Wikileaks

Taking Stock of WikiLeaks December 14, 2010 By George Friedman Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-“Cablegate” and post-“Cablegate” eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First, how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position? Let’s begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term “informed opinion” deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren’t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised. Let’s consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for putting those civilians in harm’s way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail — as they inevitably do — uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions. Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war crimes that were contained in the leaks. The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands. There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don’t know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn’t care, since the charges were all over Italian media. I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called “Batman and Robin.” That’s amusing, but it isn’t significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks. Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics. Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing. At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international tension. This raises the question of why diplomats can’t always simply state their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations. And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about people who aren’t American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn’t understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been released so far. There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state — or a business or a church — acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work? This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs. Assange’s claims are made even more interesting in terms of his “thermonuclear” threat. Apparently there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will not be revealed if he is unharmed — otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange’s position is that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not to, in which case the public has no need to know. It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in the first place. To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear solution. The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no-foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive. Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing. Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn’t a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His best defense will be that he can’t be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so trivial. I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know — given the material leaked so far — that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore, Assange’s claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on this: “Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments — some governments — deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.” “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” I don’t like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates’ view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn’t come close. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Quo vadis, Portugal? E já agora Europa (já não sei que parte é esta, mas não faz mal...há tantas) 

Da crise e sempre da crise – Diz a imprensa do dia: “A proposta ítalo-luxemburguesa para a emissão de uma dívida europeia conjunta por países da zona Euro foi novamente rejeitada pelo governo alemão.” Assim funciona a solidariedade europeia. Meus amigos, isto de “união”, nem sequer vale como símbolo: só tem o nome e palavras leva-as o vento. Em suma, a Alemanha e um grupo de escolhidos mandam à fava um conjunto heterogéneo de países ditos periféricos que onde estão bem é na pocilga (ptqtp+ab;  a primeira parte não necessita de tradução, a segunda reza: mais à burra). O núcleo duro de meninos bens comportados, que não gastaram a mais, que se portaram sempre bem, merecem, os outros não. Não é o contribuinte alemão que vai pagar por essa gente suja e desgrenhada, que não tem disciplina, não trabalha e vive de mão estendida. Já chega! Ponto final

Ah, na década de 80 era fácil, cómodo e interessante dar dinheiro a esses “untermenschen” meridionais que acabariam por comprar mais BMW’s e máquinas Bosch alemãs. Tás a topar? Porreiro, pá!  Depois há o retorno com dividendos, pois então. O pior é quando o dinheiro começa outra vez a fluir no ciclo inverso isto é do centro para a periferia, mas agora sem compensação.   Nem mais um tuste para essa cabrada! Eh, pá mas os gajos estão a viver a crédito e depois não compram Mercedes e bolas de Berlim. Pois, pois, eu quero é que esses gajos se lixem, senão quem bate a porta sou eu e mando isto tudo àquela parte. Eu vou pagar a pensão aos 50 anos dos gregos? As dívidas dos portugueses? A crise da banca irlandesa? O preço absurdo dos imóveis espanhóis? Eu dou-lhes o arroz! Vou mas é olhar para as economias emergentes. Até têm um  nome mais bonito: não são PIGS, mas BRIC’s (tijolos – e, como sabes, com tijolos constrói-se o nosso prédio). Na Rússia, na China, na Índia e no Brasil é que é bom. É o que está a dar. Eh, pá mas pertencemos à mesma família, à mesma união e o que é que quer dizer união? Deixa-te de tretas que eu tenho mais que fazer que estar pr’aqui a discutir semântica contigo. Eh, pá, mas tu, arvorado agora em chefe da família europeia, nem conseguiste unificar decentemente o teu próprio pais, não é verdade? Vê lá tu que até levantaste um imposto de solidariedade, no tempo do Kohl, para se pagar a reunificação que os teus anafados patrícios do lado de cá, não queriam compensar. Muitos perguntaram, então: solidariedade? O que é isso? Ora se não o conseguiste fazer na tua própria casa, que imbecilidade foi a nossa em pensar que serias capaz de o fazer na famelga europeia, cada vez mais vasta, como, aliás, tu querias (lá vendias umas coisas para o Leste...). Foi ou não como tu pediste?

