Obama - Osama

Carlos Fuentes

9 May. 11

La minoría extrema de la derecha en EE.UU., el Tea Party, quiere enjuiciarlo y expulsarlo de la presidencia. La mayoría del Partido Republicano busca mil maneras de dificultarle el ejercicio del poder. Donald Trump, peinado por la ley de la gravedad, duda de que Obama sea ciudadano de los EE.UU. Las reformas del presidente a las leyes de salud son disputadas por los intereses favorables a una medicina des-regulada, que sirva a compañías de seguros, negándoles seguridad a los ancianos y a los enfermos irremediables. Las leyes que han salvado a la industria automotriz ni se discuten. Pero las leyes para la banca son burladas por los salarios estratosféricos que los banqueros se atribuyen a sí mismos.

La derecha critica sistemáticamente a Barack Obama y algunos lo consideran "comunista". La extrema izquierda, asimismo, siente que sus políticas son demasiado tímidas. Y un periodista, hace un par de semanas, le espetó en la reunión del presidente con la prensa: "¿Por qué tolera usted el terrorismo y no hace nada al respecto?".

Como es su costumbre, Obama mantiene la calma, sonríe y luego actúa. Tiene que vérselas con un Congreso que no le da todo lo que quiere. Debe negociar, sin ceder ante el Tea Party pero arrebatándole a esa facción legisladores republicanos por gracia del acuerdo moderado.

Todo ello sitúa a Obama en el centro del espectro político, a veces más a la derecha pero sólo en virtud de negociaciones que inevitablemente conceden, a veces más a la izquierda donde está el corazón del profesor de Harvard que prefirió ser consejero de causas sociales y combatir a la pobreza en Chicago, que abogado de grandes compañías en Nueva York.

Pero en el centro-centro, en el corazón de corazones, está un hombre tranquilo, lejano a la "gracia" exigida al político del norte, reservado y dispuesto, llegado el caso, a actuar con todo el poder a su alcance para obtener resultados precisos, aunque peligrosos y a veces hasta imprevisibles.

Este es el Barack Obama que ordenó el asalto a la fortaleza invisible por su visibilidad, del terrorista Osama Bin-laden en Pakistán. Operación unilateral y silenciosa: el gobierno de Pakistán no es confiable y hace fortuna con su duplicidad. Operación encargada a los Seals, equipo sin compasión o dilación que en cuarenta minutos descabezó a Al-Qaeda diez años después de los ataques suicidas del 9/11 a Nueva York, Pennsylvania y Washington y los veintidós -veintidós- ataques de Al-Qaeda a hoteles, sinagogas, consulados, automóviles, trenes, refinerías, embajadas, de Túnez a Madrid, de Londres a Riyadh, de Filipinas a Marruecos, con más de ochocientos muertos, aparte de los tres mil asesinados en los ataques a las Torres Gemelas en septiembre de 2001.

¿Merecía compasión este asesino en serie, Osama Bin-laden? ¿Merecía llegar vivo a un tribunal para ser juzgado y sentenciado por sus crímenes? Esto se debate hoy. Lo indebatible es la vida perdida por tantos inocentes en todo el mundo por la saña ideológica de Bin-laden. No lo excusa su fe, como no excusó la fe a la Santa Inquisición ni la falta de fe al emperador romano Nerón. La creencia -en el nazismo, el comunismo, el nacionalismo, el imperialismo- no excusa una sola muerte inocente. Invocando a Alá, Osama Bin-laden actuaba en nombre del Diablo, un diablo, es cierto, que muchos seres humanos llevamos dentro pero al que no le damos rienda suelta por una sola y profunda razón: el respeto a las vidas ajenas.

Osama Bin-laden carecía de ese respeto a los demás. Todos eran carne de su cañón ideológico-religioso. Osama tiñó a la religión de Mahoma de un color -el de la muerte- que no es el de Islam. Muchos ciudadanos de su cultura religiosa se dieron cuenta de la falsedad y lo abandonaron. Al morir Bin-laden, el Yihadismo era ya una bandera rasgada, casi el cruel capricho de un árabe multimillonario decidido a seguir jugando a la guerra.

