exemplo nos explicassem. Mas, não, remetem-se a um prudentíssmo silêncio. Os dados do problema são estes:  estamos a aproveitar-nos de um produto roubado, que sabemos que é roubado e que por isso mesmo pagámos um bom preço por ele, mas vamos lucrar muito com isto, porque o filão é inesgotável.

            Como é que surge o problema? Surge na sequência do 11 de Setembro e da necessidade absoluta em coordenar o fluxo de informação das múltiplas agências  de informação dos EUA que funcionavam em compartimentos estanques e que, objectivamente, impediram a prevenção dos atentados. Tenha-se em atenção a incomunicabilidade existente entre o FBI, a CIA, a NSA, a intel militar norte-americana e  o  Departamento de Estado, aliás relevada a justo título pela comissão de inquérito ao 11 de Setembro. Porém, o  estabelecimento de um sistema de vasos comunicantes torna-o  vulnerável, como os factos acabam de demonstrar de modo eloquente. Logo, vamos assistir, no imediato a novas medidas de segurança em termos das comunicações e, concomitantemente, a uma restrição do fluxo  dos dados disponíveis e do acesso individual aos mesmos.

            Não obstante o que precede, registe-se que a maior parte dos dados de intel são públicos, ou seja 90% ou circulam na net ou são divulgados pelas agências noticiosas, jornais, revistas, tv e rádio. As chamadas OSINT (Open Sources of Intelligence) são hoje uma realidade. Os 10% (ou menos) que faltam e a análise de informação (ou seja, a combinação das Opens sources com as secluded sources e a visão própria que se pode ter sobre a matéria, em função dos interesses nacionais e da politica prosseguida pelos Estados) é que constituem, realmente, o pequeno reduto de intelligence relevante com  real valor acrescentado.

            Noutra tónica, a defesa da liberdade de expressão não pode pôr em causa interesses estratégicos vitais dos estados e suscitar problemas e “irritantes” nas relações multi e bilaterais, cuja gravidade dispensa quaisquer comentários adicionais. Acresce que as “fugas” através do Wikileaks têm implicações sérias em termos de intelligence sharing. Como é que iremos lidar com os EUA, em matérias sensíveis sabendo que as paredes são de vidro e as portas estão escancaradas?

Por outro lado, poderá a liberdade de expressão ser irrestrita? Por outro ainda, como conciliar a liberdade de expressão com o comércio de produtos roubados , como é o caso?

            Nota final: há dias, a prestação televisiva do embaixador Tanger Correia, na SIC Notícias defendendo a liberdade de informação sem quaisquer baias, mesmo a mais reservada, no estilo confessionário aberto e com altifalante acoplado,  talvez não seja a solução mais adequada. A propósito, ele é embaixador exactamente onde?

  

Frase do dia com comentário

"O Socialismo é a filosofia do fracasso, a crença da ignorância e a prédica da inveja, e a virtude inerente é a distribuição igualitária da miséria" 

                                             Sir Winston Churchill

OK. O socialismo pode morrer nas profundezas do inferno, o estado social não.

Quem quiser que discorde, não paga mais por isso.

Quo vadis, Portugal? E já agora Europa (já não sei que parte é esta, mas não faz mal...há tantas) 

Da crise e sempre da crise – Diz a imprensa do dia: “A proposta ítalo-luxemburguesa para a emissão de uma dívida europeia conjunta por países da zona Euro foi novamente rejeitada pelo governo alemão.” Assim funciona a solidariedade europeia. Meus amigos, isto de “união”, nem sequer vale como símbolo: só tem o nome e palavras leva-as o vento. Em suma, a Alemanha e um grupo de escolhidos mandam à fava um conjunto heterogéneo de países ditos periféricos que onde estão bem é na pocilga (ptqtp+ab;  a primeira parte não necessita de tradução, a segunda reza: mais à burra). O núcleo duro de meninos bens comportados, que não gastaram a mais, que se portaram sempre bem, merecem, os outros não. Não é o contribuinte alemão que vai pagar por essa gente suja e desgrenhada, que não tem disciplina, não trabalha e vive de mão estendida. Já chega! Ponto final

