Narco-tráfico 

Dado o seu interesse a seguir se transcreve, nas versões em língua castelhana e em língua inglesa, um artigo publicado na imprensa Mexicana (jornal “Excelsior” edição de 9 de Julho de 2010). Apesar da sua antiguidade, o texto não perdeu minimamente a respectiva actualidade.

Spanish  & English
 

Versión en  Español: 

    

   El paraíso de los  narcotraficantes

 *Francisco Martín Moreno

¿En Estados Unidos, el mercado de  enervantes más codiciado de la Tierra, no hay narcos destacados,  cuyos nombres deben ya formar parte de la leyenda criminal de su  país?  
 


¿Usted conoce el nombre de un solo  capo norteamericano de nuestros tiempos?  
 
 
Por  supuesto no me refiero a los famosos "gangsters" de los años de la  prohibición alcohólica en Estados Unidos como sin duda los fueron  Capone, Dillinger y Frank Nitti entre otros tantos personajes del  bajo mundo que encontraron en nuestros vecinos del norte el caldo  de cultivo necesario para desarrollarse hasta alcanzar "prestigio"  internacional... 
 
 Nosotros conocíamos a  García Abrego, a Caro Quintero, al Güero Palma, al Señor de los  Cielos, a los hermanos Arellano, entre otros líderes de nuestro  hampa tercermundista. 
 
 
Pero, insisto, ¿y en  EU, el mercado de enervantes más codiciado de la Tierra, no hay  narcos destacados, cuyos nombres deben ya formar parte, a mucha  honra, de la leyenda criminal de su país pues trafican con drogas  con un valor superior a los 500 mil millones de dólares?  
 
 ¿Ningún apellido destaca por su eficiencia  y popularidad o simplemente porque ya no hay narcotraficantes para  vergüenza de la larga tradición criminal  norteamericana?
 
¡Ya sé! En Estados Unidos  las drogas se trafican "solitas". 
 
 Los  enervantes son dejados en las fronteras norteamericanas por  "camellos" mexicanos o latinos y llegan "solitos", como por arte  de magia, a las manos de los consumidores.  
 
Del total de la mariguana que se consume  en dicho país, por ejemplo, 35% es producido en Texas, Arizona y  California sin que jamás se localice un sembradío, se incineren  los enervantes de cara al público, se recluya a los responsables  en una prisión federal y se rematen y adjudiquen sus propiedades  al mejor postor. 
 
 Sucede que la mariguana  se siembra solita, se corta solita, se distribuye solita y el  dinero obtenido se lava solito... 
 
¿No es  una verdadera maravilla? 
 
Nunca escuchamos  que se aseste un rudo golpe al narcotráfico en EU tal y como se  asesta, sin duda, en México, en forma por demás recurrente.  
 
Nunca vemos fotografías de capos  norteamericanos arrestados y enfundados en sus chamarras azules  del FBI con las manos y pies esposados, chalecos y cascos  antibala, además de una numerosa escolta policiaca para evitar  cualquier atentado en contra de su vida que impidiera la delación  de la identidad de sus socios y  movimientos...
  

En México, la captura de los  "famosos" capos ocupa las primeras planas de los diarios de la  República, además de generosos espacios radiofónicos y televisivos.   


Es evidente el  esfuerzo mexicano por ganar esta batalla en contra de la  producción y venta de enervantes. 
 
Sólo que  la batalla difícilmente la ganaremos si en Estados Unidos se  venden impunemente 500 mil millones de dólares de narcóticos en  las calles sin que nadie vea ni sepa ni oiga nada, absolutamente  nada, puesto que nuestros vecinos "puritanos" nunca atrapan a un  capo ni se publica por ende su captura en la prensa ni se queman  depósitos incautados de estupefacientes ni mueren soldados ni  agentes judiciales ni jueces ni procuradores ni se rematan  propiedades ni se revelan los nombres de las autoridades  implicadas en el narcotráfico. 
  
Nada, no se  sabe nada...
  
¿Por qué no se sabe? Muy  sencillo: porque una parte insospechable de autoridades  ejecutivas, legislativas y judiciales federales y estatales  norteamericanas está en la nómina de los capos.  
 

