A Alemanha e o falhanço do multiculturalismo

Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism

October 19, 2010

By George Friedman

German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared at an Oct. 16 meeting of young members of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, or Multikulti, as the Germans put it, “has failed totally.” Horst Seehofer, minister-president of Bavaria and the chairman of a sister party to the Christian Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two parties were “committed to a dominant German culture and opposed to a multicultural one.” Merkel also said that the flood of immigrants is holding back the German economy, although Germany does need more highly trained specialists, as opposed to the laborers who have sought economic advantages in Germany.

The statements were striking in their bluntness and their willingness to speak of a dominant German culture, a concept that for obvious reasons Germans have been sensitive about asserting since World War II. The statement should be taken with utmost seriousness and considered for its social and geopolitical implications. It should also be considered in the broader context of Europe’s response to immigration, not to Germany’s response alone.

The Origins of the German Immigration Question

Let’s begin with the origins of the problem. Post-World War II Germany faced a severe labor shortage for two reasons: a labor pool depleted by the devastating war — and by Soviet prisoner-of-war camps — and the economic miracle that began on the back of revived industry in the 1950s. Initially, Germany was able to compensate by admitting ethnic Germans fleeing Central Europe and Communist East Germany. But the influx only helped assuage the population loss from World War II. Germany needed more labor to feed its burgeoning export-based industry, and in particular more unskilled laborers for manufacturing, construction and other industries.

To resolve the continuing labor shortage, Germany turned to a series of successive labor recruitment deals, first with Italy (1955). After labor from Italy dried up due to Italy’s own burgeoning economy, Germany turned to Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961) and then Yugoslavia (1968). Labor recruitment led to a massive influx of “Gastarbeiter,” German for “guest workers,” into German society. The Germans did not see this as something that would change German society: They regarded the migrants as temporary labor, not as immigrants in any sense. As the term implied, the workers were guests and would return to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed (many Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese did just this). This did not particularly trouble the Germans, who were primarily interested in labor.

The Germans simply didn’t expect this to be a long-term issue. They did not consider how to assimilate these migrants, a topic that rarely came up in policy discussions. Meanwhile, the presence of migrant labor allowed millions of Germans to move it from unskilled labor to white-collar jobs during the 1960s.

An economic slowdown in 1966 and full-on recession following the oil shock of 1973 changed labor conditions in Germany. Germany no longer needed a steady stream of unskilled labor and actually found itself facing mounting unemployment among migrants already in country, leading to the “Anwerbestopp,” German for “labor recruitment stop,” in 1973.

Nonetheless, the halt in migration did not resolve the fact that guest workers already were in Germany in great numbers, migrants who now wanted to bring in family members. The 1970s saw most migration switch to “family reunions” and, when the German government moved to close that loophole, asylum. As the Italians, Spanish and Portuguese returned home to tend to their countries’ own successive economic miracles, Muslim Turks became the overwhelming majority of migrants in Germany — particularly as asylum seekers flocked into Germany, most of whom were not fleeing any real government retribution. It did not help that Germany had particularly open asylum laws in large part due to guilt over the Holocaust, a loophole Turkish migrants exploited en masse following the 1980 coup d’etat in Turkey.

As the migrants transformed from a temporary exigency to a multigenerational community, the Germans had to confront the problem. At base, they did not want the migrants to become part of Germany. But if they were to remain in the country, Berlin wanted to make sure the migrants became loyal to Germany. The onus on assimilating migrants into the larger society increased as Muslim discontent rocked Europe in the 1980s. The solution Germans finally agreed upon in the mid-to-late 1980s was multiculturalism, a liberal and humane concept that offered migrants a grand bargain: Retain your culture but pledge loyalty to the state.

In this concept, Turkish immigrants, for example, would not be expected to assimilate into German culture. Rather, they would retain their own culture, including language and religion, and that culture would coexist with German culture. Thus, there would be a large number of foreigners, many of whom could not speak German and by definition did not share German and European values.

While respecting diversity, the policy seemed to amount to buying migrant loyalty. The deeper explanation was that the Germans did not want, and did not know how, to assimilate culturally, linguistically, religiously and morally diverse people. Multiculturalism did not so much represent respect for diversity as much as a way to escape the question of what it meant to be German and what pathways foreigners would follow to become Germans.

