“Primavera árabe,” islamismo e Argélia

Do blog El boomeran, dado o seu inegável interesses, transcrevemos, com a devida vénia o seguinte post:

Los herederos de Cervantes

Jorge Volpi

3 de Júlio 2011-07-09

Para Nacho Padilla

"Aunque la reja está cerrada, en el interior del sitio histórico un grupo de jóvenes -la media de edad en Argelia es de 27 años- juega futbol alegremente. Los imito y también salto. La inscripción en el ajado monumento cuenta que, en esta cueva que entonces no se hallaba en un suburbio de la capital, Miguel de Cervantes se ocultó durante su segundo intento de evasión tras ser atrapado por corsarios turcos en 1575, cuando viajaba de regreso a España.

La gruta, salpicada por la jubilosa indiferencia de estos muchachos, quizás sirva como metáfora de los desencuentros que aún persisten entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo. Cuatro siglos después, los países del norte continúan admirándose en el espejo del escritor español como guardianes únicos de la libertad y aún contemplan a los árabes como una amenaza o como las apocadas víctimas de sus tiranos, aunque es probable que en nuestros días estas posiciones se hayan invertido.

A los europeos les ha costado un enorme esfuerzo constatar que, como Cervantes, estos jóvenes también han intentado escapar reiteradamente del sometimiento y en su mayoría han decidido enfrentarse al islamismo y otras formas de opresión. Desde principios del siglo XIX, cuando se inició la decadencia del Imperio Otomano, los occidentales -detesto esta equívoca palabra- nunca han dejado de subestimar a los árabes, y su política frente a ellos continúa marcada por un racismo apenas disimulado.

Las revueltas en Túnez y Egipto, que detonaron las de Libia, Siria y otros países -Yemen o Bahréin constituyen casos aparte- fueron para ellos una sorpresa idéntica a la que sacudió el Este de Europa a fines de los ochenta: movimientos internos de rebeldía frente a regímenes brutales y corruptos, en este caso sostenidos con el dinero de Occidente. Y las contradicciones y riesgos que enfrentan sus nuevos regímenes tendrían que ser vistos como el laboratorio donde se juega el futuro de la democracia en todo el orbe.

Argelia luce como excepción: a diferencia de sus vecinos -Marruecos incluido-, aquí la primavera árabe pareció desvanecerse de inmediato. Sin embargo, el motivo no es la indiferencia o el conformismo, sino la memoria del "decenio negro" de 1991-2002 que se cobró unas 150 mil vidas. De algún modo, Argelia experimentó con 10 años de antelación el despertar cívico que hoy admiramos en otras partes -y pagó por ello un altísimo costo.

Tras el desmantelamiento del socialismo real, en 1991 Argelia se abrió por primera vez a la democracia: se formaron decenas de pequeños partidos pero fueron los islamistas del FIS -la única fuerza organizada- quienes lograron la victoria ante la miope complacencia de Occidente. El FIS jamás ocultó su objetivo: dar paso a una República islámica basada en la sharía. Los militares impulsaron entonces un golpe de Estado y encarcelaron a sus miembros, quienes a su vez formaron grupos terroristas que atentaron contra la población civil y arrasaron pueblos completos si se oponían a sus dogmas. No fue sino hasta la elección de Abdelaziz Buteflika, en 1999, que la situación comenzó a normalizarse gracias a una amnistía general. (Desde entonces ha modificado la Constitución para mantenerse en el poder como tantos caudillos).

El caso argelino debería servir como modelo para Egipto, Túnez y eventualmente Libia o Siria: por un lado, es tiempo de echar para siempre a los sátrapas que, con la excusa de frenar a los islamistas, se convirtieron en dueños de sus países con el beneplácito occidental. Por el otro, no es posible dejar de plantearse, ante una tragedia como la argelina, de qué manera la democracia puede -o debe- cerrar sus puertas a quienes pretenden destruirla desde dentro. En la respuesta a esta pregunta se juega la estabilidad de la región y acaso del mundo.