            Não, isto não é um contrato que não funciona e que vai ser denunciado unilateralmente. Isto não é um casamento a que se põe termo porque queremos ter as mãos livres para outras uniões. Mais. Não nos sentimos encornados, nem  estamos tristes por isso ou sequer com a hipótese de um dia o virmos a ser. Atemo-nos a um compromisso solene e por demais importante na História da Europa. A  Alemanha, que de um modo irracional e maléfico nos envolveu na pior guerra da história da humanidade,  ainda não pagou tudo o que nos deve. Pensem nisto. É bom que as coisas sejam ditas, de uma vez por todas,  para que não subsistam dúvidas.

            Se querem sair do euro que o digam claramente, se querem acabar com a União Europeia que o assumam, se querem voltar aos desvarios do passado que o digam, aqui e agora. Vamos lá ver se nos entendemos:  temos de tomar medidas e com urgência, por conseguinte deixem-se de merdas.

            No fundo a pergunta impõe-se: Quo vadis, Europa? Com os bifes a quererem sair de qualquer maneira e com hiper-abundância de argumentos (deles, entenda-se), com os franciús sem rumo, comandados por essa aventesma sem ideias, nem carisma, chamado Sarkozy , com os italianos na cóboiada e no bródio tão ao gosto de  Berlusconi. Os outros...Bom, os outros ou estão em crise, ou não existem ou são irrelevantes. A Europa necessita de liderança e com esta gente não vamos a parte alguma. Esta é que é a verdadeira crise, o resto é conversa.  

    Em suma: todas as crises são iguais só que nuns casos são mais crises do que noutros.

PIGS, SWINE and other not so clean animals 

Mais uma vez o “FinancialTimes” (edição de anteontem) publica um artigo de fundo, que pretende ser objectivo, minimamente simpático, escrito até por um indivíduo da “espécie porcina” (neste caso, um espanhol), sobre os PIGS. Assim, sob o título

” Spain’s World Cup shows that Pigs can fly” José Ignacio Torreblanca, na edição do FT de 12 de Julho (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eda5d418-8de3-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html), fala da justa vitória da Espanha no campeonato do mundo, para se referir aos problemas políticos, económicos e sociais que o país vizinho atravessa e que não são poucos. Pena é que o grupo a que a Espanha pertence seja o dos “porcos”, uma designação estúpida, pejorativa, injuriosa e mesmo aviltante, mas ninguém chama aos anglo-saxões, germânicos, nórdicos e quejandos, “suínos”. A propósito se os habitantes de Marrocos são marroquinos, porque é que os suecos não hão-de chamar-se suínos? Estas designações depreciativas e imbecis tão ao gosto dos povos bárbaros do Norte, que não têm espelhos em casa, têm de acabar. Aliás, foram eles  que inventaram o “politicamente incorrecto”. Não é verdade?

Os porcos na pocilga (“Pigs in the muck” como há tempos escrevia o mesmo FT, expressão que obteve grande êxito entre os seus leitores setentrionais) é uma designação típica desses racistas que tudo o que não for branquinho (de preferência louro e de olhos azuis), protestante e de boa estirpe (germano-nórdica-anglo-saxona) não se deve sentar à mesa mas ir chafurdar para a lama.

Foi para isto que ingressámos na Europa que não nos quer?

Se quem está arrependido da porta que nos abriu

Bem pode ir depressa para a puta que o pariu

Crise? Soluções. Existem?
Creio que vale a pena ler. Quem sai?  A Alemanha ou a Grécia? Ou dobramos a finados pela Eurozona? Estamos todos metidos no mesmo barco e não sâo os nossos troca-tintas que nos ajudam a sair desta confusão. Especulações à parte, há muito que sabiam no que poderia ser realmente o resultado desta aventura. Quem nos acode?

Germany, Greece and Exiting the Eurozone

May 18, 2010

By Marko Papic, Robert Reinfrank and Peter Zeihan

Rumors of the imminent collapse of the eurozone continue to swirl despite the Europeans’ best efforts to hold the currency union together. Some accounts in the financial world have even suggested that Germany’s frustration with the crisis could cause Berlin to quit the eurozone — as soon as this past weekend, according to some — while at the most recent gathering of European leaders French President Nicolas Sarkozy apparently threatened to bolt the bloc if Berlin did not help Greece. Meanwhile, many in Germany — including Chancellor Angela Merkel herself at one point — have called for the creation of a mechanism by which Greece — or the eurozone’s other over-indebted, uncompetitive economies — could be kicked out of the eurozone in the future should they not mend their “irresponsible” spending habits.

