Crise financeira – impasse em Washington! Sinais de alarme reais!

Segundo o “Der Spiegel on line international”, os líderes europeus expressaram desde sempre confiança  que os EUA encontrariam uma solução para o actual impasse sobre a dívida. Todavia, neste momento prevalece uma crescente preocupação de que isso não será assim. O Ministro alemão das Finanças Schäuble instou os legisladores norte-americanos a actuarem de forma responsável e outros dirigentes já advertiram para  consequências imprevisíveis se assim o não fizerem. Semana após semana, os investidores têm-se mostrado estranha e incaracteristicamente calmos perante a  incapacidade dos Estados Unidos em chegarem a acordo sobre uma solução que evite o incumprimento iminente.  Os  investidores que já estão habituados a fugirem em pânico do Euro ao menor sinal de apreensão quanto a endividamento na União Europeia encolhem os ombros perante o impasse prevalecente em Washington. “Acabarão por chegar a acordo...” parece ter sido a postura assumida até à data.

Todavia, as coisas começaram agora a mudar. Os títulos cotados em bolsa encetaram uma queda acentuada,  ontem, em Wall Street, com o Dow Jones a cair 200 pontos e as taxas de juro dos T-bonds a subirem.  Os investidores começaram a comprar credit default swaps como medida de segurança contra um eventual incumprimento.

A Europa também  está preocupada. Assim, como, recentemente, os EUA insistiram que a Euro zona acelerasse os seus esforços para resolver a crise da dívida grega, os líderes europeus estão a exigir que Washington tome medidas, no imediato.

Não é, pois, fantasioso, nem  descartável, um cenário de insolvência real dos EUA. A nova Directora do FMI, Christine Lagarde já manifestou a sua preocupação pelo incumprimento nestes termos: “[it is a] very, very serious event, not just for the US, but for the global economy at large."

Germany's Choice: Part 2

Created Jul 26 2011 - 03:49

  

Related Link

•               Germany’s Choice

•               Germany: Mitteleuropa Redux

By Peter Zeihan and Marko Papic

Seventeen months ago, STRATFOR described how the future of Europe was bound to the decision-making processes in Germany. Throughout the post-World War II era, other European countries treated Germany as a feeding trough, bleeding the country for resources (primarily financial) in order to smooth over the rougher portions of their systems. Considering the carnage wrought in World War II, most Europeans — and even many Germans — considered this perfectly reasonable right up to the current decade. Germany dutifully followed the orders of the others, most notably the French, and wrote check after check to underwrite European solidarity.

However, with the end of the Cold War and German reunification, the Germans began to stand up for themselves once again. Europe’s contemporary financial crisis can be as complicated as one wants to make it, but strip away all the talk of bonds, defaults and credit-default swaps and the core of the matter consists of these three points:

•                Europe cannot function as a unified entity unless someone is in control.

•                At present, Germany is the only country with a large enough economy and population to achieve that control.

•                Being in control comes with a cost: It requires deep and ongoing financial support for the European Union’s weaker members.

What happened since STRATFOR published Germany’s Choice was a debate within Germany about how central the European Union was to German interests and how much the Germans were willing to pay to keep it intact. With their July 22 approval of a new bailout mechanism — from which the Greeks immediately received another 109 billion euros — the Germans made clear their answers to those questions, and with that decision, Europe enters a new era.

The Origins of the Eurozone

The foundations of the European Union were laid in the early post-World War II years, but the critical event happened in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on Monetary Union. In that treaty, the Europeans committed themselves to a common currency and monetary system while scrupulously maintaining national control of fiscal policy, finance and banking. They would share capital but not banks, interest rates but not tax policy. They would also share a currency but none of the political mechanisms required to manage an economy. One of the many inevitable consequences of this was that governments and investors alike assumed that Germany’s support for the new common currency was total, that the Germans would back any government that participated fully in Maastricht. As a result, the ability of weaker eurozone members to borrow was drastically improved. In Greece in particular, the rate on government bonds dropped from an 18 percentage-point premium over German bonds to less than 1 percentage point in less than a decade. To put that into context, borrowers of $200,000 mortgages would see their monthly payments drop by $2,500.