Los jóvenes que se han levantado en la rotonda de Al-Tahrir en El Cairo o en las calles de Túnez, Daraa o Bengasi, miembros de la misma generación que los improvisados jugadores de futbol en la gruta de Cervantes, son los auténticos herederos del novelista: contra toda expectativa, se arriesgaron a expulsar a los tiranos que los esclavizaron por decenios. Los grandes ideales de la Ilustración se encuentran ahora entre ellos, mientras Europa y Estados Unidos se encierran cada vez más en sus crisis internas, se parapetan en la xenofobia o el racismo y protegen al régimen más autoritario y virulento de la zona: Arabia Saudí y sus wahabitas.

Occidente no puede permitirse el lujo de abandonar a estos muchachos como hizo con Argelia en 1991: el encanto de los islamistas aún es poderoso y nada indica que no vayan a aprovechar este nuevo destello de libertad para recuperarse. Cervantes no sólo fue libre por sus reiterados intentos de fuga de los baños de Argel, sino por la imaginación que años después lo llevó a crear a Don Quijote: la misma imaginación que se requiere para discutir, en este verano árabe, cómo la democracia puede eludir a los corsarios que aún intentan secuestrarla."

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously

May 19, 2011

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially registered Wednesday for the formation of a new political wing, paving the way for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party. With parliamentary elections scheduled in September, Freedom and Justice is expected to do well at the first polls of the post-Mubarak era. Just how well is the main question on the minds of the country’s ruling military council, which would prefer to hand off the day-to-day responsibilities of governing Egypt, while holding onto real power behind the scenes. 

Leading MB official Saad al-Katatny, one of the founders of Freedom and Justice, said he hopes for the party to officially begin its activities June 17, and to begin selecting its executive authority and top leaders one month later. Members of Egypt’s Political Parties Affairs Committee will convene Sunday to discuss the application and will announce their decision the next day. They are expected to approve the request. Three and a half months after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s leading Islamist group is on the verge of forming an official political party for the first time in its history. 

Following Mubarak’s ouster, MB wasted little time in seizing what it saw as the group’s historical moment to enter Egypt’s political mainstream. They announced plans to form a political party on Feb. 14. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which took over administration of the country following the deposal of Mubarak, did nothing to hinder this development, despite the military’s deep antipathy toward Islamist groups. Political instability was (and is) rampant in the country, and the military sought to find a balance that would allow it to maintain control while appearing amenable to the people’s demands, and bring life back to normal. Opening up political space to Islamist groups, including at least two emerging Salafist parties, and announcing plans for fairly rapid elections, was seen by the military as the most effective way to achieve this balance. 

It bears repeating that what happened in Egypt in January and February did not constitute a revolution. There was no regime change; there was regime preservation, through a carefully orchestrated military coup that used the 19 days of popular demonstrations against Mubarak as a smokescreen for achieving its objective. Though a system of one-party rule existed from the aftermath of the 1967 War until Feb. 11 of this year, true power in Egypt since 1952 has been with the military and that did not change with the ouster of Mubarak. What changed was that for the first time since the 1960s, Egypt’s military found itself not just ruling, but actually governing, despite the existence of an interim government (which the SCAF itself appointed). 

The SCAF wants to get back to ruling and give up the job of governing, but it knows that there has been a sea change in Egypt’s political environment that prevents a return to the way things were done under Mubarak. The days of single-party rule are over. If the military wants stability, it is going to have to accept a true multiparty political system, one that allows for a broad spectrum of participation from all corners of Egyptian society. The generals can maintain control of the regime, but the day-to-day affairs of governance will fall under the control of coalition governments that could never have existed in the old Egypt. 