Destaco, con alegría, que la muerte de Bin-laden, por más que su cadáver siga provocando sobresaltos, coincide con el despertar democrático del norte de África, de Siria y Yemen. Una gran fortuna: estos movimientos de libertad no han sido auspiciados por el Occidente. No podían serlo: Europa y los EE.UU., en proporciones distintas, apoyaron a los dictadores de Túnez y Egipto y aún al lunático Gadafi en Libia. Mubarak, en Egipto, aceptó esta anomalía para negarle vida a la Palestina libre que, ahora, la Asamblea General de la ONU proclamará el venidero septiembre, dándole serios dolores de cabeza a Benjamin Netanyahu y proponiendo dos grandes cambios: que el centro-izquierda vuelva al poder en Israel y que la facción palestina Hamas reconozca al estado judío.

El Occidente tiene graves culpas que purgar en el área mediterránea. Ahora, le toca reconocer y apoyar a los movimientos democráticos de Egipto y Túnez, de Marruecos y Yemen, de Siria y Argelia. Apoyarlos mas no encabezarlos. La singularidad de lo ocurrido en calles y plazas de El Cairo y Damasco y Túnez y Marrakech es que ocurre sin manipulación externa, europea o norteamericana. Son movimientos locales, propios de cada sociedad y a cada sociedad le corresponde trazarse su propio porvenir y saldar su propio pasado. Jóvenes, estudiantes, clase media, trabajadores, amas de casa: son visibles, allí están. Con ellos está la esperanza de países norafricanos libres, de un Mediterráneo sur sin ninguna obligación con el Mediterráneo norte que la de la relación normal en democracia.

Faltan muchas batallas. Habrá muchos retrocesos. Pero la realidad está clara y está alli.

Nota: Carlos Fuentes é um dos mais conhecidos escritores e ensaístas mexicanos e uma referência das letras e cultura ibero-americanas. 

Egipto: pirâmides sem sombra

Para os EUA, para o Ocidente em geral e, principalmente, para Israel, o status quo vigente até há umas semanas atrás é sempre preferível a este estado de agitação e de instabilidade permanentes sem rumo determinado. O problema principal consiste, pois, na imprevisibilidade, uma vez que pode – e naturalmente vai – emergir uma situação complexa e desconhecida. De momento os acontecimentos que se sucedem em catadupa parecem conduzir a uma conjuntura caracterizada pela  fluidez.

Com efeito, no Egipto, o regime sempre foi militar. Nasser, Sadat e Mubarak vieram todos eles das fileiras. Qualquer deles esteve no poder porque a classe castrense egípcia assim entendeu que devia ser. As mudanças introduzidas por Mubarak, vão no sentido de dar ainda mais força às Forças Armadas: os novos Vice-presidente e PM são militares.

Mas quais são ou podem ser os cenários futuros?

Antes do mais, o regime pode reinventar-se a si próprio. Retira algumas cartas do baralho e prossegue com outras cartas o mesmo jogo, introduzindo algumas alterações cosméticas, podendo-o fazer com Mubarak ou, em alternativa, com uma outra figura militar. Num segundo cenário, realizam-se eleições com resultados inconclusivos forçando a uma coligação que, muito presumivelmente, só será possível com a  Irmandade Muçulmana, a principal (senão, mesmo, a única) força política organizada do pais. Aí, o Egipto entra por uma via de radicalização acelerada e tudo pode acontecer. Uma aliança com o mundo islâmico anti-ocidental e anti-Israel é perfeitamente possível. Esta radicalização do Egipto, dada a sua dimensão regional, conduzirá a uma radicalização de todo o mundo islâmico ( e neste caso, o afastamento da Turquia do campo ocidental, já visível e a sua aproximação ao Egipto é uma mera hipótese, porém, plausível e preocupante). Num terceiro cenário, a criação de um estado laico, reclamada por algumas elites, é, por ora, altamente improvável, porque depararia com a oposição firme da rua.

Assim, o triângulo Egipto-Turquia-Irão, em que cada um dos vértices apresenta características próprias  que as distinguem dos demais poderá conduzir, mas não necessariamente , a uma onda de radicalismo. Nesta matéria, quaisquer previsões são prematuras.

Independentemente da solução encontrada o Egipto vai-se afirmar face aos EUA e a Israel e esse é um dado praticamente adquirido, o que não quer dizer que irá denunciar os acordos de Camp David (1978).

Alguns apontamentos

É estranho que a U.E. venha, agora, reclamar, “eleições livres e justas” no Egipto, ao fim destes anos todos. Então porque não as reclamou antes? Não reclamou antes porque a situação então vigente era confortável e não convinha levantar ondas. O Egipto não era um regime opressivo e que não respeitava os direitos humanos? Opressivo, opressivo, havia bem pior...E os princípios? Bom... os princípios são isso mesmo. Variam consoante a latitude... Não vale a pena falar mais no assunto.