Two Notions of Nation

This goes back to the European notion of the nation, which is substantially different from the American notion. For most of its history, the United States thought of itself as a nation of immigrants, but with a core culture that immigrants would have to accept in a well-known multicultural process. Anyone could become an American, so long as they accepted the language and dominant culture of the nation. This left a lot of room for uniqueness, but some values had to be shared. Citizenship became a legal concept. It required a process, an oath and shared values. Nationality could be acquired; it had a price.

To be French, Polish or Greek meant not only that you learned their respective language or adopted their values — it meant that you were French, Polish or Greek because your parents were, as were their parents. It meant a shared history of suffering and triumph. One couldn’t acquire that.

For the Europeans, multiculturalism was not the liberal and humane respect for other cultures that it pretended to be. It was a way to deal with the reality that a large pool of migrants had been invited as workers into the country. The offer of multiculturalism was a grand bargain meant to lock in migrant loyalty in exchange for allowing them to keep their culture — and to protect European culture from foreign influences by sequestering the immigrants. The Germans tried to have their workers and a German identity simultaneously. It didn’t work.

Multiculturalism resulted in the permanent alienation of the immigrants. Having been told to keep their own identity, they did not have a shared interest in the fate of Germany. They identified with the country they came from much more than with Germany. Turkey was home. Germany was a convenience. It followed that their primary loyalty was to their home and not to Germany. The idea that a commitment to one’s homeland culture was compatible with a political loyalty to the nation one lived in was simplistic. Things don’t work that way. As a result, Germany did not simply have an alien mass in its midst: Given the state of affairs between the Islamic world and the West, at least some Muslim immigrants were engaged in potential terrorism.

Multiculturalism is profoundly divisive, particularly in countries that define the nation in European terms, e.g., through nationality. What is fascinating is that the German chancellor has chosen to become the most aggressive major European leader to speak out against multiculturalism. Her reasons, political and social, are obvious. But it must also be remembered that this is Germany, which previously addressed the problem of the German nation via the Holocaust. In the 65 years since the end of World War II, the Germans have been extraordinarily careful to avoid discussions of this issue, and German leaders have not wanted to say things such as being committed to a dominant German culture. We therefore need to look at the failure of multiculturalism in Germany in another sense, namely, with regard to what is happening in Germany.

Simply put, Germany is returning to history. It has spent the past 65 years desperately trying not to confront the question of national identity, the rights of minorities in Germany and the exercise of German self-interest. The Germans have embedded themselves in multinational groupings like the European Union and NATO to try to avoid a discussion of a simple and profound concept: nationalism. Given what they did last time the matter came up, they are to be congratulated for their exercise of decent silence. But that silence is now over.

The Re-emergence of German Nation Awareness

Two things have forced the re-emergence of German national awareness. The first, of course, is the immediate issue — a large and indigestible mass of Turkish and other Muslim workers. The second is the state of the multinational organizations to which Germany tried to confine itself. NATO, a military alliance consisting mainly of countries lacking militaries worth noting, is moribund. The second is the state of the European Union. After the Greek and related economic crises, the certainties about a united Europe have frayed. Germany now sees itself as shaping EU institutions so as not to be forced into being the European Union’s ultimate financial guarantor. And this compels Germany to think about Germany beyond its relations with Europe.

It is impossible for Germany to reconsider its position on multiculturalism without, at the same time, validating the principle of the German nation. Once the principle of the nation exists, so does the idea of a national interest. Once the national interest exists, Germany exists in the context of the European Union only as what Goethe termed an “elective affinity.” What was a certainty amid the Cold War now becomes an option. And if Europe becomes an option for Germany, then not only has Germany re-entered history, but given that Germany is the leading European power, the history of Europe begins anew again.

This isn’t to say that Germany must follow any particular foreign policy given its new official view on multiculturalism; it can choose many paths. But an attack on multiculturalism is simultaneously an affirmation of German national identity. You can’t have the first without the second. And once that happens, many things become possible.

Consider that Merkel made clear that Germany needed 400,000 trained specialists. Consider also that Germany badly needs workers of all sorts who are not Muslims living in Germany, particularly in view of Germany’s demographic problems. If Germany can’t import workers for social reasons, it can export factories, call centers, medical analysis and IT support desks. Not far to the east is Russia, which has a demographic crisis of its own but nonetheless has spare labor capacity due to its reliance on purely extractive natural resources for its economy. Germany already depends on Russian energy. If it comes to rely on Russian workers, and in turn Russia comes to rely on German investment, then the map of Europe could be redrawn once again and European history restarted at an even greater pace.