This opens the door for MB to gain more political power than it has ever held and explains why its leaders were so quick to announce their plans for the formation of Freedom and Justice in February. But the group has tempered eagerness with caution. MB is aware of its reputation in the eyes of the SCAF (and the outside world, for that matter) and is playing a shrewd game to dispel its image as an extremist Islamist group. It has been publicly supportive of the SCAF on a number of occasions, and has marketed Freedom and Justice as a non-Islamist party — it includes women and one of its founders is a Copt — based on Islamic principles. MB has also insisted that the new party will have no actual ties to the Brotherhood itself (though this is clearly not the case), while promising that it will not field a presidential candidate in polls due to take place six weeks following the parliamentary elections. In addition, MB has pledged to run for no more than 49 percent of the available parliamentary seats. This is designed to reassure the SCAF that it does not immediately seek absolute political power. 

Focusing on whether the SCAF is sincere in its publicly stated desire to transform Egypt into a democracy misses the more important point, which is that the military regime feels it has no choice but to move toward a multiparty political system. The alternatives — military dictatorship and single-party rule — are unfeasible. But there are red lines attached to the push toward political pluralism, and MB is aware of these. Trying to take too much, too quickly, will only incite a military crackdown on the political opening the armed forces have engineered in the last three months. As for the SCAF, it is willing to give Freedom and Justice a chance in the new Egypt, so long as the underlying reality of power remains the same.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Obama - Osama

Carlos Fuentes

9 May. 11

La minoría extrema de la derecha en EE.UU., el Tea Party, quiere enjuiciarlo y expulsarlo de la presidencia. La mayoría del Partido Republicano busca mil maneras de dificultarle el ejercicio del poder. Donald Trump, peinado por la ley de la gravedad, duda de que Obama sea ciudadano de los EE.UU. Las reformas del presidente a las leyes de salud son disputadas por los intereses favorables a una medicina des-regulada, que sirva a compañías de seguros, negándoles seguridad a los ancianos y a los enfermos irremediables. Las leyes que han salvado a la industria automotriz ni se discuten. Pero las leyes para la banca son burladas por los salarios estratosféricos que los banqueros se atribuyen a sí mismos.

La derecha critica sistemáticamente a Barack Obama y algunos lo consideran "comunista". La extrema izquierda, asimismo, siente que sus políticas son demasiado tímidas. Y un periodista, hace un par de semanas, le espetó en la reunión del presidente con la prensa: "¿Por qué tolera usted el terrorismo y no hace nada al respecto?".

Como es su costumbre, Obama mantiene la calma, sonríe y luego actúa. Tiene que vérselas con un Congreso que no le da todo lo que quiere. Debe negociar, sin ceder ante el Tea Party pero arrebatándole a esa facción legisladores republicanos por gracia del acuerdo moderado.

Todo ello sitúa a Obama en el centro del espectro político, a veces más a la derecha pero sólo en virtud de negociaciones que inevitablemente conceden, a veces más a la izquierda donde está el corazón del profesor de Harvard que prefirió ser consejero de causas sociales y combatir a la pobreza en Chicago, que abogado de grandes compañías en Nueva York.

Pero en el centro-centro, en el corazón de corazones, está un hombre tranquilo, lejano a la "gracia" exigida al político del norte, reservado y dispuesto, llegado el caso, a actuar con todo el poder a su alcance para obtener resultados precisos, aunque peligrosos y a veces hasta imprevisibles.

Este es el Barack Obama que ordenó el asalto a la fortaleza invisible por su visibilidad, del terrorista Osama Bin-laden en Pakistán. Operación unilateral y silenciosa: el gobierno de Pakistán no es confiable y hace fortuna con su duplicidad. Operación encargada a los Seals, equipo sin compasión o dilación que en cuarenta minutos descabezó a Al-Qaeda diez años después de los ataques suicidas del 9/11 a Nueva York, Pennsylvania y Washington y los veintidós -veintidós- ataques de Al-Qaeda a hoteles, sinagogas, consulados, automóviles, trenes, refinerías, embajadas, de Túnez a Madrid, de Londres a Riyadh, de Filipinas a Marruecos, con más de ochocientos muertos, aparte de los tres mil asesinados en los ataques a las Torres Gemelas en septiembre de 2001.