E El Baradei e o seu papel no meio de tudo isto? No fundo, é uma espécie de Gorbachov egípcio, conhecido e estimado além fronteiras e ignorado ou odiado intra-muros. Não terá grande relevância no processo interno do país sem respaldo militar consistente, sendo duvidoso que o consiga obter.

A fúria do regime (e dos militares) contra os media internacionais, como fautores de todos os problemas que o Egipto padece é um péssimo sinal. Daí o encerrar-se a Internet e a rede móvel, como se fosse possível isolar um país de 80 milhões de habitantes do mundo exterior, ao abrigo de alegados vírus perigosos que andam por aí à solta e que são a razão de todos os males. Registe-se que se é  o regime que manda  encerrar, os  militares mantém a interdição. Está tudo dito.    

Egipto: Revolta à beira Nilo

The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

January 29, 2011 | 2207 GMT

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt, remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s command in the air force (the most privileged military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the Republican Guard) and Egypt’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore (whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also itself.

This report is republished authorized by www.stratfor.com

Wikileaks

Taking Stock of WikiLeaks December 14, 2010 By George Friedman Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into pre-“Cablegate” and post-“Cablegate” eras. That was a bold claim. However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time now to address the following questions: First, how significant were the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position? Let’s begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term “informed opinion” deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren’t paying close attention, and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in any detail, you might have been surprised. Let’s consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S. troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for putting those civilians in harm’s way, not the uniformed troops who were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It follows from this that such actions against civilians are inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage. Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when controls fail — as they inevitably do — uncontrolled and potentially criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents violating the Geneva Conventions. Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential war crimes that were contained in the leaks. The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example, anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian power and most insistent that the United States do something about it. While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it required a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ statement in the leaks that the Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands. There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer. Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for diplomats to pretend that they don’t know of these things. Of course, Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly didn’t care, since the charges were all over Italian media. I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev being called “Batman and Robin.” That’s amusing, but it isn’t significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks. Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion, and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure of geopolitics. Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent. While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing. At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people. Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal tension is not, however, international tension. This raises the question of why diplomats can’t always simply state their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a person is in the company of certain other people than when that person is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and nations. And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a great deal of information about people who aren’t American that others certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn’t understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not to be found in what has been released so far. There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it is difficult to imagine a state — or a business or a church — acting without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work? This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs. Assange’s claims are made even more interesting in terms of his “thermonuclear” threat. Apparently there are massive files that will be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they will not be revealed if he is unharmed — otherwise the threat makes no sense. So, Assange’s position is that he has secrets and will keep them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not to, in which case the public has no need to know. It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in the first place. To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear solution. The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was information that was classified secret and below, with the vast majority being at the confidential, no-foreign-distribution level. This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S. government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be remembered that given their level of classification these files did not have the highest security around them because they were not seen as highly sensitive. Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was. Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of information that he had nothing to do with securing. Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is undoubtedly doing now. Assange cannot be guilty of treason, since he isn’t a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His best defense will be that he can’t be guilty of espionage because the material that was stolen was so trivial. I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of the material. I do know — given the material leaked so far — that there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it. Therefore, Assange’s claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the following point on this: “Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments — some governments — deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.” “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” I don’t like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case Robert Gates’ view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has redefined geopolitics, but it hasn’t come close. "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Israel - Nuclear - O governo israelita quer construir uma central nuclear para aliviar a respectiva dependência em relação ao carvão e ao gás natural e - por absurdo que pareça - foi ao ponto de convidar os seus vizinhos árabes a ajudarem no desenvolvimento da central.
Deve-se sublinhar que a  utilização conjunta de "Israel" e "nuclear" constituem um coquetel exploisvo ou, mesmo, um relâmpago fulminante em terras do Médio Oriente. Não obstante, o Ministro israelita das Infra-estruturas, Uzi landau, tentou diluir tensões, sugerindo que Israel espera desenvolver  energia nuclear em cooperação com cientistas e engenheiros dos "nossos vizinhos árabes", isto segundo um "take" da Associated Press.
Israel pode estar em condições de beneficiar das vantagens do nuclear (pacífico), mas estará o país preparado para um escrutínio suplementar do seu programa nuclear em geral, em que, como se sabe, corre com  insistência o rumor de que já foram desenvolvidas (e testadas) armas nucleares? 
A proposta é descabelada e arrisca-sea constituir mais um foco de tensão. Notícia a ser seguida.