Faced with unprecedentedly low capital costs, parts of Europe that had not been economically dynamic in centuries — in some cases, millennia — sprang to life. Ireland, Greece, Iberia and southern Italy all experienced the strongest growth they had known in generations. But they were not borrowing money generated locally — they were not even borrowing against their own income potential. Such borrowing was not simply a government affair. Local banks that normally faced steep financing costs could now access capital as if they were headquartered in Frankfurt and servicing Germans. The cheap credit flooded every corner of the eurozone. It was a subprime mortgage frenzy on a multinational scale, and the party couldn’t last forever. The 2008 global financial crisis forced a reckoning all over the world, and in the traditionally poorer parts of Europe the process unearthed the political-financial disconnects of Maastricht.

The investment community has been driving the issue ever since. Once investors perceived that there was no direct link between the German government and Greek debt, they started to again think of Greece on its own merits. The rate charged for Greece to borrow started creeping up again, breaking 16 percent at its height. To extend the mortgage comparison, the Greek “house” now cost an extra $2,000 a month to maintain compared to the mid-2000s. A default was not just inevitable but imminent, and all eyes turned to the Germans.

A Temporary Solution

It is easy to see why the Germans did not simply immediately write a check. Doing that for the Greeks (and others) would have merely sent more money into the same system that generated the crisis in the first place. That said, the Germans couldn’t simply let the Greeks sink. Despite its flaws, the system that currently manages Europe has granted Germany economic wealth of global reach without costing a single German life. Given the horrors of World War II, this was not something to be breezily discarded. No country in Europe has benefited more from the eurozone than Germany. For the German elite, the eurozone was an easy means of making Germany matter on a global stage without the sort of military revitalization that would have spawned panic across Europe and the former Soviet Union. And it also made the Germans rich.

But this was not obvious to the average German voter. From this voter’s point of view, Germany had already picked up the tab for Europe three times: first in paying for European institutions throughout the history of the union, second in paying for all of the costs of German reunification and third in accepting a mismatched deutschemark-euro conversion rate when the euro was launched while most other EU states hardwired in a currency advantage. To compensate for those sacrifices, the Germans have been forced to partially dismantle their much-loved welfare state while the Greeks (and others) have taken advantage of German credit to expand theirs.

Germany’s choice was not a pleasant one: Either let the structures of the past two generations fall apart and write off the possibility of Europe becoming a great power or salvage the eurozone by underwriting two trillion euros of debt issued by eurozone governments every year.

Beset with such a weighty decision, the  Germans dealt with the immediate Greek problem of early 2010 by dithering. Even the bailout fund known as the European Financial Security Facility (EFSF) — was at best a temporary patch. The German leadership had to balance messages and plans while they decided what they really wanted. That meant reassuring the other eurozone states that Berlin still cared while assuaging investor fears and pandering to a large and angry anti-bailout constituency at home. With so many audiences to speak to, it is not at all surprising that Berlin chose a solution that was sub-optimal throughout the crisis.

That sub-optimal solution is the EFSF, a bailout mechanism whose bonds enjoyed full government guarantees from the healthy eurozone states, most notably Germany. Because of those guarantees, the  EFSF was able to raise funds on the bond market and then funnel that capital to the distressed states in exchange for austerity programs. Unlike previous EU institutions (which the Germans strongly influence), the EFSF takes its orders from the Germans. The mechanism is not enshrined in EU treaties; it is instead a private bank, the director of which is German. The EFSF worked as a patch but eventually proved insufficient. All the EFSF bailouts did was buy a little time until investors could do the math and realize that even with bailouts the distressed states would never be able to grow out of their mountains of debt. These states had engorged themselves on cheap credit so much during the euro’s first decade that even 273 billion euros of bailouts was insufficient. This issue came to a boil over the past few weeks in Greece. Faced with the futility of yet another stopgap solution to the eurozone’s financial woes, the Germans finally made a tough decision.

The New EFSF

The result was an EFSF redesign. Under the new system the distressed states can now access — with German permission — all the capital they need from the fund without having to go back repeatedly to the EU Council of Ministers. The maturity on all such EFSF credit has been increased from 7.5 years to as much as 40 years, while the cost of that credit has been slashed to whatever the market charges the EFSF itself to raise it (right now that’s about 3.5 percent, far lower than what the peripheral — and even some not-so-peripheral — countries could access on the international bond markets). All outstanding debts, including the previous EFSF programs, can be reworked under the new rules. The EFSF has been granted the ability to participate directly in the bond market by buying the government debt of states that cannot find anyone else interested, or even act pre-emptively should future crises threaten, without needing to first negotiate a bailout program. The EFSF can even extend credit to states that were considering internal bailouts of their banking systems. It is a massive debt consolidation program for both private and public sectors. In order to get the money, distressed states merely have to do whatever Germany — the manager of the fund — wants. The decision-making occurs within the fund, not at the EU institutional level.

