10 questões que você precisa de saber acerca da República Islâmica do Irão 

1.    No topo da hierarquia do regime iraniano não está o presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mas, sim,  o Líder Supremo, o aiatola Ali Khamenei.

2.     O regime iraniano, de acordo com a constituição de 1989, compromete-se  com a jihad (guerra santa) para divulgar a revolução do aiatola Khomeini, com o objectivo último de restabelecer o califado e de impor a lei islâmica (sharia) à escala global – leia-se, planetária. São exactamente os mesmos objectivos prosseguidos pelos grupos terroristas como a Al-Qaeda, Hamas e Hizbollah – o que explica a razão pela qual estes grupos se encontram interligados com o Irão numa relação operacional, há já várias décadas.

3.    A missão fundamental do Corpo de Guardas Revolucionários Islâmicos (CGRI, os famigerados pasdaran) consiste em manter o regime no poder. De uma forma particularmente visível desde o levantamento popular na sequência das fraudulentas eleições presidenciais de 2009,  o CGRI e as respectivas unidades subordinadas, as Bassij, utilizam a força bruta e o terror para eliminar as aspirações democráticas do povo iraniano.

4.     O aiatola Khamenei ordenou que os pasdaran adquirissem armas nucleares em meados da década de 80. Cada presidente iraniano – incluindo os que são tidos por ‘moderados’ – apoiaram a aquisição de armas nucleares, todavia o programa foi consideravelmente acelerado, sob os dois últimos dois presidentes: Khatami e Ahmadinejad.

5.    A leitura fria das estatísticas refere-nos que o Irão averba o triste registo de ser o segundo país do mundo, após a China, a eliminar os seus próprios cidadãos. Todavia aquela possui uma população 20 vezes superior à iraniana. É possível que em termos de execuções per capita o Irão seja, de facto, o maior executor à escala mundial.

6.    O regime iraniano apoiou verbalmente a Irmandade Muçulmana do Egipto desde a eclosão da revolta anti-regime, no início do ano. A Irmandade Muçulmana, uma organização jihadista mundial, com uma presença insidiosa no Governo dos EUA, nos serviços secretos e na sociedade em geral, aproximou-se do regime iraniano e, em contrapartida,  manifestou interesse em forjar estreitos laços com as instituições norte-americanas. Com efeito, a administração Obama anunciou recentemente estar a aumentar as suas conexões com a Irmandade Muçulmana.

7.    O actual presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad crê que uma figura messiânica (o Mahdi – o redentor, ou o 12º imã), que desapareceu num poço há cerca de 1.000 anos, está a ‘ajudar’ o seu governo e a ‘controlar’ o mundo. O Chefe de Estado exprimiu publicamente a sua crença de que a violência apocalíptica podia apressar o regresso desta personagem ao “nosso mundo”.

8.    Apesar das sanções, o Irão não se encontra por forma alguma isolado. Está activamente envolvido com inúmeros países, quer do ponto de vista diplomático, quer   económico,  comprando influências a um ritmo crescente.  Isto inclui o regime visceralmente anti-americano do Chefe de Estado venezuelano, Hugo Chávez, e um número apreciável e em constante aumento de outros países, no chamado “quintal das traseiras” dos EUA, ou seja, na América Central e do Sul. O Irão também tem desenvolvido relações com países como a Eritreia, o Sudão, a Argélia, o Afeganistão, a Turquia, o Líbano, a Síria, o Qatar e, mais recentemente, a Jordânia.

9.      “O Irão tem metodicamente cultivado uma rede de sucedâneos  terroristas capazes de plausivelmente conduzirem ataques contra Israel e contra os EUA. Isto pressupõe  uma rede alternativa de mandatários, tais como o Hizbollah, que possui uma presença expressiva na América Latina, especialmente na Venezuela e também no México. Tanto quanto se sabe, o Hizbollah opera nos EUA onde dispõe pelo menos de uma dúzia de células activas.

10.                  O caso Havlish (Havlish e outros contra Osama Bin Laden, Irão e outros) que deu entrada nos tribunais  de Nova Iorque em Março de 2011, evidenciou provas cabais de que o regime iraniano  prestou assistência material directa à Al Qaeda para os ataques de 11 de Setembro. 