Merkel’s statement is therefore of enormous importance on two levels. First, she has said aloud what many leaders already know, which is that multiculturalism can become a national catastrophe. Second, in stating this, she sets in motion other processes that could have a profound impact on not only Germany and Europe but also the global balance of power. It is not clear at this time what her intention is, which may well be to boost her center-right coalition government’s abysmal popularity. But the process that has begun is neither easily contained nor neatly managed. All of Europe, indeed, much of the world, is coping with the struggle between cultures within their borders. But the Germans are different, historically and geographically. When they begin thinking these thoughts, the stakes go up.

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Crise? Qual crise? A never-ending story - 

Crise, uma pequena contribuição para o debate de ideias: - Em resposta a correspondência recente que recebemos, vamos entrar num diálogo aberto, ao estilo de apontamentos dispersos. Antecipadamente, pedimos que nos perdoem por alguma falta de estruturação neste debate.

Começo por  dizer que sou um dos mais acérrimos críticos da situação portuguesa  (política, finaceira, económia e social) e do estado a que isto chegou. Não defendo nada, nem ninguém, apenas as minhas ideias das quais não abdico.

Neste jogo de futebol em estamos a perder por 5 a 0 e em que o árbitro invalidou um golo nosso por um fora de jogo inextistente, revelaria falta de honestidade o dizermos  que perdemos o jogo por culpa do árbitro. Além disso, seria uma tontice que nos descredibilizaria. Se perdemos por 5 a 0, tenho de aceitar a derrota e se perdessemos por 5 a 1, perdíamos na mesma e bem. Não me considero mau perdedor. Só que existe um movimento especulativo contra Portugal, um ambiente negativo e malsão (é certo que nos pusémos a jeito para apanhar no toutiço) , complementado por uma tentativa insidiosa de arrastamento para o mesmo buraco da Grécia, quando se sabe - e os factos são indesmentíveis - que as situações são diferentes.

A teoria da conspiração, isto é de que há um complot liderado pelos EUA e acolitado pelos BRICs contra o Euro e contra a Europa,  não é paranóia, assenta em certos pontos que começam a emergir com nitidez. Para mim é uma questão intuitiva, mas, por ora, não o consigo demonstrar. Só o tempo me dará ou não razão. O certo é que as agências de rating têm tido um comportamento ostensivamente negativo sem distinguirem situações: por exemplo, o problema do desemprego espanhol é uma questão estrutural da economia espanhola e não dos demais países, as falcatruas gregas são falcatruas gregas e não portuguesas ou eslovacas, as propostas obras faraónicas são lusitanas, etc. etc. Ora, na sua actuação as agências de rating aceleram as movimentações do mercado em determinados sentidos, sem cuidarem se esses caminhos estão certos, se não vão agravar situações já de si difíceis e se prevalece alguma moralidade na respectiva actuação. Poder-se-á argumentar que o sistema não tem espaço para estas coisas. A minha opinião política sobre o assunto é exactamente a oposta: temos de actuar, temos de reformar as agências de alto a baixo, criando entidades sérias e credíveis. Mais. Como sempre pensei e continuo a pensar, tem de existir algum controlo por parte do estado sobre o sector bancário, essencialmente, porque a Europa, para além de um projecto politico em construção é um vasto espaço social e não pode ficar á mercê das constantes variações de humor do capitalismo e das leis inexoráveis do mercado. Entendo que o capitalismo  na sua forma selvagem tem de ser banido. Aliás, a grande crise que ainda estamos a viver deriva de uma ausência de Estado que impeça as manobras especulativas da bolsa e as manipulações com os chamados produtos tóxicos. Foi esta ausência de Estado, de Controlo e de Poder arbitral que conduziu à presente situação. o Estado demitiu-se das funções. Porque é que Washington actuou (ainda que tardiamente) e da forma em que o fez?