¿Merecía compasión este asesino en serie, Osama Bin-laden? ¿Merecía llegar vivo a un tribunal para ser juzgado y sentenciado por sus crímenes? Esto se debate hoy. Lo indebatible es la vida perdida por tantos inocentes en todo el mundo por la saña ideológica de Bin-laden. No lo excusa su fe, como no excusó la fe a la Santa Inquisición ni la falta de fe al emperador romano Nerón. La creencia -en el nazismo, el comunismo, el nacionalismo, el imperialismo- no excusa una sola muerte inocente. Invocando a Alá, Osama Bin-laden actuaba en nombre del Diablo, un diablo, es cierto, que muchos seres humanos llevamos dentro pero al que no le damos rienda suelta por una sola y profunda razón: el respeto a las vidas ajenas.

Osama Bin-laden carecía de ese respeto a los demás. Todos eran carne de su cañón ideológico-religioso. Osama tiñó a la religión de Mahoma de un color -el de la muerte- que no es el de Islam. Muchos ciudadanos de su cultura religiosa se dieron cuenta de la falsedad y lo abandonaron. Al morir Bin-laden, el Yihadismo era ya una bandera rasgada, casi el cruel capricho de un árabe multimillonario decidido a seguir jugando a la guerra.

Destaco, con alegría, que la muerte de Bin-laden, por más que su cadáver siga provocando sobresaltos, coincide con el despertar democrático del norte de África, de Siria y Yemen. Una gran fortuna: estos movimientos de libertad no han sido auspiciados por el Occidente. No podían serlo: Europa y los EE.UU., en proporciones distintas, apoyaron a los dictadores de Túnez y Egipto y aún al lunático Gadafi en Libia. Mubarak, en Egipto, aceptó esta anomalía para negarle vida a la Palestina libre que, ahora, la Asamblea General de la ONU proclamará el venidero septiembre, dándole serios dolores de cabeza a Benjamin Netanyahu y proponiendo dos grandes cambios: que el centro-izquierda vuelva al poder en Israel y que la facción palestina Hamas reconozca al estado judío.

El Occidente tiene graves culpas que purgar en el área mediterránea. Ahora, le toca reconocer y apoyar a los movimientos democráticos de Egipto y Túnez, de Marruecos y Yemen, de Siria y Argelia. Apoyarlos mas no encabezarlos. La singularidad de lo ocurrido en calles y plazas de El Cairo y Damasco y Túnez y Marrakech es que ocurre sin manipulación externa, europea o norteamericana. Son movimientos locales, propios de cada sociedad y a cada sociedad le corresponde trazarse su propio porvenir y saldar su propio pasado. Jóvenes, estudiantes, clase media, trabajadores, amas de casa: son visibles, allí están. Con ellos está la esperanza de países norafricanos libres, de un Mediterráneo sur sin ninguna obligación con el Mediterráneo norte que la de la relación normal en democracia.

Faltan muchas batallas. Habrá muchos retrocesos. Pero la realidad está clara y está alli.

Nota: Carlos Fuentes é um dos mais conhecidos escritores e ensaístas mexicanos e uma referência das letras e cultura ibero-americanas. 

Esquizofrenia ibérica - Da Catalunha e do Egipto

Quando pensamos que somos governados por um atrasado mental esquecemo-nos de olhar aqui ao lado.





Onda Cero Radio, acerca de la situación que se vive en Egipto.
8 y pico de la mañana:

- Carlos Herrera: ¿Son ustedes de España?
- Entrevistado: No, somos catalanes.
- Carlos Herrera: ¿Y no pueden regresar a su país?...
- Entrevistado: No, y nos quejamos de lo abandonados que nos tiene la Embajada de España que no nos hace ni caso...
- Carlos Herrera: Bueno... ¿lo han intentado en la embajada de Cataluña?