Rumors, hints, threats, suggestions and information “from well-placed sources” all seem to point to the hot topic in Europe at the moment, namely, the reconstitution of the eurozone whether by a German exit or a Greek expulsion. We turn to this topic with the question of whether such an option even exists.

The Geography of the European Monetary Union

As we consider the future of the euro, it is important to remember that the economic underpinnings of paper money are not nearly as important as the political underpinnings. Paper currencies in use throughout the world today hold no value without the underlying political decision to make them the legal tender of commercial activity. This means a government must be willing and capable enough to enforce the currency as a legal form of debt settlement, and refusal to accept paper currency is, within limitations, punishable by law.

The trouble with the euro is that it attempts to overlay a monetary dynamic on a geography that does not necessarily lend itself to a single economic or political “space.” The eurozone has a single central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), and therefore has only one monetary policy, regardless of whether one is located in Northern or Southern Europe. Herein lies the fundamental geographic problem of the euro.

Europe is the second-smallest continent on the planet but has the second-largest number of states packed into its territory. This is not a coincidence. Europe’s multitude of peninsulas, large islands and mountain chains create the geographic conditions that often allow even the weakest political authority to persist. Thus, the Montenegrins have held out against the Ottomans, just as the Irish have against the English.

Despite this patchwork of political authorities, the Continent’s plentiful navigable rivers, large bays and serrated coastlines enable the easy movement of goods and ideas across Europe. This encourages the accumulation of capital due to the low costs of transport while simultaneously encouraging the rapid spread of technological advances, which has allowed the various European states to become astonishingly rich: Five of the top 10 world economies hail from the Continent despite their relatively small populations.

Europe’s network of rivers and seas are not integrated via a single dominant river or sea network, however, meaning capital generation occurs in small, sequestered economic centers. To this day, and despite significant political and economic integration, there is no European New York. In Europe’s case, the Danube has Vienna, the Po has Milan, the Baltic Sea has Stockholm, the Rhineland has both Amsterdam and Frankfurt and the Thames has London. This system of multiple capital centers is then overlaid on Europe’s states, which jealously guard control over their capital and, by extension, their banking systems.

Despite a multitude of different centers of economic — and by extension, political — power, some states, due to geography, are unable to access any capital centers of their own. Much of the Club Med states are geographically disadvantaged. Aside from the Po Valley of northern Italy — and to an extent the Rhone — southern Europe lacks a single river useful for commerce. Consequently, Northern Europe is more urban, industrial and technocratic while Southern Europe tends to be more rural, agricultural and capital-poor.

Introducing the Euro

Given the barrage of economic volatility and challenges the eurozone has confronted in recent quarters and the challenges presented by housing such divergent geography and history under one monetary roof, it is easy to forget why the eurozone was originally formed.

The Cold War made the European Union possible. For centuries, Europe was home to feuding empires and states. After World War II, it became the home of devastated peoples whose security was the responsibility of the United States. Through the Bretton Woods agreement, the United States crafted an economic grouping that regenerated Western Europe’s economic fortunes under a security rubric that Washington firmly controlled. Freed of security competition, the Europeans not only were free to pursue economic growth, they also enjoyed nearly unlimited access to the American market to fuel that growth. Economic integration within Europe to maximize these opportunities made perfect sense. The United States encouraged the economic and political integration because it gave a political underpinning to a security alliance it imposed on Europe, i.e., NATO. Thus, the European Economic Community — the predecessor to today’s European Union — was born.

When the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971 (for reasons largely unconnected to things European), Washington essentially abrogated the Bretton Woods currency pegs that went with it. One result was a European panic. Floating currencies raised the inevitability of currency competition among the European states, the exact sort of competition that contributed to the Great Depression 40 years earlier. Almost immediately, the need to limit that competition sharpened, first with currency coordination efforts still concentrating on the U.S. dollar and then from 1979 on with efforts focused on the deutschmark. The specter of a unified Germany in 1989 further invigorated economic integration. The euro was in large part an attempt to give Berlin the necessary incentives so that it would not depart the EU project.