Ah, na década de 80 era fácil, cómodo e interessante dar dinheiro a esses “untermenschen” meridionais que acabariam por comprar mais BMW’s e máquinas Bosch alemãs. Tás a topar? Porreiro, pá!  Depois há o retorno com dividendos, pois então. O pior é quando o dinheiro começa outra vez a fluir no ciclo inverso isto é do centro para a periferia, mas agora sem compensação.   Nem mais um tuste para essa cabrada! Eh, pá mas os gajos estão a viver a crédito e depois não compram Mercedes e bolas de Berlim. Pois, pois, eu quero é que esses gajos se lixem, senão quem bate a porta sou eu e mando isto tudo àquela parte. Eu vou pagar a pensão aos 50 anos dos gregos? As dívidas dos portugueses? A crise da banca irlandesa? O preço absurdo dos imóveis espanhóis? Eu dou-lhes o arroz! Vou mas é olhar para as economias emergentes. Até têm um  nome mais bonito: não são PIGS, mas BRIC’s (tijolos – e, como sabes, com tijolos constrói-se o nosso prédio). Na Rússia, na China, na Índia e no Brasil é que é bom. É o que está a dar. Eh, pá mas pertencemos à mesma família, à mesma união e o que é que quer dizer união? Deixa-te de tretas que eu tenho mais que fazer que estar pr’aqui a discutir semântica contigo. Eh, pá, mas tu, arvorado agora em chefe da família europeia, nem conseguiste unificar decentemente o teu próprio pais, não é verdade? Vê lá tu que até levantaste um imposto de solidariedade, no tempo do Kohl, para se pagar a reunificação que os teus anafados patrícios do lado de cá, não queriam compensar. Muitos perguntaram, então: solidariedade? O que é isso? Ora se não o conseguiste fazer na tua própria casa, que imbecilidade foi a nossa em pensar que serias capaz de o fazer na famelga europeia, cada vez mais vasta, como, aliás, tu querias (lá vendias umas coisas para o Leste...). Foi ou não como tu pediste?

            Não, isto não é um contrato que não funciona e que vai ser denunciado unilateralmente. Isto não é um casamento a que se põe termo porque queremos ter as mãos livres para outras uniões. Mais. Não nos sentimos encornados, nem  estamos tristes por isso ou sequer com a hipótese de um dia o virmos a ser. Atemo-nos a um compromisso solene e por demais importante na História da Europa. A  Alemanha, que de um modo irracional e maléfico nos envolveu na pior guerra da história da humanidade,  ainda não pagou tudo o que nos deve. Pensem nisto. É bom que as coisas sejam ditas, de uma vez por todas,  para que não subsistam dúvidas.

            Se querem sair do euro que o digam claramente, se querem acabar com a União Europeia que o assumam, se querem voltar aos desvarios do passado que o digam, aqui e agora. Vamos lá ver se nos entendemos:  temos de tomar medidas e com urgência, por conseguinte deixem-se de merdas.

            No fundo a pergunta impõe-se: Quo vadis, Europa? Com os bifes a quererem sair de qualquer maneira e com hiper-abundância de argumentos (deles, entenda-se), com os franciús sem rumo, comandados por essa aventesma sem ideias, nem carisma, chamado Sarkozy , com os italianos na cóboiada e no bródio tão ao gosto de  Berlusconi. Os outros...Bom, os outros ou estão em crise, ou não existem ou são irrelevantes. A Europa necessita de liderança e com esta gente não vamos a parte alguma. Esta é que é a verdadeira crise, o resto é conversa.  

    Em suma: todas as crises são iguais só que nuns casos são mais crises do que noutros.