Revolution and the Muslim World

By George Friedman

The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink.

There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire. These moments do not come often. Those that come to mind include 1848, where a rising in France engulfed Europe. There was also 1968, where the demonstrations of what we might call the New Left swept the world: Mexico City, Paris, New York and hundreds of other towns saw anti-war revolutions staged by Marxists and other radicals. Prague saw the Soviets smash a New Leftist government. Even China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could, by a stretch, be included. In 1989, a wave of unrest, triggered by East Germans wanting to get to the West, generated an uprising in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule.

Each had a basic theme. The 1848 uprisings attempted to establish liberal democracies in nations that had been submerged in the reaction to Napoleon. 1968 was about radical reform in capitalist society. 1989 was about the overthrow of communism. They were all more complex than that, varying from country to country. But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.

Some of these revolutions had great impact. 1989 changed the global balance of power. 1848 ended in failure at the time — France reverted to a monarchy within four years — but set the stage for later political changes. 1968 produced little that was lasting. The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.

The Current Rising in Context

In looking at the current rising, the geographic area is clear: The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises. Of course, many other Muslim countries also had revolutionary events that have not, at least until now, escalated into events that threaten regimes or even ruling personalities. There have been hints of such events elsewhere. There were small demonstrations in China, and of course Wisconsin is in turmoil over budget cuts. But these don’t really connect to what is happening in the Middle East. The first was small and the second is not taking inspiration from Cairo. So what we have is a rising in the Arab world that has not spread beyond there for the time being.

The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted. This has expressed itself in different ways. In Bahrain, for example, the rising was of the primarily Shiite population against a predominantly Sunni royal family. In Egypt, it was against the person of Hosni Mubarak. In Libya, it is against the regime and person of Moammar Gadhafi and his family, and is driven by tribal hostility.

Why has it come together now? One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War. Since the early 1970s, the region has, with the exception of Iran in 1979, been fairly stable in the sense that the regimes — and even the personalities who rose up in the unstable phase — stabilized their countries and imposed regimes that could not easily be moved. Gadhafi, for example, overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and has governed continually for 42 years since then.

Any regime dominated by a small group of people over time will see that group use their position to enrich themselves. There are few who can resist for 40 years. It is important to recognize that Gadhafi, for example, was once a genuine, pro-Soviet revolutionary. But over time, revolutionary zeal declines and avarice emerges along with the arrogance of extended power. And in the areas of the region where there had not been regime changes since after World War I, this principle stays true as well, although interestingly, over time, the regimes seem to learn to spread the wealth a bit.

Thus, what emerged throughout the region were regimes and individuals who were classic kleptocrats. More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time. And we can add to this that they are people who were planning to maintain family power and money by installing sons as their political heirs. The same process, with variations, is under way in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a rising against the revolutionaries of previous generations.

The revolutions have been coming for a long time. The rising in Tunisia, particularly when it proved successful, caused it to spread. As in 1848, 1968 and 1989, similar social and cultural conditions generate similar events and are triggered by the example of one country and then spread more broadly. That has happened in 2011 and is continuing.

A Uniquely Sensitive Region

It is, however, happening in a region that is uniquely sensitive at the moment. The U.S.-jihadist war means that, as with previous revolutionary waves, there are broader potential geopolitical implications. 1989 meant the end of the Soviet empire, for example. In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them. We do not see these revolutions as a vast conspiracy by radical Islamists to take control of the region. A conspiracy that vast is easily detected, and the security forces of the individual countries would have destroyed the conspiracies quickly. No one organized the previous waves, although there have been conspiracy theories about them as well. They arose from certain conditions, following the example of one incident. But particular groups certainly tried, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of them.

In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them. Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious. They are a broad, transnational and disparate group brought up in conspiratorial methods. This is their opportunity to create a broad international coalition. Thus, as with traditional communists and the New Left in the 1960s, they did not create the rising but they would be fools not to try to take advantage of it. I would add that there is little question but that the United States and other Western countries are trying to influence the direction of the uprisings. For both sides, this is a difficult game to play, but it is particularly difficult for the United States as outsiders to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.