But to get Berlin on board with the idea of sharing its currency with the rest of Europe, the eurozone was modeled after the Bundesbank and its deutschmark. To join the eurozone, a country must abide by rigorous “convergence criteria” designed to synchronize the economy of the acceding country with Germany’s economy. The criteria include a budget deficit of less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); government debt levels of less than 60 percent of GDP; annual inflation no higher than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the lowest three members’ annual inflation; and a two-year trial period during which the acceding country’s national currency must float within a plus-or-minus 15 percent currency band against the euro.

As cracks have begun to show in both the political and economic support for the eurozone, however, it is clear that the convergence criteria failed to overcome divergent geography and history. Greece’s violations of the Growth and Stability Pact are clearly the most egregious, but essentially all eurozone members — including France and Germany, which helped draft the rules — have contravened the rules from the very beginning.

Mechanics of a Euro Exit

The EU treaties as presently constituted contractually obligate every EU member state — except Denmark and the United Kingdom, which negotiated opt-outs — to become a eurozone member state at some point. Forcible expulsion or self-imposed exit is technically illegal, or at best would require the approval of all 27 member states (never mind the question about why a troubled eurozone member would approve its own expulsion). Even if it could be managed, surely there are current and soon-to-be eurozone members that would be wary of establishing such a precedent, especially when their fiscal situation could soon be similar to Athens’ situation.

One creative option making the rounds would allow the European Union to technically expel members without breaking the treaties. It would involve setting up a new European Union without the offending state (say, Greece) and establishing within the new institutions a new eurozone as well. Such manipulations would not necessarily destroy the existing European Union; its major members would “simply” recreate the institutions without the member they do not much care for.

Though creative, the proposed solution it is still rife with problems. In such a reduced eurozone, Germany would hold undisputed power, something the rest of Europe might not exactly embrace. If France and the Benelux countries reconstituted the eurozone with Berlin, Germany’s economy would go from constituting 26.8 percent of eurozone version 1.0’s overall output to 45.6 percent of eurozone version 2.0’s overall output. Even states that would be expressly excluded would be able to get in a devastating parting shot: The southern European economies could simply default on any debt held by entities within the countries of the new eurozone.

With these political issues and complications in mind, we turn to the two scenarios of eurozone reconstitution that have garnered the most attention in the media.

Scenario 1: Germany Reinstitutes the Deutschmark

The option of leaving the eurozone for Germany boils down to the potential liabilities that Berlin would be on the hook for if Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland followed Greece down the default path. As Germany prepares itself to vote on its 123 billion euro contribution to the 750 billion euro financial aid mechanism for the eurozone — which sits on top of the 23 billion euros it already approved for Athens alone — the question of whether “it is all worth it” must be on top of every German policymaker’s mind.

This is especially the case as political opposition to the bailout mounts among German voters and Merkel’s coalition partners and political allies. In the latest polls, 47 percent of Germans favor adopting the deutschmark. Furthermore, Merkel’s governing coalition lost a crucial state-level election May 9 in a sign of mounting dissatisfaction with her Christian Democratic Union and its coalition ally, the Free Democratic Party. Even though the governing coalition managed to push through the Greek bailout, there are now serious doubts that Merkel will be able to do the same with the eurozone-wide mechanism May 21.

Germany would therefore not be leaving the eurozone to save its economy or extricate itself from its own debts, but rather to avoid the financial burden of supporting the Club Med economies and their ability to service their 3 trillion euro mountain of debt. At some point, Germany may decide to cut its losses — potentially as much as 500 billion euros, which is the approximate exposure of German banks to Club Med debt — and decide that further bailouts are just throwing money into a bottomless pit. Furthermore, while Germany could always simply rely on the ECB to break all of its rules and begin the policy of purchasing the debt of troubled eurozone governments with newly created money (“quantitative easing”), that in itself would also constitute a bailout. The rest of the eurozone, including Germany, would be paying for it through the weakening of the euro.

Were this moment to dawn on Germany it would have to mean that the situation had deteriorated significantly. As STRATFOR has recently argued, the eurozone provides Germany with considerable economic benefits. Its neighbors are unable to undercut German exports with currency depreciation, and German exports have in turn gained in terms of overall eurozone exports on both the global and eurozone markets. Since euro adoption, unit labor costs in Club Med have increased relative to Germany’s by approximately 25 percent, further entrenching Germany’s competitive edge.