In practical terms, these changes cause two major things to happen. First, they essentially remove any potential cap on the amount of money that the EFSF can raise, eliminating concerns that the fund is insufficiently stocked. Technically, the fund is still operating with a 440 billion-euro ceiling, but now that the Germans have fully committed themselves, that number is a mere technicality (it was German reticence before that kept the EFSF’s funding limit so “low”).

Second, all of the distressed states’ outstanding bonds will be refinanced at lower rates over longer maturities, so there will no longer be very many “Greek” or “Portuguese” bonds. Under the EFSF all of this debt will in essence be a sort of “eurobond,” a new class of bond in Europe upon which the weak states utterly depend and which the Germans utterly control. For states that experience problems, almost all of their financial existence will now be wrapped up in the EFSF structure. Accepting EFSF assistance means accepting a surrender of financial autonomy to the German commanders of the EFSF. For now, that means accepting German-designed austerity programs, but there is nothing that forces the Germans to limit their conditions to the purely financial/fiscal.

For all practical purposes, the next chapter of history has now opened in Europe. Regardless of intentions, Germany has just experienced an important development in its ability to influence fellow EU member states — particularly those experiencing financial troubles. It can now easily usurp huge amounts of national sovereignty. Rather than constraining Germany’s geopolitical potential, the European Union now enhances it; Germany is on the verge of once again becoming a great power. This hardly means that a regeneration of the Wehrmacht is imminent, but Germany’s re-emergence does force a radical rethinking of the European and Eurasian architectures.

Reactions to the New Europe

Every state will react to this new world differently. The French are both thrilled and terrified — thrilled that the Germans have finally agreed to commit the resources required to make the European Union work and terrified that Berlin has found a way to do it that preserves German control of those resources. The French realize that they are losing control of Europe, and fast. France designed the European Union to explicitly contain German power so it could never be harmed again while harnessing that power to fuel a French rise to greatness. The French nightmare scenario of an unrestrained Germany is now possible.

The British are feeling extremely thoughtful. They have always been the outsiders in the European Union, joining primarily so that they can put up obstacles from time to time. With the Germans now asserting financial control outside of EU structures, the all-important U.K. veto is now largely useless. Just as the Germans are in need of a national debate about their role in the world, the British are in need of a national debate about their role in Europe. The Europe that was a cage for Germany is no more, which means that the United Kingdom is now a member of different sort of organization that may or may not serve its purposes.

The Russians are feeling opportunistic. They have always been distrustful of the European Union, since it — like NATO — is an organization formed in part to keep them out. In recent years the union has farmed out its foreign policy to whatever state was most impacted by the issue in question, and in many cases these states has been former Soviet satellites in Central Europe, all of which have an axe to grind. With Germany rising to leadership, the Russians have just one decision-maker to deal with. Between Germany’s need for natural gas and Russia’s ample export capacity, a German-Russian partnership is blooming. It is not that the Russians are unconcerned about the possibilities of strong German power — the memories of the Great Patriotic War burn far too hot and bright for that — but now there is a belt of 12 countries between the two powers. The Russian-German bilateral relationship will not be perfect, but there is another chapter of history to be written before the Germans and Russians need to worry seriously about each other.

Those 12 countries are trapped between  rising German and consolidating Russian power. For all practical purposes, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova have already been reintegrated into the Russian sphere. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are finding themselves under ever-stronger German influence but are fighting to retain their independence. As much as the nine distrust the Russians and Germans, however, they have no alternative at present.

The obvious solution for these “Intermarium” states — as well as for the French — is sponsorship by the United States. But the Americans are distracted and contemplating a new period of isolationism, forcing the nine to consider other, less palatable, options. These include everything from a local Intermarium alliance that would be questionable at best to picking either the Russians or Germans and suing for terms. France’s nightmare scenario is on the horizon, but for these nine states — which labored under the Soviet lash only 22 years ago — it is front and center.