Si nada se hace y nada se sabe es porque  desde secretarios de Estado para abajo (sálvese el que pueda),  gobernadores, legisladores, senadores especialmente jueces,  periodistas, policías de toda índole, agentes del FBI y de la DEA  y hasta la famosa y no menos temida Patrulla Fronteriza, todos  podrían estar profundamente involucrados con los narcotraficantes  realizando jugosos negocios tal y como lo hicieron ya 

en los años de la prohibición.  
 
No hay nada nuevo bajo el sol.  
  
Menos lo va a haber ahora cuando un grupo  de maleantes goza de más poder que el Estado mismo. Nunca en la  historia de la humanidad una pandilla de delincuentes había tenido  tanto dinero como para poder comprar autoridades, periodistas y  países enteros si así lo decidieran. 
 
Todo  ello gracias a que EU pone los dólares para que esto sea posible.  
 

¿Qué prefieren los capos a cambio de la  heroína: mexican pesos or american dollars? Está clarísimo, ¿no?  ¿Cuál soberanía de un Estado cuando a un capo no se le puede  juzgar en su país de origen porque puede desestabilizarlo con  consecuencias funestas para millones y más millones de personas?   

  
¿No estamos frente a un novedosísimo  fenómeno de poder en manos de un solo individuo?
¿Dónde están  los capos norteamericanos?

¿Por qué no se inicia la persecución en  EU de los grandes narcotraficantes? 
 
 Yo, yo  sé, yo: porque ni los consumidores ni las autoridades ni los  narcos ni la prensa quieren que se sepa quiénes son.  
  
A todos les conviene el negocio. Todos  están coludidos. 
  
Mejor, mucho mejor,  culpar a México de todos sus males...

 English  version:  

 A  Trafficker’s Paradise 

   

 In the United States, the most  sought after drug market on Earth, are there are no outstanding  drug kingpins with names that make for legends? 

   

 *By Francisco Martín Moreno   


Do you know the name of a single  American drug kingpin of our times? 
 
 
I am of course not referring to  the infamous "gangsters" of the prohibition era in the United  States, such as Capone, Dillinger and Frank Nitti (among so many  underworld characters) who found in the United States the fertile  ground necessary to develop and reach international  “prestige”.
 
We knew García Abrego, Caro  Quintero, “El Güero Palma”, the “Lord of the Heavens”, the  Arellano brothers, etc. among other leaders of our meager  underworld. 
 
 
But I insist: In the US, the most  coveted drug market on Earth, are there are no outstanding drug  Kingpins (whose names must now form a proud part of the criminal  legend of their country), when they deal in a drug business worth  over 500 billion dollars? 
 
 
Is there no last name that stands  out for its efficiency and popularity or is it simply that there  are no drug traffickers to shame the longstanding American  criminal tradition? 
 
 
I know! In the US, drugs are dealt  “by themselves”. 
 
 
The drugs are dropped off at the  border by Mexican or Latin American “mules” and reach (as if by  magic) the hands of consumers “by themselves”.
 
 
Of all the marijuana that is  consumed in that country for example, 35% is produced in Texas,  Arizona and California without the authorities ever finding a  plantation, any drugs incinerated in public, or anyone being  placed in federal prison and their assets sold at auction to the  highest bidder. 
 
 
I guess  the marijuana was  planted by itself, harvested by itself, distributed by itself and  the resulting proceeds laundered by themselves... 
 
 
Is this not truly amazing?  
 
 
We never hear of a harsh blow  being dealt to drug trafficking in the United States as is  commonly done in Mexico, in a consistently recurring  form.
 
 
We never see photographs of  American drug Kingpins arrested and covered in blue FBI jackets,  hands and feet in shackles, wearing bulletproof vests and helmets,  with a huge police escort to prevent an attacks on their life that  could prevent them from informing of the identity and activities  of their associates... 
 
In Mexico, the capture of "famous"  drug Kingpins occupy the front page of newspapers, besides  receiving ample Radio and Television coverage. 
 
 
We publicly display the  incineration of narcotic drugs as soon as they are found.   Photos of heroic soldiers fallen while fighting thugs are  published. We have pictures of former State prosecutors massacred  at their doorsteps while engaged in private law practice after  retiring from fighting crime. 
 