Before Germany could again use the deutschmark, Germany would first have to reinstate its central bank (the Bundesbank), withdraw its reserves from the ECB, print its own currency and then re-denominate the country’s assets and liabilities in deutschmarks. While it would not necessarily be a smooth or easy process, Germany could reintroduce its national currency with far more ease than other eurozone members could.

The deutschmark had a well-established reputation for being a store of value, as the renowned Bundesbank directed Germany’s monetary policy. If Germany were to reintroduce its national currency, it is highly unlikely that Europeans would believe that Germany had forgotten how to run a central bank — Germany’s institutional memory would return quickly, re-establishing the credibility of both the Bundesbank and, by extension, the deutschmark.

As Germany would be replacing a weaker and weakening currency with a stronger and more stable one, if market participants did not simply welcome the exchange, they would be substantially less resistant to the change than what could be expected in other eurozone countries. Germany would therefore not necessarily have to resort to militant crackdowns on capital flows to halt capital trying to escape conversion.

Germany would probably also be able to re-denominate all its debts in the deutschmark via bond swaps. Market participants would accept this exchange because they would probably have far more faith in a deutschmark backed by Germany than in a euro backed by the remaining eurozone member states.

Reinstituting the deutschmark would still be an imperfect process, however, and there would likely be some collateral damage, particularly to Germany’s financial sector. German banks own much of the debt issued by Club Med, which would likely default on repayment in the event Germany parted with the euro. If it reached the point that Germany was going to break with the eurozone, those losses would likely pale in comparison to the costs — be they economic or political — of remaining within the eurozone and financially supporting its continued existence.

Scenario 2: Greece Leaves the Euro

If Athens were able to control its monetary policy, it would ostensibly be able to “solve” the two major problems currently plaguing the Greek economy.

First, Athens could ease its financing problems substantially. The Greek central bank could print money and purchase government debt, bypassing the credit markets. Second, reintroducing its currency would allow Athens to then devalue it, which would stimulate external demand for Greek exports and spur economic growth. This would obviate the need to undergo painful “internal devaluation” via austerity measures that the Greeks have been forced to impose as a condition for their bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.

If Athens were to reinstitute its national currency with the goal of being able to control monetary policy, however, the government would first have to get its national currency circulating (a necessary condition for devaluation).

The first practical problem is that no one is going to want this new currency, principally because it would be clear that the government would only be reintroducing it to devalue it. Unlike during the Eurozone accession process — where participation was motivated by the actual and perceived benefits of adopting a strong/stable currency and receiving lower interest rates, new funds and the ability to transact in many more places — “de-euroizing” offers no such incentives for market participants:

• The drachma would not be a store of value, given that the objective in reintroducing it is to reduce its value.
• The drachma would likely only be accepted within Greece, and even there it would not be accepted everywhere — a condition likely to persist for some time.
• Reinstituting the drachma unilaterally would likely see Greece cast out of the eurozone, and therefore also the European Union as per rules explained above.

The government would essentially be asking investors and its own population to sign a social contract that the government clearly intends to abrogate in the future, if not immediately once it is able to. Therefore, the only way to get the currency circulating would be by force.

The goal would not be to convert every euro-denominated asset into drachmas but rather to get a sufficiently large chunk of the assets so that the government could jumpstart the drachma’s circulation. To be done effectively, the government would want to minimize the amount of money that could escape conversion by either being withdrawn or transferred into asset classes easy to conceal from discovery and appropriation. This would require capital controls and shutting down banks and likely also physical force to prevent even more chaos on the streets of Athens than seen at present. Once the money was locked down, the government would then forcibly convert banks’ holdings by literally replacing banks’ holdings with a similar amount in the national currency. Greeks could then only withdraw their funds in newly issued drachmas that the government gave the banks to service those requests. At the same time, all government spending/payments would be made in the national currency, boosting circulation. The government also would have to show willingness to prosecute anyone using euros on the black market, lest the newly instituted drachma become completely worthless.

Since nobody save the government would want to do this, at the first hint that the government would be moving in this direction, the first thing the Greeks will want to do is withdraw all funds from any institution where their wealth would be at risk. Similarly, the first thing that investors would do — and remember that Greece is as capital-poor as Germany is capital-rich — is cut all exposure. This would require that the forcible conversion be coordinated and definitive, and most important, it would need to be as unexpected as possible.