Quanto à Alemanha, discordo que seja apontada como o único “mau da fita”, ela peca sobretudo, por indiferença e por egoísmo “nacionalista”. A  meu ver, os verdadeiros “maus da fita” são "actores" europeus que fazem, sempre fizeram e continuarão a fazer,  o jogo do outro lado (britânicos e outros parceiros menores) e, claro está, o "Outro Lado", no seu magnífico esplendor. Sejamos meridianamente claros: Não interessa ao mundo anglo-saxónico a existência da Europa como uma entidade própria, com a sua personalidade jurídica bem definida, o seu poder político e militar e a sua pujança económica e financeira. Isso está fora de questão. Paranóia? Mania da perseguição? Julguem pelos factos, passados, actuais e, sobretudo,  vindouros.

Em toda esta problemática, a Alemanha, por miopia,  está a cuidar dos seus interesses e apenas isso. É precisamente esta questão  que se pretende alterar em nome da construção da Europa. Se os gregos se portaram mal é chamá-los ao bom caminho. O projecto político tem de ser o primeiro objectivo e o somatório de egoísmos nacionais (de que a Alemanha, França, RU, Itália, etc. são exemplos) tem de ser combatido. 

Quanto à solidariedade intra-europeia que deve existir, antes do mais tem de se delinear num primeiro palco nacional. A melhor prova disso foi a solidariedade que todo o Povo português patenteou de forma claríssima em relação à Madeira e que ainda continua, nos supermercados, nas lojas, nas ruas, etc. Há países artificiais em que pode não haver  solidariedade interna: neste particular, os exemplos catalão ou lombardo são relevantes, porque estes povos se consideram a si mesmos como não integrando o respectivo pais mas sim outra nação. A  meu ver são excepções precisamente porque a Espanha e a Itália são países em que a verdadeira unidade nacional ou nunca existiu (Espanha) ou são de formação recente e nunca se formou (Itália).  A queda do muro de Berlim e a consequente reunificação alemã foi o acontecimento mais marcante dos finais do século XX. A solidariedade intra-nacional era -e é - imperativa, absoluta, categórica, indiscutível. Não o foi. É uma chaga que para mim ficou sempre a manchar uma das páginas mais belas e exaltantes da minha época. Pergunte-se ao homem da rua em Bremen ou em Frankfurt  porque é que na altura não queria pagar mais impostos, à semelhança de muitos outros alemães, pela reunificação...Agora e independentemente de outros considerandos (alguns válidos) , se os alemães não são solidários entre si, como poderão sê-lo com os outros? 
Em conclusão, sou categórico: a solidariedade europeia tem de ser um objectivo a alcançar no imediato.  

Se o Euro não tem condições para continuar - e pelos vistos talvez não tenha - então temos de mudar de rumo e mandar à fava o projecto europeu

Finalmente, tenho que dar a mão à palmatória, nesta crise e no caso português,  80 ou  90% do problema é nosso, mas existem 20 ou 10% que merecem uma análise mais aprofundada. Foi o que pretendi fazer, sem complexos e com perfeita abertura e  espírito construtivo, mas crítico.

.

Não ao novo nacionalismo alemão.  Não a uma Europa germanizada.  Não ao Euro-DM.  Não a Angela "Bush" Merkel .  A Europa é um projecto político  e não uma mera zona de Comércio Livre - 1/2-

Point de vue

Non à l'Allemagne du repli, par Ulrich Beck

LE MONDE | 10.04.10 | 14h06  •  Mis à jour le 10.04.10 | 14h06

a loi numéro un de la société du risque mondialisée pourrait s'énoncer comme suit : il ne faut jamais laisser passer un risque global sans en profiter, il est l'occasion de faire de grandes choses. C'est là un libellé que l'on n'est toutefois pas tenu d'interpréter dans une perspective multilatérale et "cosmopolitique" ; on peut aussi y voir l'occasion d'une réponse politique unilatérale et nationale. Lorsque la chancelière fédérale allemande Angela Merkel profite de la crise monétaire européenne pour redéfinir la politique budgétaire de la zone euro dans l'optique d'une Europe allemande, elle nous en donne un clair exemple.

Alors que le risque financier mondial tenait la planète en haleine, les gouvernements furent encensés pour avoir, contre toute attente, pris l'initiative politique de sauver l'économie mondiale par leurs propres moyens. L'an dernier, les banques étaient le problème ; cette année, ce sont les gouvernements. Qui, au sein de la zone euro, les sauvera de la banqueroute publique ? Le risque implique l'anticipation de la catastrophe au présent, lequel n'est bien sûr pas, c'est l'évidence même, le futur anticipé et effectif.