•                Economics/Trade Military Politics Peter Zeihan and Marko Papic Germany Europe USMC - Featured Analysis Geopolitical Weekly EU Eurozone

Source URL: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110725-germanys-choice-part-2

Links:
[1] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/friedman_on_geopolitics
[2] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100208_germanys_choice
[3] http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100315_germany_mitteleuropa_redux
[4] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100402_eu_consequences_greece_intervention
[5] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101215-german-domestic-politics-and-eurozone-crisis
[6] javascript:launchPlayer('d083m95v', 'http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBQqvE4obus', 640, 360)
[7] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101104_german_designs_europes_economic_future
[8] http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110217-germanys-elections-and-eurozone
[9] javascript:launchPlayer('xhroi1fx', 'http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXPphmW6k4g', 640, 360)
[10] javascript:launchPlayer('f7gfns5i', '

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRS_USLNGes', 640, 360)

__________

"Germany's Choice: Part 2 is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Finanças dos EUA – o processo de explosão da “bomba” da dívida

            No contexto prevalecente de arreigada desconfiança nas T-bonds (obrigações do Tesouro dos EUA), estamos muito rapidamente a aproximarmo-nos de uma fase caracterizada por uma espécie de “greve” ou de forte resistência à compra de tais títulos pelos principais compradores e operadores do mercado mundial. As consequências serão imediatas: antes do mais, o colapso dos preços das T-bonds, concomitante com o aumento das taxas de juro para atrair compradores O crescimento da despesa per capita dos juros da dívida é cada vez maior.

O endividamento galopante está bem patente no quadro que se segue:

Date	Dollar Amount
09/30/2010	13,561,623,030,891.79
09/30/2009	11,909,829,003,511.75
09/30/2008	10,024,724,896,912.49
09/30/2007	9,007,653,372,262.48
09/30/2006	8,506,973,899,215.23
09/30/2005	7,932,709,661,723.50
09/30/2004	7,379,052,696,330.32
09/30/2003	6,783,231,062,743.62
09/30/2002	6,228,235,965,597.16
09/30/2001	5,807,463,412,200.06
09/30/2000	5,674,178,209,886.86

O quadro que precede assenta em dados oficiais do Departamento do Tesouro norte-americano, bastante claros, que não deixam margem para grandes dúvidas, nem para manipulações estatísticas. Por outro lado,  as projecções dos analistas em termos da evolução da dívida federal adiantam que esta ultrapassará este ano os 15 mil milhões de USD e que atingirá os 20 mil milhões, daqui a 5 anos, em 2016! Os números dispensam comentários.

Veja-se o quadro seguinte, transcrito  do Global Europe Anticipation Bulletin

A aceleração do processo é, por conseguinte, cada vez maior. Todavia, baseia-se em taxas de juro da ordem dos 5%. Ora, prevê-se que, dentro de algumas semanas, aquelas taxas se situem, senão ultrapassem, mesmo, os 12%, uma vez despoletada a crise do mercado obrigacionista das T-bonds, o que se traduzirá numa asfixia das capacidades financeiras dos EUA.

Atingido esse patamar, entramos no campo das especulações puras e tudo passa a ser possível, o que desde 2008, se tem +vindo a comprovar numa base regular.

A segunda metade de 2011, designadamente o final do 3º trimestre, como já o temos vindo a dizer, será um período crítico para a crise das dívidas soberanas, uma vez que existe uma verdadeira overdose de endividamento no sistema económico. Ao acumularem cada vez mais dívida desde o meltdown de 2008, os illuminati agravaram a situação consideravelmente. Por conseguinte o mundo avança para um meltdown, agora global, económico, financeiro e monetário. Mas não terá sido essa a intenção última dos illuminati?

Preparemo-nos, pois para o pior. Trata-se do perfect storm e não há que fugir a isto

10 questões que você precisa de saber acerca da República Islâmica do Irão 

1.    No topo da hierarquia do regime iraniano não está o presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mas, sim,  o Líder Supremo, o aiatola Ali Khamenei.