But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.

Democratic revolutions have two phases. The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments. The example of Hitler is useful as a caution on what kind of governments a young democracy can produce, since he came to power through democratic and constitutional means — and then abolished democracy to cheering crowds. So there are three crosscurrents here. The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.

In any event, the real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes. Let’s consider the process of revolution for the moment, beginning by distinguishing a demonstration from an uprising. A demonstration is merely the massing of people making speeches. This can unsettle the regime and set the stage for more serious events, but by itself, it is not significant. Unless the demonstrations are large enough to paralyze a city, they are symbolic events. There have been many demonstrations in the Muslim world that have led nowhere; consider Iran.

It is interesting here to note that the young frequently dominate revolutions like 1848, 1969 and 1989 at first. This is normal. Adults with families and maturity rarely go out on the streets to face guns and tanks. It takes young people to have the courage or lack of judgment to risk their lives in what might be a hopeless cause. However, to succeed, it is vital that at some point other classes of society join them. In Iran, one of the key moments of the 1979 revolution was when the shopkeepers joined young people in the street. A revolution only of the young, as we saw in 1968 for example, rarely succeeds. A revolution requires a broader base than that, and it must go beyond demonstrations. The moment it goes beyond the demonstration is when it confronts troops and police. If the demonstrators disperse, there is no revolution. If they confront the troops and police, and if they carry on even after they are fired on, then you are in a revolutionary phase. Thus, pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.

A Revolution’s Key Event

This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event. In Bahrain, the troops fired on demonstrators and killed some. The demonstrators dispersed and then were allowed to demonstrate — with memories of the gunfire fresh. This was a revolution contained. In Egypt, the military and police opposed each other and the military sided with the demonstrators, for complex reasons obviously. Personnel change, if not regime change, was inevitable. In Libya, the military has split wide open.

When that happens, you have reached a branch in the road. If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war. Indeed, one way for a revolution to succeed is to proceed to civil war, turning the demonstrators into an army, so to speak. That’s what Mao did in China. Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success. Always, the point to look for is thus the police joining with the demonstrators. This happened widely in 1989 but hardly at all in 1968. It happened occasionally in 1848, but the balance was always on the side of the state. Hence, that revolution failed.

It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution. Therefore, to return to the earlier theme, the most important question on the role of radical Islamists is not their presence in the crowd, but their penetration of the military and police. If there were a conspiracy, it would focus on joining the military, waiting for demonstrations and then striking.

Those who argue that these risings have nothing to do with radical Islam may be correct in the sense that the demonstrators in the streets may well be students enamored with democracy. But they miss the point that the students, by themselves, can’t win. They can only win if the regime wants them to, as in Egypt, or if other classes and at least some of the police or military — people armed with guns who know how to use them — join them. Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.

The problem with revolutions is that the people who start them rarely finish them. The idealist democrats around Alexander Kerensky in Russia were not the ones who finished the revolution. The thuggish Bolsheviks did. In these Muslim countries, the focus on the young demonstrators misses the point just as it did in Tiananmen Square. It wasn’t the demonstrators that mattered, but the soldiers. If they carried out orders, there would be no revolution.

I don’t know the degree of Islamist penetration of the military in Libya, to pick one example of the unrest. I suspect that tribalism is far more important than theology. In Egypt, I suspect the regime has saved itself by buying time. Bahrain was more about Iranian influence on the Shiite population than Sunni jihadists at work. But just as the Iranians are trying to latch on to the process, so will the Sunni jihadists.

The Danger of Chaos

I suspect some regimes will fall, mostly reducing the country in question to chaos. The problem, as we are seeing in Tunisia, is that frequently there is no one on the revolutionaries’ side equipped to take power. The Bolsheviks had an organized party. In these revolutions, the parties are trying to organize themselves during the revolution, which is another way to say that the revolutionaries are in no position to govern. The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.