The multiple and ostentatious  properties seized from the Kingpins are a matter of public  knowledge. 
 
The efforts of Mexican soldiers to  win this battle against the production and sale of drugs are  evident. 
 
Only that battle will hardly be  won if in the US the unhampered sale of 500 billion dollars’ worth  of narcotics in the streets continues with no one seeing or doing  anything. Since our "Puritan" neighbors never catch a Kingpin, no  arrests are announced, no soldiers or drug agents or judges or  prosecutors die, no assets are seized and no names of corrupt  government officials are published. 
 
Nothing, no one knows anything...  
 
Why doesn't anyone know? Very  simple: because an incredible number of members of the State and  Federal Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government  are on drug Kingpin’s payrolls.  
 
 
If nothing is done, and nothing is  known it’s because from the Secretary of State on down, Governors,  Legislators, Senators and especially Judges, journalists, police  officers of all kinds, FBI and DEA agents up to and including the  famous and not the least feared Border Patrol, everyone could be  deeply involved with drug traffickers and making juicy profits  just as they did during prohibition. 

There is nothing new under the  Sun. 
 

Even less now, when a group of  thugs has more power than the State itself. 

Never in the history of mankind  has a gang of criminals had so much money as to enable it to buy  authorities, journalists and whole countries if it so  decided.
 
All this thanks to the US, who  provides the dollars to make this possible. 
 

What do drug Kingpins prefer in  exchange for heroin, Mexican pesos or American dollars? It’s quite  clear, isn't it? What sovereignty does a State have when a drug  Kingpin can’t be judged in his country of origin because doing so  could bring about the destabilization of the country with  disastrous consequences for millions and millions of people?   
 

 Are we not facing a  newfound power phenomenon in the hands of a single individual?   
Where are North American drug  Kingpins? Why not I start the prosecution of major drug  traffickers in the United States? 
 I know: Because neither consumers  nor authorities nor the Kingpins nor the press want you to know  who they are. 
 
 This is good business  for everyone.  Everyone is involved. 
 
Better, much better to blame  Mexico for all its problem...

Afeganistão: os dividendos da droga subsidiam o esforço de guerra dos talibãs – É um facto indesmentível que o dinheiro da droga está a subvencionar em larga escala os talibãs, levando-os a uma beligerância cada vez mais ousada. Todavia, os EUA alteraram a respectiva politica no terreno, ou seja deixaram de erradicar as plantações de papoilas – donde se extrai a quase totalidade da proudção de ópio, heroína e derivados (93%) passando a combater directamente os traficantes. Cerca de 50 têm ligações conhecidas aos talibãs.

Apesar das críticas internacionais ao mais alto nível, o Afeganistão vive do tráfico de droga, em todos os escalões da sociedade, designadamente a nível do Governo. Todavia, os EUA estão a de algum modo a fechar os olhos ao cultivo e produção de opiáceos – uma das principais fontes de corrupção, da má gestão do pais e de desrespeito mais elementar pelas regras do Estado de direito – procurando combater os traficantes de uma forma mais directa. A produção de droga terá aumentado 40 vezes desde a eclosão da guerra, sem embargo da presença expressiva das forças internacionais. Não obstante, enquanto os camponeses afegãos auferem cerca de mil milhões de dólares com a produção, os talibãs e a al Qaeda deverão lucrar qualquer coisa como 4 mil milhões de dólares. Logo, a principal fonte de financiamento dos talibãs centra-se na droga.

A coligação pouco tem conseguido nesta área  enquanto a corrupção alastra a todos os níveis pelo pais e pelo vizinho Paquistão.   

A erradicação da droga através de herbicidas e a opção por culturas alternativas pode ser uma das soluções para apressar o fim da guerra e do narcoterrorismo, permitindo o regresso das forças estrangeiras aos seus países de origem, muito embora implique investimentos avultados em termos da implantação de novas culturas. Suscita algumas interrogações a actuação tardia de Washington  nesta matéria, porquanto os EUA são o principal pais consumidor de droga, quem mais sofre os respectivos efeitos  e, por outro lado, como se sabe, a primacial força combatente estrangeira no Afeganistão.