2.     O regime iraniano, de acordo com a constituição de 1989, compromete-se  com a jihad (guerra santa) para divulgar a revolução do aiatola Khomeini, com o objectivo último de restabelecer o califado e de impor a lei islâmica (sharia) à escala global – leia-se, planetária. São exactamente os mesmos objectivos prosseguidos pelos grupos terroristas como a Al-Qaeda, Hamas e Hizbollah – o que explica a razão pela qual estes grupos se encontram interligados com o Irão numa relação operacional, há já várias décadas.

3.    A missão fundamental do Corpo de Guardas Revolucionários Islâmicos (CGRI, os famigerados pasdaran) consiste em manter o regime no poder. De uma forma particularmente visível desde o levantamento popular na sequência das fraudulentas eleições presidenciais de 2009,  o CGRI e as respectivas unidades subordinadas, as Bassij, utilizam a força bruta e o terror para eliminar as aspirações democráticas do povo iraniano.

4.     O aiatola Khamenei ordenou que os pasdaran adquirissem armas nucleares em meados da década de 80. Cada presidente iraniano – incluindo os que são tidos por ‘moderados’ – apoiaram a aquisição de armas nucleares, todavia o programa foi consideravelmente acelerado, sob os dois últimos dois presidentes: Khatami e Ahmadinejad.

5.    A leitura fria das estatísticas refere-nos que o Irão averba o triste registo de ser o segundo país do mundo, após a China, a eliminar os seus próprios cidadãos. Todavia aquela possui uma população 20 vezes superior à iraniana. É possível que em termos de execuções per capita o Irão seja, de facto, o maior executor à escala mundial.

6.    O regime iraniano apoiou verbalmente a Irmandade Muçulmana do Egipto desde a eclosão da revolta anti-regime, no início do ano. A Irmandade Muçulmana, uma organização jihadista mundial, com uma presença insidiosa no Governo dos EUA, nos serviços secretos e na sociedade em geral, aproximou-se do regime iraniano e, em contrapartida,  manifestou interesse em forjar estreitos laços com as instituições norte-americanas. Com efeito, a administração Obama anunciou recentemente estar a aumentar as suas conexões com a Irmandade Muçulmana.

7.    O actual presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad crê que uma figura messiânica (o Mahdi – o redentor, ou o 12º imã), que desapareceu num poço há cerca de 1.000 anos, está a ‘ajudar’ o seu governo e a ‘controlar’ o mundo. O Chefe de Estado exprimiu publicamente a sua crença de que a violência apocalíptica podia apressar o regresso desta personagem ao “nosso mundo”.

8.    Apesar das sanções, o Irão não se encontra por forma alguma isolado. Está activamente envolvido com inúmeros países, quer do ponto de vista diplomático, quer   económico,  comprando influências a um ritmo crescente.  Isto inclui o regime visceralmente anti-americano do Chefe de Estado venezuelano, Hugo Chávez, e um número apreciável e em constante aumento de outros países, no chamado “quintal das traseiras” dos EUA, ou seja, na América Central e do Sul. O Irão também tem desenvolvido relações com países como a Eritreia, o Sudão, a Argélia, o Afeganistão, a Turquia, o Líbano, a Síria, o Qatar e, mais recentemente, a Jordânia.

9.      “O Irão tem metodicamente cultivado uma rede de sucedâneos  terroristas capazes de plausivelmente conduzirem ataques contra Israel e contra os EUA. Isto pressupõe  uma rede alternativa de mandatários, tais como o Hizbollah, que possui uma presença expressiva na América Latina, especialmente na Venezuela e também no México. Tanto quanto se sabe, o Hizbollah opera nos EUA onde dispõe pelo menos de uma dúzia de células activas.

10.                  O caso Havlish (Havlish e outros contra Osama Bin Laden, Irão e outros) que deu entrada nos tribunais  de Nova Iorque em Março de 2011, evidenciou provas cabais de que o regime iraniano  prestou assistência material directa à Al Qaeda para os ataques de 11 de Setembro. 

Império Financeiro/Financial empire

Vejam o vídeo/ Watch the video


A brief depiction on how the bankers were able to enslave us and how the money is sucked up into the state, corporations, banks and owners.Understand why a financial collapse is eminent. These facts are real and searchable. Type New World Order".

Welcome to the Intellectual Revolution

Uma breve descrição  em como os banqueiros nos conseguiram escravizar e o modo como o dinheiro é sugado dos produtores de riqueza para o governo, corporações, bancos e donos. Percebe-se porque é que o colapso financeiro está iminente.Estes facto são reais e pesquisáveis. Digite "Nova Ordem Mundial"

Bem vindos à Revolução Intelectual.