All of this is speculation. What we do know is that this is not the first wave of revolution in the world, and most waves fail, with their effects seen decades later in new regimes and political cultures. Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.

In the meantime, as you watch the region, remember not to watch the demonstrators. Watch the men with the guns. If they stand their ground for the state, the demonstrators have failed. If some come over, there is some chance of victory. And if victory comes, and democracy is declared, do not assume that what follows will in any way please the West — democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.

The situation remains fluid, and there are no broad certainties. It is a country-by-country matter now, with most regimes managing to stay in power to this point. There are three possibilities. One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades. The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance. The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.

If I were to guess at this point, I would guess that we are facing 1848. The Muslim world will not experience massive regime change as in 1989, but neither will the effects be as ephemeral as 1968. Like 1848, this revolution will fail to transform the Muslim world or even just the Arab world. But it will plant seeds that will germinate in the coming decades. I think those seeds will be democratic, but not necessarily liberal. In other words, the democracies that eventually arise will produce regimes that will take their bearings from their own culture, which means Islam.

The West celebrates democracy. It should be careful what it hopes for: It might get it.

"Revolution and the Muslim World is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Egypt Army Wear

So just to outline here – these are makeshift helmets 
made by the Egyptians whilst scrapping in their current predicament. 


I shall guide you through these pieces of registered non standard army kit:

Your classic 1979 ‘Tribottle rag’ helmet – a must in any type of combat

A late 80’s ‘boxhat’. The bloke next to him doesn’t appear too sure of its effectiveness

A renaissance period piece of brickwear teamed with a black and cream scarf. Textbook


Im not sure that tuna sarnie he is about to lob is gonna cause to much destruction. 
Old skool 80’s broken bin helmet. 
I personally love the fact he needs to lift it up to see – 
does he spend the rest of the time walking in to things??


Textbook saucepaning with lifejacket combo. He does not take, ANY!!


I literally have no idea what this is.


And the winner by 100 miles. 
This bloke is going to war with 2 baguettes strapped to his ears and a ham salad roll 
sellotaped to his forehead. I’d def wanna be behind him if someone lobs a load of bricks at me.

Cairo – Os meus parabéns a Aristides Gonçalves.

Não há dúvida que tem feito um trabalho excelente, no meio daquela bagunçada. O Zé Tuga tem sempre que se queixar, mas desta vez se o faz não tem razão nenhuma.

Pena, foi que essa emissora ranhosa, de quinta ordem que dá pelo nome de TVI, num destes dias, deu em primeira mão que não se conseguia falar para a nossa embaixada no Cairo e que respondia de lá uma gravação em árabe, não sendo, por conseguinte, verdade a afirmação, feita pelo embaixador Aristides Vieira Gonçalves, que a missão estava a laborar a 100% ,24 horas sobre 24.

Se a TVI ou alguém por ela soubesse árabe (eu até sei um bocadinho, porque por lá andei durante uns anos) , constataria que a gravação, da telefónica egípcia, muito simplesmente referia que os circuitos estavam saturados e que as comunicações estavam temporariamente interrompidas, pedindo para se ligar mais tarde. É natural que, naquele caos, os circuitos através da linha fixa terrestre estivessem saturados! Em seguida, não contente com isso, a TVI transmite uma gravação em inglês a dizer a mesmíssima coisa. A incompetência é, pois, total e recomenda-se... Mas será muito difícil assumir as besteiras, as idiotices, as acusações gratuitas e, sobretudo, a inépcia, e pedir desculpa?  Transmitam telenovelas que é o que sabem fazer.

Quem tem manda a ti sapateiro tocar tão mal rabecão...

Não defendo Aristides que ele não precisa de advogado, mas são coisas que não se fazem.