Por outro lado, o combate aos narcotraficantes pode revelar-se um importante elemento complementar neste combate, permitindo abreviar o esforço de guerra, quer militar, quer financeiro, mas não pode, porém, constituir o objectivo estratégico principal.

México e EUA - o problema do narco-tráfico -

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR". 

"Este relato é republicado com autorização da STRATFOR"

Mexico and the Failed State Revisited

April 6, 2010

By George Friedman

STRATFOR argued March 13, 2008, that Mexico was nearing the status of a failed state. A failed state is one in which the central government has lost control over significant areas of the country and the state is unable to function. In revisiting this issue, it seems to us that the Mexican government has lost control of the northern tier of Mexico to drug-smuggling organizations, which have significantly greater power in that region than government forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to assert its will against these organizations has weakened to the point that decisions made by the state against the cartels are not being implemented or are being implemented in a way that would guarantee failure.

Despite these facts, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Mexico is becoming a failed state. Instead, it appears the Mexican state has accommodated itself to the situation. Rather than failing, it has developed strategies designed both to ride out the storm and to maximize the benefits of that storm for Mexico.

First, while the Mexican government has lost control over matters having to do with drugs and with the borderlands of the United States, Mexico City’s control over other regions — and over areas other than drug enforcement — has not collapsed (though its lack of control over drugs could well extend to other areas eventually). Second, while drugs reshape Mexican institutions dramatically, they also, paradoxically, stabilize Mexico. We need to examine these crosscurrents to understand the status of Mexico.

Mexico’s Core Problem

Let’s begin by understanding the core problem. The United States consumes vast amounts of narcotics, which, while illegal there, make their way in abundance. Narcotics derive from low-cost agricultural products that become consumable with minimal processing. With its long, shared border with the United States, Mexico has become a major grower, processor and exporter of narcotics. Because the drugs are illegal and thus outside normal market processes, their price is determined by their illegality rather than by the cost of production. This means extraordinary profits can be made by moving narcotics from the Mexican side of the border to markets on the other side.

Whoever controls the supply chain from the fields to the processing facilities and, above all, across the border, will make enormous amounts of money. Various Mexican organizations — labeled cartels, although they do not truly function as such, since real cartels involve at least a degree of cooperation among producers, not open warfare — vie for this business. These are competing businesses, each with its own competing supply chain.

Typically, competition among businesses involves lowering prices and increasing quality. This would produce small, incremental shifts in profits on the whole while dramatically reducing prices. An increased market share would compensate for lower prices. Similarly, lawsuits are the normal solution to unfair competition. But neither is the case with regard to illegal goods.

The surest way to increase smuggling profits is not through market mechanisms but by taking over competitors’ supply chains. Given the profit margins involved, persons wanting to control drug supply chains would be irrational to buy, since the lower-cost solution would be to take control of these supply chains by force. Thus, each smuggling organization has an attached paramilitary organization designed to protect its own supply chain and to seize its competitors’ supply chains.

The result is ongoing warfare between competing organizations. Given the amount of money being made in delivering their product to American cities, these paramilitary organizations are well-armed, well-led and well-motivated. Membership in such paramilitary groups offers impoverished young men extraordinary opportunities for making money, far greater than would be available to them in legitimate activities.

The raging war in Mexico derives logically from the existence of markets for narcotics in the United States; the low cost of the materials and processes required to produce these products; and the extraordinarily favorable economics of moving narcotics across the border. This warfare is concentrated on the Mexican side of the border. But from the Mexican point of view, this warfare does not fundamentally threaten Mexico’s interests.

A Struggle Far From the Mexican Heartland

The heartland of Mexico is to the south, far from the country’s northern tier. The north is largely a sparsely populated highland desert region seen from Mexico City as an alien borderland intertwined with the United States as much as it is part of Mexico. Accordingly, the war raging there doesn’t represent a direct threat to the survival of the Mexican regime.

(click here to enlarge image)

Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40 billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant. Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports. Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80 percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion.

In estimating the impact of drug money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any conventional export. The drug trade’s tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted substantially.

On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion of such funds.