EUA à beira do incumprimento

Conforme inúmeras vezes e com a devida antecedência informámos neste blog, os EUA encontram-se na iminência quase certa  de insolvência. Em entrevista à CNBC David Murrin, principal responsável pelo sector de investimentos da Emergent Asset Managemet, afirmou que o incumprimento por parte dos EUA não é uma questão hipotética mas apenas de tempo (it isn’t a matter of ‘if’ but ‘when’). Para o referenciado: “É inevitável que os EUA vão à bancarrota. Trata-se essencialmente de um império sobre-dimensionado e em declínio e o sistema financeiro irá com ele”, disse. A questão é a seguinte: os EUA deixam de honrar os seus compromissos  quando a tal são forçados pelo mundo exterior, provavelmente pelos chineses, ou assumem (voluntariamente) a opção de incumprimento nos seus próprios termos de tal forma que possam daí extrair uma vantagem estratégica, afirmou Murrin.

Algumas Notas Sobre as Agências de Rating (para quem não tenha visto o "Inside job")

Anda meio País perplexo perante o mais que esperado corte brutal do «rating» de Portugal pelas ditas «agências de rating», «inexplicável», «injusto», «murro no estômago», «logo agora que estávamos a fazer tudo o que eles nos diziam para fazermos», são alguns dos comentários mais ouvidos. Mas estes economistas são ingénuos? Não têm cultura histórica? Acreditam cegamente no que certos sectores lhes dizem, não questionando a boa ou má fé desses mesmos sectores? Parece que assim é.

 Desde há muito que se previa isto. Aliás, tudo apontava para tal. Desde a delapidação do erário público pelo poder político da última legislatura, à sabotagem planeada da imagem empresarial e turística do País (crimes contra cidadãos ingleses no Algarve, por ex.), às «medidas de austeridade» impostas à presente legislatura por uma «troika» que, tal como as agências, apenas são agentes de quem está por detrás disto tudo.

 E quem é?

 Simples: certos grupos bancários mundiais (Goldman & Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Loeb & Khün, Frères Lazare, Banco Rothshild e até o já «comido» Lehman Brothers), representando outras tantas dinastias bancárias e o célebre «Comité dos 300», grupo que reúne as cerca de 300 maiores fortunas do mundo, ao pé das quais Bill Gates faz figura de moço de recados.

 A coisa já vem de longe (pelo menos da segunda metade do Séc. XIX) e já Fernando Pessoa falava neles («Os 300 e outros ensaios», edição póstuma).

 Quais os objectivos?

 Também é simples. Após um processo de fusão e aquisição de empresas em cadeia, formando grandes corporações globais, passaram à fusão e aquisição de estados soberanos - ou seja, países.

 Os métodos são precisamente os mesmos: provocar dificuldades financeiras, mercê de infiltrados (os políticos «eleitos»), destruir economias familiares, locais, regionais e depois, usando as mesmas agências de rating empregues para as fusões e aquisições de empresas pelas grandes «corporations», num esquema extorsionário que faria empalidecer Al Capone.

 E o mais grave é que a maior parte de políticos (não os infiltrados), economistas e juristas são completamente iludidos ao ponto de não verem - ou não quererem ver - o que lhes está à frente dos olhos. Daí o espanto.

 Começa um ou outro responsável a acordar, como o director da Agência das Nações Unidas para o Comércio Mundial e o Desenvolvimento (UNCTAD), Heiner Flassbeck, que hoje pediu a extinção das ditas agências de rating.

 Estas já têm um rol de crimes que lhes são imputados, desde chantagem, extorsão, intrusão nos assuntos internos de estados soberanos, etc. Mas parece que ninguém lhes toca, por causa dos interesses instalados.

 E isto nada tem a ver com os EUA ou com a UE, com o dólar ou com o euro, pois estas agências - independentemente de onde estão sediadas - há muito que são apátridas, tal como os bancos que nelas mandam.

 De momento mantêm um rating Aaa aos E.U.A. apesar do estado calamitoso da sua economia (pior do que o da Grécia) para que estes não desencadeiem uma investigação às suas actividades.