Realistically, the only way to make this transition without completely unhinging the Greek economy and shredding Greece’s social fabric would be to coordinate with organizations that could provide assistance and oversight. If the IMF, ECB or eurozone member states were to coordinate the transition period and perhaps provide some backing for the national currency’s value during that transition period, the chances of a less-than-completely-disruptive transition would increase.

It is difficult to imagine circumstances under which such help would manifest itself in assistance that would dwarf the 110 billion euro bailout already on the table. For if Europe’s populations are so resistant to the Greek bailout now, what would they think about their governments assuming even more risk by propping up a former eurozone country’s entire financial system so that the country could escape its debt responsibilities to the rest of the eurozone?

The European Dilemma

Europe therefore finds itself being tied in a Gordian knot. On one hand, the Continent’s geography presents a number of incongruities that cannot be overcome without a Herculean (and politically unpalatable) effort on the part of Southern Europe and (equally unpopular) accommodation on the part of Northern Europe. On the other hand, the cost of exit from the eurozone — particularly at a time of global financial calamity, when the move would be in danger of precipitating an even greater crisis — is daunting to say the least.

The resulting conundrum is one in which reconstitution of the eurozone may make sense at some point down the line. But the interlinked web of economic, political, legal and institutional relationships makes this nearly impossible. The cost of exit is prohibitively high, regardless of whether it makes sense.

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Construção da Europa e egoísmo nacionalista 1/5 - 

Após várias semanas de hesitação, em nosso entender fatais para a sorte da crise financeira global, do Euro e da própria Europa, cujas repercussões, ainda agora mal se começaram a esboçar, os alemães, detentores da chave do problema, lá se decidiram, ainda que relutantemente, a apoiar em termos financeiros a Grécia, mas, com a quase certeza de que Merkel perderia, como perdeu, as eleições cruciais na Renânia-Norte Vestefália, deixando a CDU de ser maioritária no Bundestag.

Neste gesto, a Alemanha e outros parceiros (França e não só) pressionaram de forma musculada alguns países – Espanha, Portugal, Itália e Irlanda – a porem de imediato a casa em ordem. No caso português,  o aldra-bilhas Sócrates meteu os pés pelas mãos e depois de ter dito 478 vezes que não aumentava impostos lá se viu forçado a fazê-lo, depois de ter dito que as grandes obras iam para a frente, só uma avança (a do  troço do Comboio de Alta Velocidade Poceirão-Caia, presumindo-se que os passageiros seguem do Poceirão para o Barreiro em comboio a vapor e, em seguida, de cacilheiro para o Terreiro do Paço).  Sócrates desdiz-se e mentiu mais uma vez, mas, meu Deus, são tantas as mentirolas...

Os alemães, irritados, não quiseram ajudar os gregos, nem querem ouvir falar no pacote dos 600 mil milhões de euros para acudir aos fogos que irão eclodir um pouco por toda a parte e que serão muitos. Na lógica germânica: se o problema  é grego, os gregos que o resolvam.  Para o homem da rua na Alemanha, o problema não é, pois, europeu. A óptica grega expressa-se exactamente no sentido oposto, entendendo que os problemas gregos são problemas europeus, razão pela qual aderiram à U.E. First things, first!

Trata-se de uma problema que não é exclusivamente grego, mas comum a todos os países que aderiram à U.E., designadamente os da Europa meridional e da Europa central. Neste momento,  emergem com maior mediatismo – e por razões que se conhecem - os problemas mediterrânicos, mas na Europa central e oriental são idênticos.

Esta questão é fulcral para o futuro da U.E.

Exército Secreto Europeu - Para vossa informação. Vendo o peixe como o comprei. As páginas da Net estão abertas à vossa consulta

Existe um EXÉRCITO SECRETO EUROPEU, que também pode ser chamado de FORÇA SECRETA POLICIAL DE INTERVENÇÃO PARA O ESMAGAMENTO DE REVOLTAS NA EUROPA.

Já se encontra dentro da União Europeia, porém apenas muito poucos sabem disso.

A força possui os mais amplos direitos, tem de momento 3.000 homens e responde pelo nome de “EURO GENDFOR (EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE)”, ou seja, TROPA DE POLÍCIA EUROPEIA. O seu comando encontra-se em Vicenza, na Itália, longe do Centro da UE.