The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it out on the border; even their bosses couldn’t manage funds of that magnitude. And while money can be — and often is — baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions — banks and other financial entities — and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no different from the American Mafia’s practice during and after Prohibition.

The Drug War and Mexican National Interests

From Mexico’s point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it generates wealth and jobs.

For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the difficulty of ending the traffic anyway — and that many in the state security and military apparatus benefit from it — an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade.

Mexico’s policy is consistent: It makes every effort to appear to be stopping the drug trade so that it will not be accused of supporting it. The government does not object to disrupting one or more of the smuggling groups, so long as the aggregate inflow of cash does not materially decline. It demonstrates to the United States efforts (albeit inadequate) to tackle the trade, while pointing out very real problems with its military and security apparatus and with its officials in Mexico City. It simultaneously points to the United States as the cause of the problem, given Washington’s failure to control demand or to reduce prices by legalization. And if massive amounts of money pour into Mexico as a result of this U.S. failure, Mexico is not going to refuse it.

The problem with the Mexican military or police is not lack of training or equipment. It is not a lack of leadership. These may be problems, but they are only problems if they interfere with implementing Mexican national policy. The problem is that these forces are personally unmotivated to take the risks needed to be effective because they benefit more from being ineffective. This isn’t incompetence but a rational national policy.

Moreover, Mexico has deep historic grievances toward the United States dating back to the Mexican-American War. These have been exacerbated by U.S. immigration policy that the Mexicans see both as insulting and as a threat to their policy of exporting surplus labor north. There is thus no desire to solve the Americans’ problem. Certainly, there are individuals in the Mexican government who wish to stop the smuggling and the inflow of billions of dollars. They will try. But they will not succeed, as too much is at stake. One must ignore public statements and earnest private assurances and instead observe the facts on the ground to understand what’s really going on.

The U.S. Strategic Problem

And this leaves the United States with a strategic problem. There is some talk in Mexico City and Washington of the Americans becoming involved in suppression of the smuggling within Mexico (even though the cartels, to use that strange name, make certain not to engage in significant violence north of the border and mask it when they do to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexico). This is certainly something the Mexicans would be attracted to. But it is unclear that the Americans would be any more successful than the Mexicans. What is clear is that any U.S. intervention would turn Mexican drug traffickers into patriots fighting yet another Yankee incursion. Recall that Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, but he did help turn Villa into a national hero in Mexico.

The United States has a number of choices. It could accept the status quo. It could figure out how to reduce drug demand in the United States while keeping drugs illegal. It could legalize drugs, thereby driving their price down and ending the motivation for smuggling. And it could move into Mexico in a bid to impose its will against a government, banking system and police and military force that benefit from the drug trade.

The United States does not know how to reduce demand for drugs. The United States is not prepared to legalize drugs. This means the choice lies between the status quo and a complex and uncertain (to say the least) intervention. We suspect the United States will attempt some limited variety of the latter, while in effect following the current strategy and living with the problem.

Ultimately, Mexico is a failed state only if you accept the idea that its goal is to crush the smugglers. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea that all of Mexican society benefits from the inflow of billions of American dollars (even though it also pays a price), then the Mexican state has not failed — it is following a rational strategy to turn a national problem into a national benefit.

México - subsídios aos pequenos agricultores mexicanos vão para às mãos dos barões da droga e de burocratas governamentais  - Segundo o "Los Angeles Times" os subsídios estipulados no decurso das negociações do NAFTA (Tratado de Comércio Livre da América do Norte) para auxiliar os pequenos e médios agricultorers mexicanos, a fim de poderem competir com os seus vizinhos mais a Norte, designadamente nos EUA, estão a ser desviados para os cartéis da droga ou para altos responsáveis governamentais. 

Este esquema de corrpupção está a levar muitos agricultores à falência e, concomitantemente,  encoraja a plantação de culturas ilegais (cannabis, cocaína, etc.).

 Dos 1,3 mil milhões de dólares dados a 2,7 milhões de mexicanos, cerca de 80% desse dinheiro foi parar aos bolsos  de apenas 20% dos agricultores. É importante salientar que o México passou, em pouco tempo, de exportador para importador de produtos alimentares.