 Logo que os ditos bancos ganhem o suficiente com a especulação proporcionada com a subida do dólar e a queda do euro, inverterão o jogo para que a especulação continue.

 Tudo isto nada tem a ver com política (esta tornou-se «acessória», mero instrumento dos interesses económicos desses grupos).

 Se isto não é «conspiração», não sei o que será!

 Tem de se compreender a jogada global destes profissionais do racketeering para se compreender o que se passa.

 Vejamos então um pouco do historial das três maiores agências de rating:

 Moody's

Comecemos pela Moody's. Em português, quer dizer «caprichosa», «instável», «temperamental», nome do fundador, mas bastante sugestivo (negativamente), ligado aos «Robber Barons» que fizeram fortuna com os caminhos de ferro nos EUA. Vejamos o que diz a Wikipedia:
 


History


Moody's was founded in 1909 by John Moody, beginning with Analyses of Railroad Investments, "a book about railroad securities, using letter grades to assess their risk."[1] Moody's Investors Service was incorporated on July 1, 1914, and soon extended coverage to US municipal bonds. By 1924, Moody's ratings covered nearly 100 percent of the US bond market.[3]


In the 1970s, Moody's expanded into commercial debt, and also began the practice, along with other ratings agencies, of charging bond issuers for ratings as well as charging investors.[3]

 The number of countries covered by Moody's has risen from 3 in 1975, to 33 in 1990, to over 100 by 2000.[4] Announcements by Moody's of possible or actual downgrades of a country's bond rating can have a major political and economic impact, as for example in Canada in 1995.[4]
 


Criticism


Credit rating agencies such as Moody's have been subject to criticism in the wake of large losses in the asset-backed security collateralized debt obligation (ABS CDO) market that occurred despite being assigned top ratings by the credit rating agencies.

 For instance, losses on $340.7 million worth of ABS collateralized debt obligations (CDO) issued by Credit Suisse Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated Aaa by Moody's.[5]


See also: Credit rating agency#Criticism
 
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Power and influence


Moody's has been accused of "blackmail". In one example the German insurer Hannover Re was offered a "free rating" by Moody's. The insurer refused. Moody's continued with the "free ratings", but over time lowered its rating of the company. Still refusing Moody's services, Moody's lowered Hannover's debt to junk, and the company in a few hours lost $175 million in market value.[6]
 
"As the housing market collapsed in late 2007, Moody's Investors Service, whose investment ratings were widely trusted, responded by purging analysts and executives who warned of trouble and promoting those who helped Wall Street plunge the country into its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. A McClatchy investigation has found that Moody's punished executives who questioned why the company was risking its reputation by putting its profits ahead of providing trustworthy ratings for investment offerings."[7]
 
Só pergunto porque é que ainda dão crédito a estes escroques...
 


Standard & Poor's (S&P)

 Passemos à Standard & Poor. Outro nome significativo, que dá a ideia de «Padrão de Pobreza», e não o contrário. É claro que o nome deriva de um dos fundadores da companhia, Henry Varnum Poor, ligado aos Robber Barons dos caminhos de ferro, no rescaldo da Guerra da Secessão, e do Standard Statistics Bureau, mas não deixa de ser curioso. A sua história e actuação (Wikipedia) é semelhante à da Moody's:
 


Standard & Poor's (S&P) is a United States-based financial services company. It is a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies that publishes financial research and analysis on stocks and bonds. It is well known for the stock market indices, the US-based S&P 500, the Australian S&P/ASX 200, the Canadian S&P/TSX, the Italian S&P/MIB and India's S&P CNX Nifty. It is one of the Big Three (credit rating agencies) (Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Service and Fitch Ratings).[2]
 


Corporate history


Standard & Poor's traces its history back to 1860, with the publication by Henry Varnum Poor of History of Railroads and Canals in the United States. This book was an attempt to compile comprehensive information about the financial and operational state of U.S. railroad companies. Henry Varnum went on to establish H.V. and H.W. Poor Co with his son, Henry William, and published updated versions of this book on an annual basis.[citation needed]


In 1906 Luther Lee Blake founded the Standard Statistics Bureau, with the view to providing financial information on non-railroad companies. Instead of an annually published book Standard Statistics would use 5" x 7" cards, allowing for more frequent updates.[citation needed]