Quem deu vida a este projecto foi a Ministra da Defesa Francesa, Alliot-Marie, com o objectivo de mais facilmente esmagar levantamentos populares, como os que têm surgido frequentemente em cidades francesas.

Esta força, já existente, pode agora ser empregue por toda a União Europeia, anulando os direitos nacionais e as soberanias dos Estados Membros!

O Tratado de Velsen (Holanda), decidiu de forma inequívoca, que vai ser um CONSELHO DE GUERRA, que vai decidir sobre a sua actuação. Este conselho compõe-se dos Ministérios de Defesa e de Segurança dos países membros da UE, inclusivamente do país onde vai ser aplicado.

Aos olhos dos observadores trata-se de uma clara manifestação de um DIREITO DE OCUPAÇÃO DA EUROPA. Porque, desde que tenha sido decidido por unidades da EURO GENDFOR a ocupação de edifícios e regiões, ficam estas debaixo da sua alçada, já não podendo sequer ser visitadas pelos organismos oficiais do país a que territorialmente pertencem. De facto, existe assim um DIREITO DE OCUPAÇÃO EUROPEU. Porém, a situação pode vir a piorar ainda mais.

A EURO GENDFOR não possui apenas os direitos policiais, mas também a competência sobre os serviços secretos, e, pode, em estreita colaboração com forças militares, restabelecer a lei e a ordem nas zonas consideradas convenientes. Em caso de necessidade, deve esta tropa possuir todos os direitos e acessos a todos os meios considerados necessários, para executar o respectivo mandato.

Graças à EURO GENDFOR encontram-se os governos europeus à vontade. Desta forma podem ordenar o abrir fogo contra as próprias populações em caso de demonstrações de massas, colocar regiões inteiras sobre quarentena militar e prender os principais cabecilhas, sem ter de chamar militares, ou polícias, da sua própria nação, visto existir o perigo destes se solidarizarem com os revoltosos.

A EURO GENDFOR, por sua vez, graças às suas excepcionais atribuições de direitos civis e militares, não pode ser responsabilizada por ninguém.

Este cenário, que parece incrível, tornou-se agora possível através da entrada em vigor do TRATADO DE LISBOA, que não é mais do que a Constituição da UE sob novo título.

http://www.grifo.com.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=1

———//———

Esta noticia deixou-nos particularmente curiosos, tendo alguns dos membros ido investigar melhor e eis o que se descobriu acerca desta temática.

Esta força existe mesmo: http://www.eurogendfor.eu.

Reparem no que está escrito na pagina de introdução:

“The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is an initiative of 5 EU Member States - France, Italy, The Netherlands,Portugal and Spain – aimed at improving the crisis management capability in sensitive areas. Since Wednesday, 17^thDecember 2008, the High Level Interdepartmental Committee Meeting (CIMIN) decided to welcome the Romanian Gendarmerie to become a full member of the EGF. Therefore the EGF consists from that moment of 6 member states.“
Iniciativa de Portugal?! Porque nunca ouvimos falar disto antes?!

”EGF responds to the need to rapidly conduct all the spectrum of civil security actions, either on its own or in parallel with the military intervention, by providing a multinational and effective tool.
The EGF will facilitate the handling of crisis that require management by police forces, usually in a critical situation, also taking advantage from the experience already gained in the relevant peace-keeping missions.”

As suas funções são:

- responder à necessidade imediata de conduzir todo o espectro da acções de segurança civil.

Como?

- Sozinhos ou em cooperação cm as forças militares intervenientes.

Reparem que são uma força multinacional, o mail está correcto também nesse ponto.

Based in Vicenza in the “Generale Chinotto” barracks, the EGF HQ is now developing a comprehensive and coherent operational system, which will permit to be ready in case of prompt deployment to crisis areas.”

O quartel general (HQ) está em Vicenza,  Italia (confirma) e reforçam a prontidão das forças.

EGF goal is to provide the International Community with a valid and operational instrument for crisis management, first and foremost at disposal of EU, but also of other International Organizations, as NATO, UN and OSCE, and ad hoc coalitions.

Olhem só o objectivo:

Providenciar a Comunidade Internacional com um instrumento valido e operacional para a gestão de crises, à disposição total da EU, mas também para outras Organizações Internacionais, como a Nato, NU e a OSCE e suas coligações.

Mas ainda há mais!

Vejam quem é o Comandante da Força!