C'est en ce sens que les gouvernements européens luttent contre ce qui était jusqu'ici impensable, le spectre d'une possible banqueroute publique et de l'effondrement de l'euro qui hante les marchés financiers. Il y a peu encore, l'euro était le point d'ancrage fiable qui assurait la stabilité, en ces temps de turbulences financières mondiales.

Et voilà soudain que s'impose la décision de principe : coopérer ou échouer ! Je me suis dit : mon Dieu, quelle chance ! Si l'Union européenne n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer pour empêcher l'effondrement de l'euro. Emmanuel Kant ou la catastrophe ! Il nous faut un euro fort et stable, c'est donc le moment ou jamais de mobiliser la volonté politique et de faire en sorte que la politique de paix par d'autres moyens, la coordination et l'intégration de la politique économique franchissent un nouveau pas décisif.

A moins que l'Allemagne n'estime que le temps est venu de se défendre contre l'Europe - le succès allemand comme modèle, face aux abus de voisins européens jaloux qui voudraient soigner leurs déficits publics en tapant dans le porte-monnaie des Allemands ? Le nationalisme réciproque qu'avancent certains Européens pragmatiques n'est-il pas la solution ? Non seulement il permet que chaque Etat règle ses propres problèmes de finances de manière autonome, mais il lui en fait même le devoir.

Chaque nation devant reconnaître la souveraineté des autres nations européennes, toutes doivent du même coup éviter les conséquences négatives que leurs décisions de politique économique peuvent entraîner pour les autres. C'est là un point de vue qui repose sur trois principes - égalité de droit, trains de mesures concertés et responsabilité réciproque - auxquels s'ajoute un quatrième : le refus strict que soit étendue la compétence de l'UE en matière de politique économique.

Si, par beau fixe, ce modèle du nationalisme réciproque peut suffire, en des temps où l'euro est menacé d'effondrement, il ne peut qu'échouer. L'incompatibilité des politiques budgétaires et financières et des systèmes sociaux et fiscaux ouvre un champ politique miné, tant au sein des nations qu'entre les nations. Aucun Etat n'est assez fort pour sortir les autres des sables mouvants ; dans le même temps, il n'apparaît que trop clairement à quel point tous sont liés les uns aux autres en réseau : qu'un Etat fasse banqueroute, et les autres sont menacés d'être engloutis avec lui.

Un "impératif cosmopolitique" se dégage des risques financiers actuels, en ce sens qu'ils contraignent à la collaboration y compris des acteurs-clés qui, telle la chancelière fédérale, ne veulent absolument pas en voir la nécessité.

La crise provoquée par les risques qu'encourt l'euro a catalysé de nouveaux rapports de pouvoir. Lorsqu'il s'agit de décider, ce n'est pas la Commission européenne qui prend les choses en main, ni le président de l'Union européenne (UE), ni le président du Conseil, pas plus que la France, l'Italie, l'Espagne ou le Royaume-Uni ; dans les cas critiques, c'est la chancelière fédérale allemande qui agit en étroite collaboration avec le président français, Nicolas Sarkozy.

Angela Merkel n'est pas Angela Kohl ou Angela Brandt. Le chancelier Kohl avait déclaré dans son programme de gouvernement pour les années 1991-1994 : "L'Allemagne est notre patrie, l'Europe notre futur." Willy Brandt avait dit lors de la première session du Bundestag de l'Allemagne réunifiée : "Etre allemand et être européen, désormais, cela va ensemble et, espérons-le, à jamais." La torsion à laquelle la chancelière Merkel a soumis cette profession de foi froisse un nerf sensible, et pas seulement chez les voisins européens.

Elle n'est pas non plus Maggie Merkel, soumettant d'une main de fer l'Europe à la logique du marché. Elle est Angela Bush. A l'instar du président américain George W. Bush, qui utilisa la logique du risque pour dicter au reste du monde son unilatéralisme par une déclaration de guerre au terrorisme, Angela Bush a utilisé le risque financier en Europe pour imposer au reste de l'UE la politique allemande de stabilité.