In 1941, Poor and Standard Statistics merged to become Standard & Poor's Corp. Then in 1966 S&P was acquired by The McGraw-Hill Companies, and now encompasses the Financial Services division.[3]
 


Criticism


See also: Credit rating agency#Criticism

 Credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's have been subject to criticism in the wake of large losses beginning in 2007 in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market that occurred despite being assigned top ratings by the CRAs.
Credit ratings of AAA (the highest rating available) were given to large portions of even the riskiest pools of loans. Investors, trusting the low risk profile that AAA implies, loaded up on these CDOs that later became unsellable. Those that could be sold often took staggering losses. For instance, losses on $340.7 million worth of CDOs issued by Credit Suisse Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated AAA by Standard & Poor's.[6]


Despite common perception, Standard & Poor's didn't rate the two major Icelandic banks, Kaupthing and Landsbanki.[citation needed]


Companies pay Standard & Poor's to rate their debt issues. As a result, some critics have contended that Standard & Poor's is beholden to these issuers and that its ratings are not as objective as they should be.

See also: 2010 European sovereign debt crisis


In April 2009 Standard & Poor's called for "new faces" in the Irish Government, which was seen as interfering in the democratic process. In a subsequent statement they said they were "misunderstood".[7]
 
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Antitrust Review


In November 2009, ten months after launching an investigation, the European Commission formally charged Standard & Poor’s with abusing its position as the sole provider of international securities identification codes for U.S. securities by requiring European financial firms and data vendors to pay licensing fees for their use.

 “This behavior amounts to unfair pricing,” the European Commission said in its statement of objections which lays the groundwork for an adverse finding against S&P. “The (numbers) are indispensable for a number of operations that financial institutions carry out – for instance, reporting to authorities or clearing and settlement – and cannot be substituted.”[8]


S&P has run the CUSIP Service Bureau, the only ISIN issuer in the US, on behalf of the American Bankers Association. In its formal statement of objections, the European Commission alleges "that S&P is abusing this monopoly position by enforcing the payment of licence fees for the use of US Isins by (a) banks and other financial services providers in the EEA and (b) information service providers in the EEA." It claims that comparable agencies elsewhere in the world either do not charge fees at all, or do so on the basis of distribution cost, rather than usage.[9]
 


Fitch Group


Vejamos agora a Fitch. Tal como as precedentes, tem um nome curioso, no mínimo, já que «fitch» é um furão, uma espécie de doninha...

 Fundada no início do Séc. XX, destaca-se um pouco das suas outras congéneres, e tem fortes ligações europeias, especialmente a Paris e Londres. Mas a sua actuação recente é muito semelhante, servindo também de alavanca da banca globalista para o «takeover» das nações, como se estas fossem empresas. Vejamos o que diz a Wikipedia:
 


The Fitch Group is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., headquartered in Paris, France. Fitch Ratings, Fitch Solutions and Algorithmics, are part of the Fitch Group.


Dual-headquartered in New York and London with 50 offices worldwide, Fitch Ratings positions itself as a global rating agency dedicated to providing value beyond the rating through independent and prospective credit opinions, research and data.

 Fitch Ratings was one of the three Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) designated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975, together with Moody's and Standard & Poor's. It is one of the "Big Three credit rating agencies"(Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Service and Fitch Ratings). [1]


The firm was founded by John Knowles Fitch on December 24, 1913 in New York City as the Fitch Publishing Company.

 It merged with London-based IBCA Limited in December 1997.

 In 2000 Fitch acquired both Chicago-based Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co. (April) and Thomson Financial BankWatch (December).

 Fitch Ratings is the smallest of the "big three" NRSROs, covering a more limited share of the market than S&P and Moody's, though it has grown with acquisitions and frequently positions itself as a "tie-breaker" when the other two agencies have ratings similar, but not equal, in scale.


Stephen W. Joynt is chief executive officer.
 


Criticism


See also: Credit rating agency#Criticism


Credit rating agencies such as Fitch Ratings have been subject to criticism in the wake of large losses in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market that occurred despite being assigned top ratings by the CRAs.

 For instance, losses on $340.7 million worth of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) issued by Credit Suisse Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated AAA by Fitch.[2]

 However, differently from the other agencies, Fitch has been warning the market on the constant proportion debt obligations (CPDO) with an early and pre-crisis report highlighting the dangers of CPDO's.[3]