Colonel Jorge ESTEVES (Portuguese GNR)

É português?! E nunca passou nas noticias nacionais uma coisa destas?!

Segundo o site ele comanda desde 26/6/2009, cargo que deixará  em 2011.

É da GNR! Agora se percebe porque é que escolhem a GNR para ir para manutenção de paz (como Bósnia, Timor, Afeganistão, Iraque, etç.) em vez das tropas mais especializadas…. Estão a treiná-los em situações reais.

O homem é de Abrantes, tem 52 anos e veio do Regimento de  Cavalaria, vejam o CV do personagem:

“As a high-ranking Officer he has been Territorial Group Commander, Head of the 3rd Territorial Brigade Operations and Information’s Office, Head of the 3rd Territorial Brigade Criminal Investigation Office, 3rd Territorial Brigade Chief of Staff and 3rd Territorial Brigade Deputy Commander (2000 – 2007). During 2006 he integrated the Working Group for the Reform of the Portuguese Internal Security System. From 2004 to 2007 he was Assistant Lecturer of Military Sociology at the Military Academy in Lisbon. From July 2007 till June 2009 he has been the European Gendarmerie Force Chief of Staff.

He attended several courses related with Crisis Management Operations among them the United Nations Police Commander Course, the Strategic Planning for European Union Police Mission Course, the European Security and Defence Policy Orientation Course, the NATO Staff Officer Force Planning Course and the NATO Partnership for Peace Staff Officer Course.”

Ora bem vamos lá analisar o que podem fazer!

A nível estratégico:

- Fazer policiamento em operações de gestão de crise, com base nas conclusões dos Conselhos de Santa Maria da Feira e de Nice:

http://www.ena.lu/conclusions_santa_maria_da_feira_european_council_1920_june_2000-02-27325%20target=http://www.ena.lu/conclusions_nice_european_council_7_9_december_2000-02-17960

- Quem pode usar esta Força?

EU, NU, OSCE, NATO, outras e coligações.

- Quem ordena?

A Estrutura de Comando é a CIMIN (Comité InterMiistériel de haut Niveau) composta pelos representantes dos responsáveis pelos Ministérios de cada Pais, que assegura coordenação político-militar, nomeia o Comandante da Força e provisiona-lhe directivas e orientações para o emprego.

Qual a estrutura da Força?

E a nível táctico?

- A Força pode ser posta sob o comando quer tanto de autoridades militares como de civis, por forma a assegurar a segurança publica, ordem publica e o funcionamento pleno das tarefas judiciais. (Entrega de alimentos, cuidados médicos não interessa!)

- Não é uma força permanente (é só para repor a ordem… a ordem deles, é uma Força de Intervenção).

- A força é formada num máximo de 800 oficiais de policia, em menos de 30 dias. Para quem ainda não perceba como é que funciona, explicamos, existe um HQ permanente em Itália e quando necessitam formam uma força e essa é enviada para a crise, depois de fazer o que tem a fazer esta força é desmantelada.

Mas afinal o que é que eles tem a fazer?

– Missões gerais de segurança publica;
- Missões de manutenção da ordem publica - Combate ao crime;
- Investigação criminal (detecção, recolha, analise de informação);
- Processamento, protecção e assistência de indivíduos;
- Controlo de tráfego;
- Desactivação de explosivos;
- Combate ao terrorismo e crimes maiores e outros especializados;
- Armazenamento, gestão, recuperação e evacuação de equipamentos, transportes, e ajuda medica (não se deixem enganar por este último ponto, pois reparem que não existe distribuição nem de propriamente a ajuda, apenas a organizam);
- Monitorizar e aconselhar a policia  local no seu trabalho do dia-a-dia;
- Vigilância do publico;
- Policiamento das fronteiras;
- Serviços secretos;
- Protecção de pessoas e propriedades (esta até é cómica! Vamos ver quem são essas pessoas e propriedades…);
- Treino de oficiais de policia e de instrutores.

Por fim vamos aos símbolos, este é o logótipo da força em questão:

- O mote “Lex Paciferat” (A Lei trará a Paz);
- A espada como cruz invertida;
- O louro maçónico;
- A granada a rebentar (parece uma planta, mas é uma granada e as chamas a sair dela) – Pacifistas vê-se…

Sendo tudo isto tão interessante porque não passou nos média nacionais e europeus?