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously

May 19, 2011

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially registered Wednesday for the formation of a new political wing, paving the way for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party. With parliamentary elections scheduled in September, Freedom and Justice is expected to do well at the first polls of the post-Mubarak era. Just how well is the main question on the minds of the country’s ruling military council, which would prefer to hand off the day-to-day responsibilities of governing Egypt, while holding onto real power behind the scenes. 

Leading MB official Saad al-Katatny, one of the founders of Freedom and Justice, said he hopes for the party to officially begin its activities June 17, and to begin selecting its executive authority and top leaders one month later. Members of Egypt’s Political Parties Affairs Committee will convene Sunday to discuss the application and will announce their decision the next day. They are expected to approve the request. Three and a half months after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s leading Islamist group is on the verge of forming an official political party for the first time in its history. 

Following Mubarak’s ouster, MB wasted little time in seizing what it saw as the group’s historical moment to enter Egypt’s political mainstream. They announced plans to form a political party on Feb. 14. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which took over administration of the country following the deposal of Mubarak, did nothing to hinder this development, despite the military’s deep antipathy toward Islamist groups. Political instability was (and is) rampant in the country, and the military sought to find a balance that would allow it to maintain control while appearing amenable to the people’s demands, and bring life back to normal. Opening up political space to Islamist groups, including at least two emerging Salafist parties, and announcing plans for fairly rapid elections, was seen by the military as the most effective way to achieve this balance. 

It bears repeating that what happened in Egypt in January and February did not constitute a revolution. There was no regime change; there was regime preservation, through a carefully orchestrated military coup that used the 19 days of popular demonstrations against Mubarak as a smokescreen for achieving its objective. Though a system of one-party rule existed from the aftermath of the 1967 War until Feb. 11 of this year, true power in Egypt since 1952 has been with the military and that did not change with the ouster of Mubarak. What changed was that for the first time since the 1960s, Egypt’s military found itself not just ruling, but actually governing, despite the existence of an interim government (which the SCAF itself appointed). 

The SCAF wants to get back to ruling and give up the job of governing, but it knows that there has been a sea change in Egypt’s political environment that prevents a return to the way things were done under Mubarak. The days of single-party rule are over. If the military wants stability, it is going to have to accept a true multiparty political system, one that allows for a broad spectrum of participation from all corners of Egyptian society. The generals can maintain control of the regime, but the day-to-day affairs of governance will fall under the control of coalition governments that could never have existed in the old Egypt. 

This opens the door for MB to gain more political power than it has ever held and explains why its leaders were so quick to announce their plans for the formation of Freedom and Justice in February. But the group has tempered eagerness with caution. MB is aware of its reputation in the eyes of the SCAF (and the outside world, for that matter) and is playing a shrewd game to dispel its image as an extremist Islamist group. It has been publicly supportive of the SCAF on a number of occasions, and has marketed Freedom and Justice as a non-Islamist party — it includes women and one of its founders is a Copt — based on Islamic principles. MB has also insisted that the new party will have no actual ties to the Brotherhood itself (though this is clearly not the case), while promising that it will not field a presidential candidate in polls due to take place six weeks following the parliamentary elections. In addition, MB has pledged to run for no more than 49 percent of the available parliamentary seats. This is designed to reassure the SCAF that it does not immediately seek absolute political power. 

Focusing on whether the SCAF is sincere in its publicly stated desire to transform Egypt into a democracy misses the more important point, which is that the military regime feels it has no choice but to move toward a multiparty political system. The alternatives — military dictatorship and single-party rule — are unfeasible. But there are red lines attached to the push toward political pluralism, and MB is aware of these. Trying to take too much, too quickly, will only incite a military crackdown on the political opening the armed forces have engineered in the last three months. As for the SCAF, it is willing to give Freedom and Justice a chance in the new Egypt, so long as the underlying reality of power remains the same.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Egipto: Revolta à beira Nilo

The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

January 29, 2011 | 2207 GMT

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt, remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s command in the air force (the most privileged military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the Republican Guard) and Egypt’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore (whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also itself.

This report is republished authorized by www.stratfor.com