Le deutsche mark fut la monnaie de la puissance allemande. Il faut désormais qu'il en soit de même avec l'euro. Après coup et avec constance, le nationalisme du deutsche mark est imprimé dans cet euro aujourd'hui menacé d'effondrement. Les bases de la politique allemande d'après-guerre, en l'occurrence le multilatéralisme, ont été tout bonnement sacrifiées, au nom de l'Europe, sur l'autel de la "stabilité de l'euro", au prix d'un étonnant mélange d'autoréférentialité, d'autosuffisance et d'auto-illusion.

Mais l'offensive de Merkel en faveur du "deutscheuro" - DE - s'inscrit dans un cadre plus large. Tant dans le domaine économique que dans celui de la politique extérieure ou dans celui des interventions de la Bundeswehr à l'étranger, la chancelière est la porte-parole d'une nation repliée sur elle-même, une Allemagne qui a cessé d'être la plus européenne des Européens et qui préfère minimiser ses alliances et ses obligations dans le cadre de l'Union ; une Allemagne qui caresse un avenir de "grande Suisse" ou de "petite Chine" (des excédents extérieurs avec une demande intérieure limitée) ; une Allemagne qui redéfinit son histoire constitutionnelle d'après-guerre dans le sens d'un Etat-nation autoréférentiel, et, last but not least, une Allemagne qui reprend à nouveaux frais la "question allemande" dans le cadre européen.

Derrière tout cela, ce qui est en train de prendre forme politiquement, c'est l'illusoire légende nationale que forgent certaines élites intellectuelles. Celles-ci stigmatisent l'absence de visage de la bureaucratie européenne (comme récemment Hans-Magnus Enzensberger dans le Spiegel) ou le recul démocratique (l'arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle sur le traité de Lisbonne - autre exemple éclatant, au demeurant, du nouvel unilatéralisme allemand) ; ce faisant, elles formulent implicitement l'hypothèse absolument irréaliste d'un retour possible à un idyllique Etat-nation.

Règnent une foi aveugle en l'Etat-nation à rebours de sa propre historicité, et une naïveté opiniâtre et déconcertante qui fait que l'on tient pour éternel et naturel ce qui passait il y a encore deux ou trois siècles pour absurde et totalement étranger à la nature. Ce nationalisme intellectuel et son illusoire légende nationale fondée sur la nostalgie ne sont pas seulement à l'oeuvre dans d'obscurs coins d'Europe en proie au populisme de droite, ils dominent dans les cercles les plus instruits et les plus cultivés.

Le modèle allemand d'après-guerre était porteur d'une politique étrangère empreinte de la plus haute modernité : il était postnational, multilatéral, fondé sur une approche économique forte, pacifique au plus haut point et sous tous ses aspects - prêchant l'interdépendance tous azimuts, partout en quête d'amis et ne s'imaginant nulle part d'ennemis. "Puissance", "pouvoir" étaient quasiment des gros mots, qu'il fallait remplacer par celui de "responsabilité" ; quant aux intérêts nationaux, ils demeuraient toujours discrètement relégués, telles de vieilles chaises Charles X, derrière un épais rideau dans lequel étaient tissés les mots "Europe", "paix", "collaboration", "stabilité", "normalité", voire "humanité".

N'est-ce qu'une impression ou un état de fait : l'Europe unie mentionnée dans le préambule de la Loi fondamentale a-t-elle effectivement cessé d'être l'étoile polaire de la politique allemande et de la manière dont les Allemands se comprennent eux-mêmes ? Si tel était le cas - et cela exigerait une vive discussion au sein et à l'extérieur de l'Europe -, c'en serait fini de la belle époque de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe. L'UE serait en passe de redevenir une zone de libre-échange de luxe - dans une société du risque mondialisée, où aucun pays ne peut résoudre ses problèmes seul.

(Traduit de l'allemand par Christian Bouchindhomme)

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Ulrich Beck est sociologue et philosophe

En 1944, professeur à l'université de Munich, cet intellectuel allemand s'est fait connaître, en 1986, par sa "Société du risque" (Aubier, 2001). Il y caractérisait notre époque comme postindustrielle et postnationale. Européen convaincu à l'ère de la mondialisation,

Il est notamment l'auteur d'un "Qu'est-ce que le cosmopolitisme ?" (Aubier, 2006). (PHOTO : DR)

Article paru dans l'édition du 11.04.10