Egipto: pirâmides sem sombra

Para os EUA, para o Ocidente em geral e, principalmente, para Israel, o status quo vigente até há umas semanas atrás é sempre preferível a este estado de agitação e de instabilidade permanentes sem rumo determinado. O problema principal consiste, pois, na imprevisibilidade, uma vez que pode – e naturalmente vai – emergir uma situação complexa e desconhecida. De momento os acontecimentos que se sucedem em catadupa parecem conduzir a uma conjuntura caracterizada pela  fluidez.

Com efeito, no Egipto, o regime sempre foi militar. Nasser, Sadat e Mubarak vieram todos eles das fileiras. Qualquer deles esteve no poder porque a classe castrense egípcia assim entendeu que devia ser. As mudanças introduzidas por Mubarak, vão no sentido de dar ainda mais força às Forças Armadas: os novos Vice-presidente e PM são militares.

Mas quais são ou podem ser os cenários futuros?

Antes do mais, o regime pode reinventar-se a si próprio. Retira algumas cartas do baralho e prossegue com outras cartas o mesmo jogo, introduzindo algumas alterações cosméticas, podendo-o fazer com Mubarak ou, em alternativa, com uma outra figura militar. Num segundo cenário, realizam-se eleições com resultados inconclusivos forçando a uma coligação que, muito presumivelmente, só será possível com a  Irmandade Muçulmana, a principal (senão, mesmo, a única) força política organizada do pais. Aí, o Egipto entra por uma via de radicalização acelerada e tudo pode acontecer. Uma aliança com o mundo islâmico anti-ocidental e anti-Israel é perfeitamente possível. Esta radicalização do Egipto, dada a sua dimensão regional, conduzirá a uma radicalização de todo o mundo islâmico ( e neste caso, o afastamento da Turquia do campo ocidental, já visível e a sua aproximação ao Egipto é uma mera hipótese, porém, plausível e preocupante). Num terceiro cenário, a criação de um estado laico, reclamada por algumas elites, é, por ora, altamente improvável, porque depararia com a oposição firme da rua.

Assim, o triângulo Egipto-Turquia-Irão, em que cada um dos vértices apresenta características próprias  que as distinguem dos demais poderá conduzir, mas não necessariamente , a uma onda de radicalismo. Nesta matéria, quaisquer previsões são prematuras.

Independentemente da solução encontrada o Egipto vai-se afirmar face aos EUA e a Israel e esse é um dado praticamente adquirido, o que não quer dizer que irá denunciar os acordos de Camp David (1978).

Alguns apontamentos

É estranho que a U.E. venha, agora, reclamar, “eleições livres e justas” no Egipto, ao fim destes anos todos. Então porque não as reclamou antes? Não reclamou antes porque a situação então vigente era confortável e não convinha levantar ondas. O Egipto não era um regime opressivo e que não respeitava os direitos humanos? Opressivo, opressivo, havia bem pior...E os princípios? Bom... os princípios são isso mesmo. Variam consoante a latitude... Não vale a pena falar mais no assunto.

E El Baradei e o seu papel no meio de tudo isto? No fundo, é uma espécie de Gorbachov egípcio, conhecido e estimado além fronteiras e ignorado ou odiado intra-muros. Não terá grande relevância no processo interno do país sem respaldo militar consistente, sendo duvidoso que o consiga obter.

A fúria do regime (e dos militares) contra os media internacionais, como fautores de todos os problemas que o Egipto padece é um péssimo sinal. Daí o encerrar-se a Internet e a rede móvel, como se fosse possível isolar um país de 80 milhões de habitantes do mundo exterior, ao abrigo de alegados vírus perigosos que andam por aí à solta e que são a razão de todos os males. Registe-se que se é  o regime que manda  encerrar, os  militares mantém a interdição. Está tudo dito.    

Egipto: Revolta à beira Nilo

The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

January 29, 2011 | 2207 GMT

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt, remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s command in the air force (the most privileged military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the Republican Guard) and Egypt’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore (whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also itself.

This report is republished authorized by www.stratfor.com